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INTRODUCTION
Ethical codes for mediators describe party self-determination as
"the fundamental principle of mediation,"1 regardless of the context
within which the mediation is occurring. But what exactly does
"party self-determination" mean? Does it mean the same thing now
in the context of court-connected mediation as it did when it inspired
many people to become involved in the "contemporary mediation
movement"2 that arose in the 1970s and early 1980s?3 Most impor-
tantly, if the meaning of this "fundamental" term is changing as me-
diation adapts to its home in the courthouse, does it matter?
4
Based on a review of the debate surrounding recently promul-
gated or revised ethical codes for court-connected mediators in Flor-
ida and Minnesota,5 this Article will demonstrate that the originally
1. See MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS § I (Joint Committee of
Delegates from American Arbitration Association, American Bar Association, and So-
ciety of Professionals in Dispute Resolution 1994); see also John Feerick, Toward Uni-
form Standards of Conduct for Mediators, 38 S. Tsx. L. Ruy. 455, 460 (1997)
(explaining that drafters of the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators believed
that self-determination is the fundamental principle of mediation); FL" R. FOR CEFM-
FIED AND COURT-APPOINTED MEDIATORS 10.310; MINN. R. OF CounT, STATE 114 app.
(2000); THE NEW UNrwom R. ON Dirp. RESOL., Massachusetts Continuing Legal Edu-
cation Inc. 1(b)(v) (stating the importance of party self-determination to the mediation
process); VA. R. OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 2.11 (2000).
2. See ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FoLGER, PROMISE OF MEDIATION 1
(1994). Bush and Folger coined the term "contemporary mediation movement," recog-
nizing that mediation had been used for many years before this time to resolve labor
disputes and that many of the early writings and proposals regarding mediation re-
lied upon this experience. It is also worth noting, however, that many of the princi-
ples and practices that had developed in the labor mediation context varied
considerably from those that arose in the context of the 1970s and early 1980s.
3. See id. at 1-2; see also JAY P. FOLBERG & ALISON TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A Com.
PREHENSIVE GUIDE TO RESOLVING DISPUTES WITHOUT LITIGATION 4-7 (1984).
4. Deborah Hensler recently argued for attention to be paid to the evolution or
"transmogrification" of ADR in the courts, explaining that ADR has "a catch to it-
this romantic ideology about empowering people and giving power to people to settle
their disputes .... I think we ought to challenge courts to make good on those
promises that are made to disputants, and I think that's becoming ever more critical
as courts order people to use these procedures on the claims that these procedures are
doing something better for them." Deborah Hensler, Address at "ADR 2000: Court-
Sponsored ADR Programs," Association of American Law Schools Centennial Annual
Meeting (Jan. 7, 2000).
5. See infra Part IV.
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dominant vision 6 of self-determination, which borrowed heavily from
concepts of party empowerment,7 is yielding to a different vision in
the court-connected context. Perhaps not surprisingly, this vision is
more consistent with the culture of the courts.
8
Believers in the originally dominant vision of self-determination
assumed that the disputing parties would be the principal actors and
creators within the mediation process. The parties would: 1) actively
and directly participate in the communication and negotiation that
occurs during mediation, 2) choose and control the substantive norms
to guide their decision-making, 3) create the options for settlement,
and 4) control the final decision regarding whether or not to settle.9
The mediator's role was to enable the parties' will to emerge and thus
support their exercise of self-determination. 10 Many mediation advo-
cates continue to adhere to this vision. 1
However, as mediation has been institutionalized in the courts
and as evaluation has become an acknowledged and accepted part of
the mediator's function,12 the original vision of self-determination is
giving way to a vision in which the disputing parties play a less cen-
tral role. The parties are still responsible for making the final deci-
sion regarding settlement, but they are cast in the role of consumers,
largely limited to selecting from among the settlement options devel-
oped by their attorneys. Indeed, it is the parties' attorneys, often
aided by mediators who are also attorneys, who assume responsibil-
ity for actively and directly participating in the mediation process,
invoking the substantive (i.e., legal) norms to be applied and creating
6. It would be unreasonable to suggest that there was only one vision of self-
determination that inspired every person who became involved in the contemporary
mediation movement or that this vision was consistently and/or fully realized in be-
lievers' mediation practice. Nonetheless, many of the writings and proposals from the
time do suggest at least a dominant rhetoric embraced by those involved in the con-
temporary mediation movement. See infra Part II.A.
7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part II.
10. In PROMISE OF MEDIATION, supra note 2, at 15-32, Bush and Folger describe
four different accounts of the contemporary mediation movement, each with a differ-
ent view of the societal goal the mediation movement should seek to achieve. Most
attention has focused on two of these stories-the "Satisfaction Story" and the "Trans-
formation Story." Bush and Folger describe the mediators' approaches in these two
stories as quite different, but both of these accounts share a commitment to party self-
determination. Despite the differences between these accounts, both place impor-
tance on the parties' control of the decision whether and how to resolve a dispute and
parties' self-definition of the criteria to be used to fashion a resolution.
" 11. See infra Part IV.A.
12. See infra Part III.
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settlement options. 13 Thus, even as most mediators and many courts
continue to name party self-determination as the "fundamental prin-
ciple" underlying court-connected mediation, the party-centered em-
powerment concepts that anchored the original vision of self-
determination are being replaced with concepts that are more reflec-
tive of the norms and traditional practices of lawyers and judges, as
well as the courts' strong orientation to efficiency and closure of cases
through settlement.
It can be argued that this thinning of the vision of self-determi-
nation does not matter. After all, even in its reduced form, self-deter-
mination still promises that the mediator will respect, support, and
protect the parties' control over the final decision regarding settle-
ment. Unfortunately, however, a disconnect is surfacing between
even this more limited promise and the reality of court-connected
mediation.
It is quite clear that court-connected mediators are providing
evaluations of the parties' positions (e.g., estimates of the strengths
and weaknesses of the parties' cases, suggestions regarding settle-
ment options, etc.).14 When offered in the context of a party-centered,
facilitative mediation, evaluation can serve a useful educational func-
tion and can aid party self-determination by assisting the parties in
making informed decisions.' 5 There is growing evidence, however,
that at least some court-connected mediators are engaging in very
aggressive evaluations of parties' cases and settlement options (i.e.,
"muscle mediation")' 6 with the goal of winning a settlement, rather
than supporting parties in their exercise of self-determination. As
mediation has become increasingly institutionalized in the courts, a
small but growing number of disputants have approached courts and
ethical boards, claiming that mediators' aggressive evaluation or ad-
vocacy for particular settlements actually coerced them into a
settlement.' 7
13. See infra Part I.
14. See infra Part I.
15. See infra Part I.
16. FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 135.
17. See infra Part I. Professor Menkel-Meadow concisely described the impor-
tance and difficulty of this issue when she wrote, "[O]ne of the most troubling of our
ethical dilemmas in ADR [is determining]-when is a solution suggested ... by a
third party neutral too coercive on the parties[.]" Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in
Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No Answers from the Adversary Concep-
tion of Lawyers' Responsibilities, 38 S. Tfx. L. REv. 407, 411 (1997) thereinafter
Menkel-Meadow, Ethics] (emphasis added); see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose
Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement tin
Some Cases), 83 GEO. L. J. 2663, 2693-94 (1995) (arguing that if settlements are not
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In response to this challenge to party self-determination, ethical
boards in some states have established mechanisms intended to keep
evaluative mediation in check. Specifically, Florida and Minnesota,
while permitting mediator evaluation in their ethical guidelines,' 8
have incorporated safeguards that pronounce party self-determina-
tion as the paramount goal of mediators and clearly prohibit coercion
by the mediator. 19
These mechanisms are unlikely to be effective in taming media-
tor evaluation and in protecting even the narrowed vision of party
self-determination. Despite the aspirational language and the good
intentions underlying Florida's and Minnesota's ethical guidelines,
the narrowed vision of party self-determination that is now institu-
tionalized in these guidelines will be understood as no different than
the free will which is to be exercised by parties involved in judicially-
hosted settlement conferences. In that context, when parties have
alleged that the judge or magistrate presiding over their settlement
conference coerced them into reaching a settlement agreement by
evaluating the parties' cases or urging a particular settlement, the
courts have generally refused to find coercion unless the judge or
magistrate engaged in outright threats or issued sanctions. Indeed,
one court has written, "We do not agree that a judge should refrain
from offering his or her assessment of a case on the eve of trial, solely
to avoid the appearance of impropriety. Such a policy would effec-
tively render meaningless a judge's role in the settlement process."
20 It
is unlikely that the courts or ethical boards responsible for interpret-
ing and enforcing mediators' ethical guidelines will judge aggressive
evaluation as coercive just because it occurred within the context of a
mediation rather than in a judicially-hosted settlement conference,
especially if the vision of party self-determination in mediation is no
longer anchored in the concept of party empowerment.
This Article examines possible means to protect parties' self-de-
termination in mediation 2' and advocates for a particular solution.
Specifically, the proposal suggests modifying the current presump-
tions regarding the finality of mediated settlement agreements and
urges the adoption of a three-day, non-waivable cooling-off period
truly consensual, they must be questioned because one of the important values that
justify enforcing settlements is absent).
18. See infra Part IV.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. Associates Fin. Serv. Co. of Haw. v. Mijo, 950 P.2d 1219, 1230 (Haw. 1998)
(emphasis added); see also infra Part V.C (examining the Mijo case).
21. See infra Part VI.
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before mediated settlement agreements may become enforceable. 2
This modification would permit the continued use of evaluative tech-
niques as a means to educate parties and inform their decision-mak-
ing while rewarding the use of techniques (often facilitative) that
increase parties' commitment to their settlement. The more commit-
ted parties are to their settlement, the less likely it is that they will
withdraw from the settlement during the cooling-off period. Ulti-
mately, this proposal has the potential to keep "muscle mediation" in
check while also allowing the return to a vision of self-determination
which is closer to that which first dominated (and inspired) the con-
temporary mediation movement.
This Article begins with a description of a 1998 court-connected
mediation in which the parties alleged mediator coercion. This case
demonstrates both the reality and the potential consequences of the
thinning vision of party self-determination in court-connected media-
tion. Part II discusses the vision of self-determination that domi-
nated the original mediation movement and inspired the broad
facilitative approach to mediation. Part DI traces the adaptation of
the mediation process to the culture of the courts,2 3 with particular
attention given to the facilitative-evaluative debate because it clearly
reveals the differing conceptions of self-determination. The focus of
Part IV is on the background, process, debate, and final language of
Florida's and Minnesota's ethical guidelines for court-connected
mediators regarding the propriety of evaluation and the protection of
self-determination. Part V reviews the courts' handling of allegations
of coercion by judges and magistrates presiding over settlement con-
ferences in order to explain why Florida's and Minnesota's provisions
will not be adequate to safeguard party self-determination or to pro-
tect parties from coercive evaluation by mediators. Finally, Part VI
discusses various means to protect party self-determination and pre-
vent coercion in mediation, with particular focus on a proposal for a
non-waivable cooling-off period.
I. ILLUSTRATING THE REALITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF A THINNING
VISION OF SELF-DETERMINATION
Self-determination in mediation has deep significance for the
parties who participate in the process because the meaning and im-
plementation of self-determination almost certainly affects parties'
22. See infra Part VI.E.
23. This Article will focus primarily on the use and model of mediation employed
to resolve personal injury, contract, employment, and other non-family law civil
actions.
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judgments regarding the procedural justice furnished by the media-
tion process,2 4 as well as their level of commitment to the settlement
they reach in mediation. 25 The vision of self-determination that in-
spired the contemporary mediation movement placed the disputants
themselves at the center of the mediation process. They were the
principal actors and creators within the process. It was assumed that
the parties would actively and directly participate in the communica-
tion and negotiation that occurs during mediation, would choose and
control the substantive norms to guide their decision-making, would
create the options for settlement of their dispute, and ultimately
would control the final decision regarding whether or not to settle
their dispute in mediation. This vision of party self-determination
assumed that, at the conclusion of a mediation, the parties would feel
that the agreement they reached was their own. This vision did not
anticipate that the parties would feel that they had been forced to
agree to accept or offer a settlement which reflected a third party's
norms, experience, or will.
24. See E. ALLAN LIND, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, DISPUTING, AND REACTIONS TO LE-
GAL AUTHORITIES 2-5 (Am. B. Found. Working Paper No. 9403, 1994) (noting that high
levels of party control over the presentation of evidence and arguments [termed "dis-
putant voice"] and parties' feeling that they have been treated in a "dignified and
polite fashion" correlate highly with their procedural justice judgments); see also Ste-
phen Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settlement in an Adversary System, 44 HASTINGS
L.J. 1, 43-44 (1992) (noting that "dialogic negotiation" has the potential to make the
adversarial system more fair); Robert A. Baruch Bush, "What Do We Need a Mediator
For?". Mediation's "Value-Added" for Negotiators, 12 O1io ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 1,
18-21 (1996) (reporting that procedural justice studies have found that parties usually
prefer consensual processes, regardless of the outcome, because they value the oppor-
tunity to participate in the process and the ability to express their own views); Craig
McEwen et al., Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant Approaches to Ensur-
ing Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L. REv. 1317, 1384 (1995) ("A central
conclusion from the research about procedural justice is that people value highly the
opportunity to voice their grievances and to be heard in a dignified setting").
Carrie Menkel-Meadow has observed that judges' roles in settlement conferences
and the particular tactics they employ vary depending upon whether they conceive of
the "facilitation of procedural justice" as their overriding goal or favor other compet-
ing goals, such as "efficient case management," "facilitation of substantive justice," or
'simple brokering of what would occur anyway in bilateral negotiations." See Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Set-
tlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REv. 485, 506-7 (1985). Similarly, the role of the
mediator in court-connected mediation will depend upon which of these goals is
deemed most fundamental to the mediation process.
25. See LIND, supra note 24, at 1 (surveying research which has shown that
whether or not a party perceives that the judicial system is just affects their obedi-
ence to laws and judgments as to the legitimacy of legal authority); see also Bundy,
supra note 24, at 50 (expressing doubts that settlement will increase compliance un-
less agreements accurately reflect the party's interests or improve provision of
justice).
The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?
Yet, increasingly, parties involved in court-connected mediation
are bringing complaints to courts and ethical boards, alleging that
mediators' conduct or statements had the effect of supplanting the
parties' will and their central role in the mediation process. 26 The
following case, which was mediated in Texas in 1998, raises serious
questions about whether the concept of party self-determination,
even in its narrowed form, is truly as fundamental to court-connected
mediation practice as our ethical codes of conduct suggest.
A. The Mediation of Allen v. Leal
27
In July, 1995, a Bellaire, Texas, police officer shot and killed
Noel and Rebecca Allen's 17-year-old son.28 Alleging an intentional
deprivation of their son's constitutional rights, the Allens brought
26. In Randle v. Mid Gulf, Inc., No. 14-95-01292, 1996 WL 447954, at '1 (Tex.
App. Aug. 8, 1996), an action to enforce a mediated settlement agreement, the defen-
dant asserted the defense of duress, claiming that the mediator refused to grant his
request to leave the mediation session despite chest pains and a history of heart
trouble. The appellate court reversed the granting of summary judgment for plaintiff
and remanded for trial on the merits.
In a Complaint to the Office of the Executive Secretary of the Supreme Court of
Virginia (Nov. 3, 1996) (on file with author), a complainant alleged that "the mediator
assumed the role as a judge meeting privately with the attorneys" and then repeat-
edily said, in a threatening and manipulative manner, that "if you don't accept my
offer to you then rl have to[.]" The complainant failed to pursue a grievance. Id.
A number of complaints have also been reported to the Florida Mediator Qualifi-
cations Board. In Florida Mediator Qualifications Board Case No. [hereinafter Flor-
ida MQB] 98-009 (1998) (summary on file with author), the complainant in a family
case alleged that the mediator was abusive and attempted to intimidate the parties
into accepting his preferred solution. Id A consent agreement was entered into and
the grievance was dismissed for lack of probable cause.
In Florida MQB 96-001 (1996) (summary on file with author), the complainant
alleged that the mediator coerced him into agreement and destroyed neutrality by
giving his own opinion regarding reconciliation. Id. The Complaint Committee deter-
mined that there was probable cause that the mediator demonstrated bias against the
complainant and exhibited a lack of impartiality but decided not to pursue the case
because it concluded the "violation committed by the mediator was of a minor nature
and did not significantly prejudice the interests of the complainant." Id. The Com-
mittee recommended that the mediator complete a course dealing with mediator eth-
ics and sensitivity training. Id.
See also other allegations of coercion, infra note 153.
27. 27 F. Supp. 2d 945 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
28. On the night of July 15, 1995, Travis Allen attended a party with friends in
Bellaire, Texas. Sometime between 1:00 and 1:30 in the morning, Travis and a friend
left the party and began walking home. Travis, under the effects of LSD, abruptly ran
away from his friend and entered a nearby home by leaping through a large plate
glass window. Travis sustained serious injuries. The homeowners placed a 911 call,
to which three police officers responded. The officers ordered Travis to get down on
the ground. After he was on the ground, one of the officers returned to the police car
and another one stood on Travis' back in order to restrain him. Officer Michael Leal
Spring 20011
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suit against the City and the three police officers who were in-
volved.29 After two and a half years of litigation, the attorney for the
defendants 30 suggested that the dispute be submitted to mediation.3 1
The Allens agreed to attempt the process and to use the mediator
suggested by defendants' counsel.32
The Allens attended the mediation with their attorney on Satur-
day, July 25, 1998. 33 The mediation began at 10:30 a.m. and ended
at about 6:45 p.m., after Rebecca Allen and then Noel Allen reluc-
tantly agreed to a settlement.34 At approximately 11:00 p.m. that
night, the Allens called their attorney3 5 and told him that they
wished to withdraw their consent to the agreement. 36 On Monday,
July 27, 1998, defendants' counsel received a letter from plaintiffs'
counsel expressing the Allens' wishes.37
By August 5, 1998, at a settlement conference held that day,38 it
appeared that the Allens had reconsidered and decided that they
would be willing to proceed with a modified agreement.3 9 The par-
ties' attorneys and the judge discussed the settlement and possible
modifications. 40 Then, the Allens' attorney said, "Judge, there is one
other matter."41 With the judge's permission, Mrs. Allen addressed
the court regarding her perceptions of the mediation and her reasons
for expressing her desire to withdraw her consent from the agree-
ment that had been reached on July 25, 1998:
shot Travis twice in the back at this time, later claiming that Travis was acting irra-
tionally and was not complying with the officers' instructions. See Defendants' Re-
sponse in Opposition to the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 5-6, Leal v.
Allen, No. 98-53281 (Tex. Dist. Ct., Harris County, Tex., Feb. 8, 1999).
29. See Allen, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 945.
30. One of the original defendants had been dismissed from the case. See id. at
946.
31. See Defendants' Response in Opposition to the Plaintiffs' Motion for Sum-




34. See id. at 7-8.
35. See Defendants' Response in Opposition to the Plaintiffs' Motion for Sum-




38. See Transcript of Proceedings Before The Honorable David Hittner, Settle-
ment Hearing, August 5, 1998, Allen v. Leal, 27 F. Supp. 2d 945 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (No.
H-96-CV-30).
39. See id. at 3.
40. See id. at 3-14.
41. Id. at 14.
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MRS. REBECCA O'NEILL ALLEN: You characterized the me-
diator as excellent, and that would not exactly be my characteri-
zation. We settled this case out of fear, fear of leaving ourselves
exposed financially. It's just that I did not know-my husband
and I did not know going into mediation that fear would be a
part of our decision-making process, and I understand-and I
cannot talk about the mediation process because that is confi-
dential, but we didn't want our family destroyed anymore. We
didn't want any more insults.
THE COURT: Was that what you were told in mediation?
MRS. REBECCA O'NEILL ALLEN: Yes ....
THE COURT: [Apparently, you're saying you have some con-
cern about the mediator in this case. Is that right?
MRS. REBECCA O'NEILL ALLEN: Yes, sir ....
THE COURT: Do you think he was leaning one way or the
other?
MRS. REBECCA O'NEILL ALLEN: Absolutely.
THE COURT: To settle the case?
MRS. REBECCA O'NEILL ALLEN: To settle the case and to
diminish and demoralize it, at least, this is the way I felt. It was
only my perception.
42
By the end of this hearing, the court had determined that the Allens
needed to "think about" whether they wished to settle their case or
not.43 He rescheduled the settlement conference for later in the
week, saying:
I want you to come in here without the concept of settling be-
cause you're afraid or-not afraid but you have fear but that you
think it's the right thing to do, the correct thing to do, for you
and your family and it's a decision you can live with because I
don't see that right now. It's going to eat at you for a long time.
So you need to think. Talk to your attorney, talk to anyone else
or just talk to-or just get together with the family or just sit
and make your own decision; but I don't want you to be eaten,
you know, from the inside out for the rest of your life that you
walked away from something like this concerning the death of a
child.44
At this point, the trial judge appeared to be very concerned with
party self-determination. He wanted to be sure that the parties felt
42. Id. at 14-15, 23-24.
43. Id. at 29.
44. Transcript of Proceedings Before The Honorable David Hittner, Settlement
Hearing at 29-30, August 5, 1998, Allen v. Leal, 27 F. Supp. 2d 945 (S.D. Tex. 1998)
(No. H-96-CV-30).
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that this was their settlement and that it reflected their substantive
norms.
At the second settlement conference, the Allens' attorney an-
nounced that his clients had decided that they wished to rescind the
settlement agreement and proceed to trial. As part of the ensuing
discussion of the enforceability of the written settlement agreement
which had arisen out of the mediation, the Allens' attorney described
the final hours of the July 25, 1998 session:
[Elverything he [the mediator] said to them was, "Your family is
going to be destroyed in this case. You got zero-and if he said
it once, he must have said it 40 times-"you got zero chance of
success on this and your family is just going to be destroyed"-
and he really harped on that. [When the mediator returned with
an offer that was $10,000 less than the Allens' demand] [hie
said, "This is a take it or leave it. You got the 90 and that's it.
And you better do this because you got zero chance of success
and this will destroy your family." Mr. and Mrs. Allen were very
distressed; but ultimately said-they authorized me to tell him
yes. I went out. I told him how they felt, that they hated it but
they would agree. [When the Allens' attorney returned with a
written agreement,] they were standing up saying, "We thought
about it and we just can't do this." They said, 'This is bad. This
is wrong. We can't do this." That was just before 5:00 o'clock in
the afternoon; and [the mediator] sat there and harangued them
for an hour and half .... [H]e just beat up on them vigorously
for that hour and half. Finally, they signed it; and you could see
that Mr. Allen was-when he tells you that he felt shamed, it
was visible. That's what transpired. 45
Before turning to the court's reaction to and analysis of the Al-
lens' claim of coercion, it is worth pausing to consider whether the
Allens' self-determination was the fundamental principle underlying
45. Transcript of Proceedings Before the Honorable David Hittner, Settlement
Hearing at 36-38, August 7, 1998, Allen v. Leal, 27 F. Supp. 2d 945 (S.D. Tex. 1998)
(No. H-96-CV-30). At a later settlement hearing held before the court on August 13,
1998, the mediator testified: "Well, the value of each case, the risk associated with
each case is driven by the ability to distinguish the facts and then apply the law; and I
said, 'Guys, based on my experience, based on the facts as I understand it, based on
the law as I understand it, I think the risk of winning this case ultimately is very slim'
... There has not been a case that I know about that the 5th Circuit has affirmed
under these types of facts where there's been a shooting where they have held for the
Plaintiff. And what I discussed for the entire day in the presence of [the Allens' attor-
ney] was the risk to this family .... And as a mediator, I'm obligated to point out to
both sides the risk associated with litigation; and I think that I have the experience
and the ability to do it correctly, Your Honor." Transcript of Proceedings Before the
Honorable David Hittner, Settlement Hearing at 14-15, August 13, 1998, Allen v.
Leal, 27 F. Supp. 2d 945 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (No. H-96-CV-30).
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this mediation. There is no question that the Allens uttered words on
Saturday evening in which they agreed to the defendants' settlement
proposal. However, the circumstances under which they agreed cer-
tainly would not be used to illustrate mediator respect for and protec-
tion of party self-determination. Of course, the question confronting
the court was whether to enforce the settlement agreement that
arose out of these circumstances.
B. The Court's Reaction to Allen v. Leal
The federal district court never reached the question of whether
to enforce the settlement agreement in Allen v. Leal because it issued
an order declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
breach of contract counterclaim brought by the defendants.46 The
opinion accompanying the court's November 1998 order is nonethe-
less instructive. The court began by criticizing the recent statement
of a prominent Texas mediator 47 that "[wihat some people might con-
sider a little bullying is really just part of how mediation works."' s
The court continued by pointing out that Texas' standards governing
the conduct of mediators provide that a "person appointed to facili-
tate an alternative dispute resolution procedure under this sub-
chapter shall encourage and assist the parties in reaching a
settlement of their dispute but may not compel or coerce the parties to
enter into a settlement agreement."49 The court then concluded that
"[cloercion or 'bullying' clearly is not acceptable conduct for a media-
tor in order to secure a settlement." °
46. The defendants brought an action in state court to enforce the settlement
agreement. See Plaintiffs' Original Petition, Leal v. Allen, No. 98-53281 (Tex. Dist.
Ct., Harris County, Tex., Nov. 10, 1998). On February 22, 1999, the court granted
summary judgment for the defendants, finding that the parties had entered into an
enforceable contract. See Order Partially Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment, Leal v. Allen, No. 98-53281 (Tex. Dist. Ct., Harris County, Tex., Jan. 4,
1999). However, the Allens did not raise their allegations of coercion either in their
answer in the state court action or in their opposition to defendants' summary judg-
ment motion. See Defendants' Response in Opposition to the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment, Leal v. Allen, No. 98-53281 (Tem. Dist. Ct, Harris County, Tex.,
Feb. 8, 1999). Instead, they relied on other grounds. See id.
47. The mediator was John Lee Arellano, the president of the Houston chapter of
the Association of Attorney-Mediators. See Allen, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 947.
48. Id. (quoting Charlotte Aguilar, No Decision in Allen Case, 14 SOUTHWEST
NEws, Oct. 6, 1998, at 1, 22).
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Based on this language and the court's comments during the Au-
gust 5, 1998 hearing, it might appear that this court was very con-
cerned about party self-determination in mediation. However, the
court saved its strongest language for the Allens and their attorney:
The court is gravely concerned with the plaintiffs' frontal attack
on the mediation process itself. The mediation process has been
responsible for the resolution of countless cases in this district,
thereby avoiding the necessity for expensive adversary proceed-
ings, including jury and non-jury trials. A significant amount of
time and energy has been expended by the court and the parties
in this case as a result of the plaintiffs' actions. The conduct of
the plaintiffs and their attorneys in attempting to upset a settle-
ment of this case appears to constitute an abuse, even if unin-
tentional, of the federal trial process. Considering the enormity
of the loss of a child, the court is perplexed that the Allens would
have agreed to settle this case (even assuming arguendo that
the mediator exerted pressure on the plaintiffs to settle the
case) without being certain that such a settlement was appro-
priate. The court is even more concerned that counsel for the
Allens failed to advise his clients of the seriousness and finality
of signing a settlement agreement if they had any reservations
whatsoever. Moreover, the court has not been advised of any
actions taken by counsel for the Allens to protect them against
any untoward pressure allegedly exerted by the mediator or the
defendants.
51
The court's reaction is striking. First, it illustrates the clash be-
tween the original vision of the "fundamental" principle of party self-
determination and the goal of settlement, which is fundamental to
the judicial system's enthusiasm for mediation. Second, the court's
ultimate reaction raises questions about whether a party's interest in
protecting his or her self-determination in the mediation process by
avoiding very aggressive evaluation will ever prevail if it conflicts
51. Id. at 949. The court's concern about the role of counsel in this case is under-
standable. Unfortunately, a discussion of the appropriate role of the legal advocate in
mediation is beyond the scope of this Article. However, it is worth noting the follow-
ing: first, attorneys often are just as committed to settlement as judges, and attorneys
are likely to expect that a mediation will be run in much the same way as a judicial
settlement conference. Thus, attorneys may choose not to protect their clients from
aggressive evaluation in mediation if they believe settlement is more likely to result.
Second, it is unclear whether a client who had been coerced into a settlement would
have any real remedy if the court enforced the settlement agreement and left the
client to pursue a legal malpractice claim against his/her attorney due to the difficulty
proving damages. Third, given the original vision of the mediator's role as one who
supports and nurtures party self-determination, it is ironic and sad that mediation is
now conceived as a process in which the parties require protection from mediators.
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with the court's interest in using mediation to close cases. Finally,
this case and the court's reaction suggest that the judge (and perhaps
the mediator) did not recognize that mediation is somehow different
from a traditional judicial settlement conference and that the differ-
ence relates to the underlying principle of party self-determination.
With Allen v. Leal providing a very real backdrop, Part H will
turn to the meaning of party self-determination and how that mean-
ing is evolving. It will focus on the conception of self-determination
that inspired the "contemporary mediation movement."
II. THE CONTEMPORARY MEDIATION MOVEMENT AND THE QUEST
FOR SELF-DETERMINATION
A. The Original Vision of Self-Determination
The discontent and idealism of the 1960s and early 1970s fueled
the "contemporary mediation movement."52 Much of the support for
mediation was rooted in dissatisfaction with the legal system's per-
ceived mistreatment of disputants.53 Commentators argued that the
legal system mistreated litigants by depriving them of control over
the resolution of their disputes. Mediation proponents pointed out
that, even before trial, the litigation process took "[miuch of the deci-
sion making out of the hands of the clients, as the attorneys en-
gage[d] in battle within the legal system."54 Because the civil
52. The 1960s were "characterized by strife, conflict, and discontent on many
fronts." Jay Folberg, A Mediation Overview: History and Dimensions of Practice, 1
MEDIATION Q. 3, 5-6 (1983). Interest began to develop in alternative dispute resolu-
tion at that time, with experimentation occurring in the 1970s. By 1978, the Lau
Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) in the Department of Justice had
provided demonstration grants to establish community mediation and neighborhood
justice projects in several cities. The mediation process developed strong supporters
in these communities. See generally James Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing It
Out: Is This the End of 'Good Mediation"?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 47, 50-59 (1991)
(describing the evolution of Florida's court-connected mediation programs); Barbara
McAdoo, The Minnesota ADR Experience: Exploration to Institutionalization, 12 HAMt-
LINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 65 (1991) (describing the evolution of mediation in Minne-
sota); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of
Innovation Co-Opted or "The Law ofADR," 19 FLA. ST. U. L. lxv. 1, 6-9 (1991) (pro-
viding a chronological overview of the evolution of ADR from the 1960s through the
1980s); Harry M. Webne-Behrman, The Emergence of Ethical Codes and Standards of
Practice in Mediation: The Current State of Affairs, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 1289.
53. See Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, Mapping Mediation: The Rishs of
Riskin's Grid, 3 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 71, 88-89 (1998) [hereinafter Kovach & Love,
Mapping Mediation].
54. McEwen et al., supra note 24, at 1324 n.22 (citing Joiu M. HAmES, DIocE
MEDIATION 3 (1981)); see Frank E. Sander et al., Judicial (Mis)use of ADR?:A Debate,
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litigation system forced disputants to delegate their disputes "to law-
yers for expression and [to] judges for decision,"55 some commenta-
tors argued that disputants inevitably felt excluded from the
resolution of their disputes in the courts, regardless of whether that
resolution occurred at trial or through settlement.
Commentators "urged that dispute resolution should more fully
involve the participants in disputes."56 In sharp contrast to the tradi-
tional litigation process, then, mediation was conceived as a dispu-
tant-centered, disputant-dominated process. 57 It relied on the
parties' active and direct participation in the process and in decision-
making.58 Thus, mediation offered citizens a means to wrest control
over both the dispute resolution process and the dispute resolution
outcome from judges and lawyers. 59 It could even be argued that by
providing disputants with a process in which they participated di-
rectly and controlled the expression of their perceptions and con-
cerns, mediation offered a means to import procedural justice into the
often-invisible yet ubiquitous settlement process. 60 Ultimately, advo-
cates argued that mediation offered the potential to enhance parties'
"self-determination."6'
27 U. TOL. L. REV. 885, 893 (1996) (describing research that found that because ordi-
nary lay litigants were unable to participate, they perceived their attorneys' negotia-
tions and judicial settlement conferences to be less procedurally fair than arbitration
or trial).
55. NANCY ROGERS & CRAIG McEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE
§ 5.02 n.10 (2d ed. 1994); see FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 10-11 (supporting
the proposition that the adversarial process denies parties control over their
situation).
56. FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 3 at 6.
57. See Folberg, supra note 52, at 8.
58. See, e.g., FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 3, at xiii ("Those involved in media-
tion are not simply recipients of a service; they are actively involved in the process as
participants.").
59. For example, "[plarticipation in the resolution of their own disputes can give
clients a sense of control over their own lives in contrast to the feeling of being victims
of legal process they do not understand," ROGERS & McEWEN, supra note 55, at §5:02
n.10 (citing Rifkin & Sawyer, Alternative Dispute Resolution-From A Legal Services
Perspective, NLADA BRIEFCASE, Fall 1982, at 20, 22).
60. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
61. FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 34-35. The "basic assumption" of media-
tion is described as: "Equity and joint interests are best served through cooperative
techniques of conflict resolution and guided negotiation resulting in the maximum
degree of individualization and self-determination." Id. at 34. See also Bush, supra
note 24, at 27-28 (attributing improvement in negotiation processes to increased party
participation and decision control, or party self-determination); Jamie Henikoff &
Michael Moffitt, Remodeling the Standards of Conduct for Mediators, 2 HARv. NEGOT.
L. REV. 87, 102 n.63 (1997) (noting that the principle of self-determinations requires
that the parties be able to take mutual responsibility for developing the terms of their
own agreement).
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Mediation advocates also rejected the notion that the law should
serve as the exclusive source of the substantive norms controlling dis-
cussion and decision-making in the dispute resolution process. 62 In-
stead, these advocates argued that the disputants could and should
define fairness for themselves.6 3 Control of the substantive norms to
be applied to the discussion and in decision-making was part of the
originally dominant vision of self-determination. 64 Thus, many medi-
ation advocates envisioned party self-determination as involving
more than just the disputants' passive ability to respond to the par-
ticular settlement proposal put before them. Rather, self-determina-
tion in mediation involved party empowerment that "restor[ed] to
individuals... a sense of their own value and strength and own ca-
pacity to handle life's problems."65 It promised disputants the oppor-
tunity to participate actively and directly in the process of resolving
their dispute, control the substantive norms guiding their discussion
and decision-making, create the options for settlement, and control
62. See William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Dis-
putes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming..., 15 L. & Soc'y REv. 631, 643 (1980-81) (argu-
ing that judicial norms make parties' needs irrelevant); Andrew W. McThenia &
Thomas Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L. J. 1660, 1664-65 t1985) (positing that
the ADR movement rests on non-legal values and that "justice... is something people
give to one another"); see also John Lande, Getting the Faith: Why Business Lauyers
and Executives Believe in Mediation, 5 HA v. NEOT. L. REv. 137, 148-50120001 (sug-
gesting that the growth of ADR has been supported by the evolution of a "process
pluralist' ideology"); McEwen et al., supra note 24, at 1327 (noting that the legal sys-
tem fashions decisions that do not relate to the parties' interests); Menkel-Meadow,
Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?, supra note 17, at 2673-76 (asserting that negotiated
settlements can be more democratic and just than adjudicated results). But see David
Trubek, Turning Away from Law?, 82 MICH. L. Rlv. 824,825 (1984) (criticizing medi-
ation as being a form of "informal justice [that] seems to be the negation of the idea of
the rule of law).
63. FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 8, 10 (noting that parties involved in
mediation have the freedom to tailor their settlement to their personal values and
norms because the process does not operate under the constraints of legal precedent);
see also Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 53, at 89 (stating that resolu-
tion in mediation reflects the parties' definition of fairness).
64. With mediation conceived in this way, it made great sense that the law would
be viewed as at least irrelevant and potentially antithetical to parties' self-determina-
tion. Similar concerns have inspired various ethnic and religious groups to create
their own alternative dispute resolution systems. Folberg, supra note 52, at 3, 5; se
Menkel-Meadow, Ethics, supra note 17, at 416 (noting that courts' rigid rules and
limited remedies created need for more fle)xible and party-sensitive processes like
mediation).
65. BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 2, at 2. In describing the potential of mediation
to transform people, the authors describe empowerment as "realizing and strengthen-
ing one's inherent human capacity for dealing with difficulties of all kdnds by engag-
ing in conscious and deliberate reflection, choice and action," id. at 81, and "when
disputing parties experience a strengthened awareness of their own self-worth and
ability to deal with whatever difficulties they face." Id. at 84.
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the final outcome of the dispute resolution process. Self-determina-
tion in mediation was founded upon principles of party
empowerment.
66
B. Manifesting the Original Vision of Self-Determination
The mediation model which was developed by many community
mediation programs at this time manifested this empowerment-ori-
ented vision of self-determination. 67 Specifically:
1. Mediation was voluntary. Mediation advocates argued that
people should participate in mediation only if they chose to
do so.
6 8
2. Mediation required that each party become "an active part of
the communication."69 Consistent with this participatory
conception of self-determination, the mediator was to make
66. See FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 8 (urging that mediation is a "self-
empowering process"); see also Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dan-
gers for Women, 100 YALE L. J. 1545, 1581 (1991) (describing self-determination as
empowering); Sally Merry, Albie M. Davis: Community Mediation as Community Or-
ganizing, in WHEN TALK WORKS: PROFILES OF MEDIATORS 244, 254 (Deborah M. Kolb
& Assoc. eds. 1994) (describing the importance of empowerment to Albie Davis' medi-
ation program); Leonard Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies,
and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 7, 29, 45 (1996)
[hereinafter Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations] (observing that facilita-
tive mediators empower parties, giving the parties an enhanced feeling of participa-
tion, control, and understanding).
67. It appears that regardless of whether these programs adopted a "problem-
solving" approach or a "transformational" approach, they were committed to "empow-
ering" the parties through the parties' active and direct participation and through the
development of resolutions responding directly to the parties' self-identified interests,
needs, and norms. See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 2.
68. See, e.g., JENNIFER BEER ET AL., PEACEMAKING IN YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD: MEDI-
ATOR'S HANDBOOK 19 (1982) (emphasizing the party's choice to participate in media-
tion); Grillo, supra note 66, at 1581 (musing that mandatory mediation destroys the
benefits brought by allowing parties to make their own decisions); Raymond
Shonholtz, Neighborhood Justice Systems: Work, Structure, and Guiding Principles, 5
MEDIATION Q. 3, 22-23 (1984) (contrasting the effects of "coerced participation" in the
civil justice system with benefits of voluntary participation in community boards'
model of mediation); see also Lucy Katz, Compulsory Alternative Dispute Resolution
and Voluntarism: Two-Headed Monster or Two Sides of the Coin?, 1993 J. Disp.
RESOL. 1, 5 (noting that "the growth in compulsory ADR may have destroyed part of
its original value as an informal, consensual alternative"); SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONALS
IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION [hereinafter SPIDRI, MANDATED PARTICIPATION AND SETTLE-
MENT COERCION: DISPUTE RESOLUTION As IT RELATES TO THE COURTS 13-14 (1991) (ob-
serving that mandated participation in mediation can lead to "short, rigid sessions
[that] may result in lower party involvement, poor resolution, and thus lower volun-
tary compliance with the resolution").
69. FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 41; see also BEER ET AL., supra note 68,
at 2, 18 (establishing empowerment as the first guideline for mediation).
The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?
sure that each party had a chance to speak, that no one domi-
nated the session, that the disputants heard each other's per-
ceptions, and that positions were translated into interests
and "positive need statements."
7 0
3. The mediator's role was to "validate[ I and encourage[ I par-
ties throughout the process"7 ' and to foster an environment
that would enable the parties' individual and joint will to
emerge.72 The general presumption was that the mediator
was facilitative and was not to give his or her own view on
any issue.
73
4. The disputants themselves were responsible for the process.
The parties' responsibilities included identifying the issues to
be resolved, 74 recognizing the concerns and interests under-
lying their positions,75 generating options for resolution of
their dispute,7 6 and evaluating the resolution options.
7 7
5. Mediation promised "a climate of cooperation"78 that would
enhance all disputants' ability to understand each other and
70. See CooNrmr DISPUTE RESOLUTION CTR. (Ithaca, N.Y.) MEDATION TRAIN.
ING A NUAL - SIX STAGES OF MEDIATION [hereinafter COMMNITy DIsPUTE RESOLU-
TION CTR.] 2 (1989) (excerpt on file with author); see also, e.g., BEER ET AL., supra note
68, at 12, 23, 35; NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE CTRS. Or ATLANTA, INC., TawnING MANUAL
FOR MEDIATORS 49 (1987) (emphasizing the importance of joint sessions).
71. See ComnmNIT DISPUTE RESOLUTION Cm, supra note 70, at 4.
72. Recommended techniques included: actively listening, clarifying, reflecting
and acknowledging feelings, probing for parties' underlying issues and concerns,
translating positions into interests and positive need statements, helping parties
state what was important to them and what they would like to have happen, enabling
the parties to generate a list of possible options, checking the "workability" of each
alternative with the parties, and encouraging the parties to select alternatives which
appeared acceptable to them. See id.; see also, e.g., BEER ET AL., supra note 68, at 23-
30.
73. See CohmwrTY DISPUTE RESOLUTION CT., supra note 70, at 4; see also, e.g.,
BEER ET AL., supra note 68, at 35, 38 (providing several techniques to encourage and
assist parties in developing their own solution); NEIGHORHOOD JUSTICE CTRS. OF Ar-
LANTA, INC., supra note 70, at 22 (stressing the importance of assisting parties' com-
munication so that they may reach common solution).
74. See Conmrr DISPUTE RESOLUTION CT., supra note 70, at 4.
75. See id.
76. See id.; see also BEER ET AL., supra note 68, at 35, 38 (providing several tech-
niques to permit parties to develop their own solutions but also providing techniques
to assist parties who were unable to do so unaided); NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE CTRS. OF
ATLANTA, supra note 70, at 17 ("The two or more sides involved in a dispute are given
an OPPORTUNITY through the MEDIATOR to fashion between and among THEM-
SELVES a solution SATISFACTORY to ALL sides.").
77. See CotmuNrrv DISPUTE RESOLUTION CT, supra note 70, at 4.
78. Id.; see also BEER ET AL., supra note 68, at 35:
Compassion and respect are the intangible attitudes which let disputants
safely express feelings and break away from locked-in positions .... An
agreement is signed when each disputant is willing to accept each point of
the contract. A person pressured into concession is less likely to follow the
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participate in reaching resolution. 7 9 To be sure that dispu-
tants heard each other's perceptions and to enhance their
communication, some programs discouraged the use of
caucuses or separate meetings.8 0 Some programs also explic-
itly excluded lawyers.8 1
When first established, mediation's form fit its function rather
neatly, and it appeared that this form was quite effective in aiding
parties to reach resolution and in generating high user satisfaction.
2
Unfortunately, a relatively small number of disputants actually
chose to take advantage of this new process.83 Most disputants con-
tinued to turn to the courts for resolution of their disputes. By the
mid-1980s, despite mediation's genesis out of dissatisfaction with the
judicial process, many mediation proponents were advocating for the
institutionalization of mediation within the courts because that is
where parties and their disputes could be found.8 4 The next section
terms of the agreement. If someone is uncomfortable with a suggestion, no
matter how rational the solution appears, the group continues to look for
other possibilities.
Id. See also NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE CTRS. OF ATLANTA, supra note 70, at 14 (noting
that mediation is, by nature, nonadversarial and seeks reconciliation).
79. Mediation's focus of cooperation is in contrast to a competitive approach,
which many have argued favors men and those with power. See, e.g., Joseph B.
Stulberg, Facilitative Versus Evaluative Mediator Orientations: Piercing the "Grid"
Lock, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985, 993-94 (1997). See generally Linda Stamato, Voice,
Place, and Process: Research on Gender, Negotiation, and Conflict Resolution, 9 MEDI.
ATION Q. 375, 378 (1992) (reporting on research regarding the effect of gender differ-
ences and situational power on negotiating behavior).
80. See, e.g., BEER ET AL., supra note 68, at 21 (noting the underutilization of
caucus in a community mediation program); NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE CTRS. OF AT-
LANTA, supra note 70, at 49 (directing that caucuses should only be implemented after
there has been an attempt at joint discussion between the parties).
81. See, e.g., BEER ET AL., supra note 68, at 12 (excluding lawyers and witnesses
from the mediation proceedings). Even if not explicitly excluded, lawyers often were
to play a limited role in mediation. See, e.g., NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE CTRS. OF AT.
LANTA, supra note 70, at 111 (noting that, while attorneys have a right to be present
at a mediation session, the session will be adjourned if the attorney attempts to con-
trol the process); Leonard Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OH. ST. L. J. 29, 36
(1982) (describing Houston Neighborhood Justice Center's discouragement of use of
lawyers).
82. See, e.g., Tom Tyler, The Quality of Dispute Resolution Procedures and Out.
come: Measurement Problems and Possibilities, 66 U. DENVER L. REV. 419, 436 (1989).
83. See ROGERS & McEWEN, supra note 55, at §5:02, n.19 (citing COOK, ROEHL &
SHEPARD, NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE CENTERS FIELD TEST 2 (1980)).
84. See infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text. Interestingly, it does not ap-
pear that most mediation advocates or courts acknowledged the irony-and potential
conflict-created by transplanting a process which rejects the relevance of the law
into the very institution which conditions access upon an effective invocation of the
law. Further, this party-centered process was transplanted into an institution which
tended to constrict parties' participation in its processes and viewed the individual
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will examine the reasons that the courts decided to embrace media-
tion, the evolution of mediation once it entered the courthouse, and
the changing vision of self-determination as revealed in the rise of
evaluative mediation.
II. THE ADAPTATION OF MEDIATION TO THE COURTHOUSE
A- The Courts' Reasons for Embracing Mediation
It is somewhat ironic that the courts embraced a process that
originally arose out of frustration with the litigation process,s5 but
there were two major reasons for its welcome. First, mediation advo-
cates promised that the process would save time and money.8 6 This
benefit responded directly to concerns raised by judges-including
the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court 87-and attorneys that
litigant not as an unique, multi-faceted person but as "a legal problem accompanied
by a person." ROBERT BASTRESs & JOSEPH HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING, CouNSEUING
AND NEGOTIATING: SKILLS FOR EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION 30 (1990). Viewed in this
way, it was inevitable that the mediation process had to adapt in order to survive in
its new home.
85. See generally ELizABETH PLAPINGER & MARGARET SHAW, CouRT ADR: ELE-
MENTS OF PROGRAM DESIGN (1992); Nancy Welsh & Barbara McAdoo, The ABCs of
ADR. Making ADR Work in Your Court System, JUDGES' J., Winter 1998, at 11.
86. See Thomas Radio, Advising Your Client Regarding ADR, 46 BE'zci & BAR oF
MINN., April, 1989, at 19 (listing "savings in legal fees and expenses7 as a potential
benefit of using ADR); Nancy Welsh, The Lawyers' Buffet: Options in Resolving Dis-
putes, 44 BENCH & BAR OF MINN., Nov. 1987, at 17, 18 (suggesting that ADR will aid
courts in reducing the volume of cases litigated); see also STEVENS H. CLARME ET AL.,
COURT-ORDERED CIVIL CASE MEDIATION IN NORTH CAROLINA: AN EVALUATION OF ITS
EFFECTs 56 (1996) (noting that the program of court-ordered mediated settlement
conferences reduced the median filing-to-disposition time in contested cases by about
seven weeks and, although data was not conclusive, it suggested that the program
produced savings for litigants); DONNA STIENSTRA ET AL., REPORT TO THE JuDICIAL
CONFERENCE COMITTEE ON COURT ADMINISTRATION AND CASE MANAGE.IENT. A
STUDY OF THE FIVE DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMLS ESTABLISHED UNDER TIlE CIVIL JUS-
TICE REFORm ACT OF 1990 16 (1997) (reporting finding that, for cases assigned to Mis-
souri Western's Early Assessment Program, median age at termination was reduced
by more than two months). But see Wayne Kobbervig, Mediation of Civil Cases in
Hennepin County: An Evaluation 19 (1991) (indicating that median disposition times
in cases referred to mediation and cases disposed of in the judicial process were iden-
tical); RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, AN EVALUATION OF MEDIATION AND EARLY
NEUTRAL EVALUATION UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM AcT 48 (1996) (finding that
federal courts' use of mediation and early neutral evaluation, as mandated by the
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, has not resulted in significantly quicker settlements
or reduced expenses for litigants).
87. In 1976, the American judicial system acknowledged popular dissatisfaction
with a national conference that focused on "the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction
with the Administration of Justice" (the conference is more popularly known as the
"Pound Conference"). Chief Justice Burger, who planned and implemented the con-
ference, later observed: "The notion that ordinary people want black-robed judges,
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the courts were facing increased dockets and reduced resources,
while litigants were enduring longer waits for trial."" Mediation ad-
vocates also highlighted the high levels of party satisfaction achieved
through the use of mediation.8 9 To some, mediation appeared as a
timely and attractive antidote to the perceived ills of the judicial sys-
tem. It was a process that could simultaneously increase efficiency
and improve litigants' satisfaction with their treatment in court.90
well-dressed lawyers, and fine paneled courtrooms as the setting to resolve their dis-
putes is not correct. People with problems, like people with pain, want relief, and
they want it as quickly and inexpensively as possible." Warren E. Burger, Our Vi-
cious Legal Spiral, JUDGES' J., Fall 1977, at 22, 49. The primary focus of the Chief
Justice and others was on remedying the perceived slowness, expense, and ineffi-
ciency of the civil litigation system, not on changing the role played by litigants within
the system or the "quality" of the outcomes produced by the system. See STEPHEN
GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER
PROCESSES 6-9 (3d ed. 1999) (describing the sources and goals of the ADR movement);
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Inno-
vation Co-Opted or "The Law of ADR," 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 6-10 (1991) (contrast-
ing early conceptions of the purposes of ADR).
88. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Beyond Formalism and False Dichotomies: The Need
for Institutionalizing a Flexible Concept of the Mediator's Role, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
949, 954 (1997) (noting that "the ultimate goal of mediation or any other ADR tech-
nique [within the courts is] the efficient and just resolution of controvers[iesJ"). Of
course, the degree of these efficiency pressures (or perceptions regarding the degree of
these pressures) varied from location to location. This may be one factor that helps
explain why some courts began adopting ADR programs in the early 1980s, while
other courts are just now experimenting with ADR.
89. See SUSAN KEILITZ ET AL., MULTI-STATE ASSESSMENT OF DIVORCE MEDIATION
AND TRADITIONAL COURT PROCESSING 18-22 (1992) (showing that, in a study of divorc-
ing litigants who participated in mediation or conventional court program, those in-
volved in mediation rated the process more favorably on most measures of quality and
fairness of process); KOBBERVIG, supra note 86, at 23-25 (demonstrating that litigants
in mediation rated it more favorably than did litigants in the judicial process, while
attorneys rated the judicial process more highly); Craig A. McEwen & Richard J.
Maiman, Small Claims Mediation in Maine: An Empirical Assessment, 33 ME. L. REV.
237, 238 (1981) (reporting that litigants in mediation expressed higher levels of satis-
faction with their experience than those whose cases were adjudicated); Jessica Pear-
son & Nancy Thoennes, Divorce Mediation: Reflections on a Decade of Research, in
MEDIATION RESEARCH: THE PROCESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THIRD-PARTY INTERVEN-
TION 19 (Kenneth Kressel et al. eds, 1989) (noting that, in two studies of divorcing
couples with child custody and visitation disputes, more than three-quarters of medi-
ation users expressed extreme satisfaction with mediation). See generally SUSAN KE!-
LITZ ET AL., NATIONAL SYMPosItMi ON COURT-CONNECTED DISPUTE RESOLUTION
RESEARCH: A REPORT ON CURRENT RESEARCH FINDINGS-IMPLICATIONS FOR COURTS
AND FUTURE RESEARCH NEEDS (1994).
90. Some commentators raised concerns about the potential incompatibility of
"quantitative-efficiency claims" and "qualitative-justice claims." See Menkel-
Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Advisory Culture, supra note 52, at 6; see also
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of
Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 838 (1984). On the whole, however, most
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A second reason the courts welcomed mediation was that a criti-
cal mass of lawyers and judges became persistent advocates for the
process. As the years passed, some of these lawyers and judges found
themselves in positions of influence as they became members of the
committees, commissions, and advisory groups working to improve
the judicial process. 91 As a result, mediation was put on the reform
agenda in many state and federal courts.
B. The Evolution of Mediation in the Court-Connected Context
During this time of change, some courts experienced success by
experimenting with the use of mediation in "smaller" cases (e.g.,
small claims court) 92 and in cases that were more emotionally
charged (e.g., disputes over custody and visitation).93 These suc-
cesses helped to set the stage for the introduction of mediation to re-
solve more substantial civil cases (e.g., contract, personal injury, and
employment cases involving claims for damages greater than the ju-
risdictional limit for small claims court).94 Mediation advocates per-
suaded many courts to give parties the option to submit these larger
advocates either acknowledged no conflict in goals or anticipated that, with appropri-
ate modifications, mediation could always achieve both sets of goals. See, e.g., Joshua
D. Rosenberg, In Defense of Mediation, 33 Amz. L. REv. 467 (1991).
91. See ELIZABETr PLAPINGER & DONNA STIENSTRA, ADR ,D SETTLEMENT IN TIE
FEDERAL DisTRicT CouRTs: A SOURCEBOOK FOR JUDGES & LAwYERS 3 (1996) (describ-
ing the institutionalization of ADR in the federal courts); see also McAdoo, The Minne-
sotaADR Experience, supra note 52, at 67 (describing the transition from the period of
exploration to the development of the institutionalized recommendations that later
served as the basis for state legislation and court rules); Barbara McAdoo & Nancy
Welsh, Does ADR Really Have a Place on the Lawyer's Philosophical Map?, 18 HM,.
LINE J. PUB. L. & PoL'Y 376 (1997) (continuing the story of Minnesota courts' institu-
tionalization of ADR and reporting perceptions of the effect of Rule 114 on the
practices of law and mediation).
92. See fini, supra note 52, at 51-54; McAdoo, The Minnesota ADR Experience,
supra note 52, at 74. Small claims court easily adapted to the mediation process.
Generally, disputants were not accompanied by attorneys, the legal issues were not as
significant, and community mediators trained according to the facilitative model of
mediation often provided the mediation services in this setting.
93. See Alfini, supra note 52, at 54-56; McAdoo, The Minnesota ADR Experience,
supra note 52, at 79-80. The mediation model began to evolve in domestic cases. In
this setting, court personnel served as mediators, there were limits on the amount of
time that could be spent in mediation, and some courts expected that if the parties
were unable to reach resolution themselves, the mediators would make recommenda-
tions regarding custody and visitation. See generally McEwen et al., supra note 24, at
1330-50; GriUo, supra note 66, at 1554-55.
94. See Alfini, supra note 52, at 60; McAdoo, The Minnesota ADR Experience,
supra note 52, at 81-82.
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cases to voluntary mediation programs. However, few parties chose
to exercise this voluntary option.
95
In response to this lackluster reception, mediation advocates pro-
posed "mandatory" mediation. They argued that courts should have
the authority to order parties into mediation. This was inconsistent
with the original conception of self-determination, but mediation pro-
ponents suspected that parties were not choosing mediation because
they (or their attorneys) were simply wary of an unfamiliar process
96
or feared signaling an overeager willingness to settle.97 Many media-
tion advocates saw "mandatory" mediation as an opportunity to pro-
vide a forced education regarding mediation to attorneys and their
clients. 98 Additionally, research indicated that parties who were re-
quired to use mediation continued to reach settlements in a substan-
tial percentage of the cases and reported high levels of satisfaction
with the process. 99 Those courts that adopted pilot projects to test
the use of mandatory mediation in civil cases involving claims for
substantial damages experienced success, and this triggered even
95. See CENTER FOR ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEMS &
THE INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR COURT-CON.
NECTED MEDIATION PROGRAMS 3-1 (1992).
Experience with court mediation programs has shown that voluntary pro-
grams often are underutilized. In spite of the increasing number of ADR pro-
grams, in courts and communities, mediation remains a largely unfamiliar
process to judges, court administrators, citizens and attorneys. Judges, law-
yers and clients tend to do things in the way to which they are accustomed
and may resist new processes with which they are unfamiliar.
Id.; see also ELIZABETH PLAPINGER & MARGARET SHAW, COURT ADR: ELEMENTS OF
PROGRAM DESIGN 15-16 (1992) (describing commentators' evaluation of usefulness of
voluntary mediation programs in the courts); SPIDR, MANDATED PARTICIPATION AND
SETTLEMENT COERCION, supra note 68, at 11 (observing that "[rlates of voluntary us-
age are often low, perhaps because parties or their lawyers may be more accustomed
to the litigation process or do not want to signal to their adversary a desire for
compromise.").
96. See SPIDR, MANDATED PARTICIPATION AND SETTLEMENT COERCION, supra note
68, at 11; Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, supra note 81, at 41 (noting that unless a
lawyer is familiar with mediation, he will tend not to recommend its use).
97. See SPIDR, MANDATED PARTICIPATION AND SETTLEMENT COERCION, supra note
68, at 11.
98. See SPIDR, MANDATED PARTICIPATION AND SETTLEMENT COERCION, supra note
68, at 12; see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes
of Its Own: Conflicts Among Dispute Professionals, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1871, 1932
(1997) (acknowledging the "educative effect of 'presumptively mandatory' referrals");
Sander et al., supra note 54, at 886 (comparing mandatory mediation to affirmative
action).
99. See Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 89, at 9, 14, 18.
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greater institutionalization with the development of statewide court-
connected mediation in several states.'0 0
Perhaps inevitably,' 0 ' current evidence strongly suggests that
the "legitimacy handed to [the ADR movement] by its assimilation
into the court system"10 2 has come at a price. Court-connected medi-
ation of non-family civil cases is developing an uncanny resemblance
to the judicially-hosted settlement conference. In certain types of
cases, such as personal injury and medical malpractice, the defend-
ants regularly fail to attend mediation sessions.' 0 3 Even when all of
the clients do attend, their attorneys are likely to do much, if not all,
of the talking, particularly in joint sessions.' 0 4 An increasing num-
ber of mediators are abandoning or greatly minimizing the joint ses-
sion, preferring to move quickly to caucuses.' 0 5 The attorneys are
100. See, e.g., Barbara McAdoo & Nancy Welsh, supra note 91, at 378-81 (describ-
ing Hennepin County District Court mediation pilot project and legislation and court
rules establishing statewide court-connected ADR program); see also KOBBERvIG,
supra note 86, at 5-8.
101. See Menkel-Meadow, Ethics, supra note 17, at 418. ("As with all cyclical
human history, the reforms of flexibility, informality, particularity and privacy have
led to their own set of abuses.... ADR now needs 'ethics' or standards in part be-
cause of its successes-it is being challenged from within as well as without."); see
also Stempel, supra note 88, at 983 (noting that court-ordered mediation forces medi-
ation away from the spirit of cooperation that fostered its growth).
102. Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture, supra note
52, at 2.
103. In personal injury actions, insurers often are required to attend mediation
sessions while those who are insured-the actual defendants-are not to required to
attend. See, e.g., MINN. R. OF PRACTICE FOR Dmr. CT. 114.07(c) (2000) ("Facilitative
processes aimed at settlement of the case, such as mediation ... shall be attended by
individuals with the authority to settle the case, unless otherwise directed by the
court."); Thomas Metzloffet al., Empirical Perspectives on Mediation and Malpractice,
60 LAw AND CorrEmp. PRoBs. 107, 123-25 (1997) (observing that in eight of 36 ob-
served mediation sessions, the physicians who were named as defendants were not
present, despite existence of rules that anticipated presence of all parties); see also
Kovach & Love, supra note 53, at 99 (reporting that Civil Appeals Management Plan
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit "neither expects nor re-
quires party participation, though mediators may invite the parties to attend the
conferences").
104. See, e.g., Elizabeth Ellen Gordon, Why Attorneys Support Mandatory Media-
tion, 82 JUDICATURE 224, 227 (1999) (stating that, in observed mediations, lawyers
dominated negotiation and that the minority of clients who did "play active roles"
were "supporting rather than starring players"); Metzloff, supra note 103, at 123-25.
But see BARBARA McADoo, A REPORT TO THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURTr. Tim IMPACT
OF RuLE 114 ON CIVIL LITIGATION PRACTICE IN MINNESOTA 39 (1997) (reporting that
nearly 80 percent of attorneys perceive that mediators always or frequently en-
courage clients to participate); McEwen et al., supra note 24, at 1382-84 (describing
lawyer appreciation of client involvement in divorce mediation).
105. See Alfini, supra note 52, at 66 (reporting that "trashers" discourage direct
party communication and quickly move to caucuses); Metzloff, supra note 103, at 120;
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choosing mediators who, like judges, are expected to have the knowl-
edge and experience which would permit them to comment on the
parties' legal arguments.10 6 Indeed, mediators now often focus on the
legal issues and opine regarding the strengths and weaknesses of
each party's case and appropriate settlement ranges. 0 7 Finally, it
appears that few mediators now actively promote the search in medi-
ation for creative, non-monetary settlements. 08
To a large extent, the presence of lawyers, as advocates and as
mediators, explains why court-connected mediation now looks like a
judicial settlement conference. First, attorneys have long operated
see also McAnoo, A REPORT TO THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT, supra note 104, at 39
(reporting that approximately 72 percent of attorneys perceive that mediators "al-
ways or frequently" use caucuses effectively while only about 49 percent of attorneys
perceive that mediators "always or frequently" ask each side to present an opening
statement); McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 91, at 391 (noting that mediator's often
abandon asking the parties for opening statements).
106. See Alfini, supra note 52, at 66-71 (describing "trashers" and "bashers");
Gordon, supra note 104, at 228 (noting that attorneys prefer mediators who are exper-
ienced in the courtroom); see also McADoo, A REPORT TO THE MINNESOTA SUPREME
COURT, supra note 104, at 38 (reporting that lawyers perceive that the most impor-
tant qualification for mediators is "substantive experience in the field of law related to
case" [84 percent of respondents]); McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 91, at 390 (showing
that Hennepin County lawyers reported that they wanted mediators to give their
view of settlement ranges); Metzloff, supra note 103, at 144-45 (reporting that almost
70 percent of attorneys want mediators to provide opinions on the merits of cases and
that attorneys highly valued mediator's substantive expertise).
107. See, e.g., Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 53, at 99 (reporting
that mediators employed by the Civil Appeals Management Plan of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit evaluate strengths and weaknesses of cases);
McADoo, A REPORT TO THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT, supra note 104, at 39 (re-
porting that approximately 30 percent of lawyers perceive that mediators frequently
or always predict court outcomes, and about 68 percent perceive that mediators fre-
quently or always propose realistic settlement ranges); McAdoo & Welsh, supra note
91, at 390 n.71 (stating that Hennepin County lawyers reported that they "perceive
mediators to 'frequently or always predict' court outcomes about one-third of the time
and 'propose realistic settlement ranges' about two-thirds of the time"); Metzloff,
supra note 103, at 121 (reporting that half of the mediators who were observed ex-
pressed opinions about parties' offers, while 12 percent opined regarding the case's
merits); see also DONNA STIENSTRA ET AL., supra note 86, at 267 (describing observed
EAP and settlement week sessions). But see Gordon, supra note 104, at 228 (report-
ing that observed mediators were reticent in offering opinions or suggesting specific
offers or demands).
108. See McADoo, A REPORT TO THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT, supra note 104,
at 39 (reporting that about 26 percent of attorneys perceive that mediators frequently
or always "provide input for non-monetary aspects of settlement"); see also Elizabeth
Gordon, Attorneys' Negotiation Strategies in Mediation: Business as Usual?, MEDIA-
TION Q. 377, 384 (Summer 2000) (reporting that plaintiffs are more likely to receive
nonmonetary relief in cases disposed through a trial than in cases settling at medi-
ated settlement conferences); Metzloff, supra note 103, at 151.
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within an "adversary culture."10 9 As they were ordered to participate
with their clients in the mysterious process called "mediation," they
brought with them a "standard philosophical map,"110 assumptions
regarding their relationship with their clients,'" and expectations
and tactics that they had honed in their prior experience with tradi-
tional judicial settlement conferences. 112 Second, as more and more
attorneys and retired judges were attracted to mediation as a remu-
nerative activity, they brought to the role of mediator the skills and
knowledge that had served them well in their careers, 113 as well as
certain assumptions about "the role of the [quasi-Ijudicial host.""
4
Parties and their attorneys began to select mediators who could and
would provide reasoned evaluation. 115 Increasingly, mediators were
willing to provide it. 1 16
C. The Facilitative-Evaluative Debate and the Changing
Conception of Self-Determination
In 1994, Professor Leonard Riskin pointedly acknowledged that
legal evaluation was occurring in mediation. 117 Specifically, he wrote
that he had observed mediators using the following strategies:
o Urg[ing] parties to settle or to accept a particular settlement
proposal or range.
o Propos[ing] position-based compromise agreements.
109. See Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture, supra
note 52, at 1.
110. Riskin, Mediation and Lauoers, supra note 81, at 43-44 (describing lawyers'
"standard philosophical map" as one that assumes the "adversariness of parties and
rule-solubility of dispute").
111. See Ronald Gilson & Robert Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Coopera-
tion and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUDI. L. REv. 509 (1994) (noting
that a "distinctive characteristic of our formal mechanisms of conflict resolution is
that clients carry on their disputes through lawyers"); Leonard Riskin, The Repre-
sented Client in a Settlement Conference: the Lessons of G. Heileman Brewing Co. v.
Joseph Oat Corp., 69 WASH. U. L. Q. 1059, 1076-77 (1991) [hereinafter Riskin, The
Represented Client] (contrasting traditional and participatory lawyer-client
relationships).
112. See Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 53, at 96 (arguing that
lawyers tend to bring mediation into the adversarial system with which they are more
familiar).
113. See id. at 94.
114. Riskin, The Represented Client supra note 111, at 1081-89 (describing courts'
and attorneys' expectations of the role of the judicial host in settlement conferences).
115. See supra note 106.
116. See supra note 107.
117. See Leonard L. Riskin, Mediator Orientations, Strategies and Techniques, AL.
TERNATIVES TO HIGH CosT LrrIG., Sept. 1994, at 111 [hereinafter Riskin, Mediator
Orientations]. See also Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, supra note 66,
at 7.
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o Predict[ing] court (or administrative agency) dispositions.
o Try[ing] to persuade parties to accept the mediator's
assessments.
* Directly assess[ing] the strengths and weaknesses of each
side's case (usually in private caucuses) and perhaps try[ing]
to persuade the parties to accept the mediator's analysis.1 18
Professor Riskin suggested that these strategies were consistent
with an "evaluative-narrow" orientation. 119 He outraged some by go-
ing further and arguing that a process dominated by such an evalua-
tive-narrow approach could still be described as "mediation."120
In the debate that followed, some scholars and practitioners re-
acted very strongly, proclaiming that "'[e]valuative' [m]ediation is an
[olxymoron" and arguing that mediation should be clearly distin-
guishable from other, evaluative processes. 121 These critics used sev-
eral bases to support their arguments. First and quite provocatively,
they pointed out the danger of permitting mediators to provide unfet-
tered evaluations and assessments and suggested that "ethical norms
118. See Riskin, Mediator Orientations, supra note 117, at 112. In his 1996 arti-
cle, Professor Riskin altered the list, concluding that mediators were "assess[ing] the
strengths and weaknesses of each side's case," "predict[ing] outcomes of court or other
processes," "propos[ing] position-based compromise agreements," and "urg[ing] or
push[ing] the parties to settle or to accept a particular settlement proposal or range."
See Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, supra note 66, at 27.
119. In his article, Professor Riskin proposed a system for classifying mediator
orientations, strategies, and techniques with reference to: 1) "the scope of the problem
that the mediation seeks to address or resolve" (narrow vs. broad) and 2) "the strate-
gies and techniques that the mediator employs in attempting to address or resolve the
problems that comprise the subject matter of the mediation" (facilitation of parties'
negotiations vs. evaluation of matters that are important to the mediation). An evalu-
ative-narrow mediator would define the problem to be addressed by the mediation
narrowly and would use evaluative strategies based on an assumption "that the par-
ticipants want and need her to provide some guidance as to the appropriate grounds
for settlement-based on law, industry practice, or technology-and that she is quali-
fied to give such guidance by virtue of her training, experience, and objectivity." Ris-
kin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, supra note 66, at 17, 24.
120. It is quite clear that Professor Riskin anticipated that some would object to
his inclusion of this orientation and set of strategies within the definition of media-
tion, based on "fearfs] that somehow it will legitimize activities that are inconsistent
with the goals that they associate with mediation." Id. at 13. However, Professor
Riskin responded:
Although I sympathize with this view, I also disagree with it. Usage deter-
mines meaning. It is too late for commentators or mediation organizations to
tell practitioners who are widely recognized as mediators that they are not,
in the same sense that it is too late for the Pizza Association of Naples, Italy,
to tell Domino's that its product is not the genuine article.
Id.
121. See Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, Evaluative Mediation IsAn Oxymo-
ron, ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LiTIG., Mar. 1996, at 31 [hereinafter Kovach & Love,
Evaluative Mediation].
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and legal standards" would be required to "direct those evalua-
tions."122 The remainder of their arguments were grounded in their
understanding of the unique goals, underlying principles, and activi-
ties that should be associated with a process labeled "mediation."
They claimed that evaluation was "not consonant with mediation's
primary goals of enhancing understanding between parties and en-
couraging parties to create outcomes that respond to underlying in-
terests;"123 that, because "a mediator's assessment invariably favors
one side over another," evaluation "jeopardizes" the mediator's "neu-
trality;"124 that "[elvaluation and facilitation require different sdlls
and expertise[,I generate different outcomes [and] should have accu-
rate-and separate-labels;" 125 and, ultimately, that "'mediation'
should connote facilitation."
26
Later, these same critics focused their disapproval primarily on
the dangers presented by mediators with predominantly evaluative
orientations 27 or those using the most aggressive of the possible
evaluative strategies (i.e., "assert[ing] an opinion or judgment as to
the likely court outcome or a 'fair' or correct resolution of an issue in
122. Id. See also Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not
Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 937, 942-43 (1997) [hereinafter Love, Top Ten Rea-
sons] (arguing that insufficient protections against incorrect mediator evaluations
exist).
123. Kovach & Love, Evaluative Mediation, supra note 121, at 32. See also Riskin,
Understanding Mediators' Orientations, supra note 66, at 45, 47 (acknowledging that
evaluative techniques "can interfere with the parties' coming to understand fully their
own and each other's positions and interests" and "with the development of creative
solutions"); Stulberg, supra note 79, at 991 (noting that "[n]othing in principle [would
be] improper about the mediator bullying someone into an agreement as long as there
is some operative notion that the parties 'voluntarily' agreed to the outcome7 if the
efficiency with which the parties accepted the outcome of mediation were the only
criterion for evaluating mediators).
124. Kovach & Love, Evaluative Mediation, supra note 121, at 31. See also
Stulberg, supra note 79, at 986. Professor Riskin also anticipated this objection. See
Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, supra note 66, at 44.
125. Kovach & Love, Evaluative Mediation, supra note 121, at 32. See also Love,
Top Ten Reasons, supra note 122, at 938-39, 948 (arguing that evaluators and
facilitators use "different skills and techniques" and require "different competencies,
training norms, and ethical guidelines").
126. Kovach & Love, Evaluative Mediation, supra note 121, at 32. See also
Stulberg, supra note 79, at 1005 ("[The] vision of consensual decision making, and the
facilitative role required to support it, should inform the meaning of the term 'media-
tion' in whatever statute, rule, or program it appears, and should constitute the stan-
dards by which we select and evaluate mediator performance.")
127. See Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 53, at 80 (arguing that a
mediator is "off the mediation map when the mediator has an attitude or identity of
being an evaluator (evaluative orientation)").
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dispute"). 128 For the reasons described above, critics continued to ar-
gue that these mediators were "off the mediation map."' 29 Ulti-
mately, these critics argued that the evaluative-narrow orientation
and its most aggressive strategies were inconsistent with "a para-
digm that has party self-determination as its primary value."' 30
In response, scholars and practitioners who supported evaluative
mediation admitted that "[in some instances, 'evaluative' mediators
undoubtedly need to be reined in to prevent mediation from being
converted to arbitration and to prevent the evaluative mediator who
jumps to conclusions from bullying one or both parties into an unsat-
isfactory resolution of a controversy." 1 1 They argued, however, that
"it hardly follows that all evaluative mediation is bad and all
nonevaluative mediation is good." 132 These commentators raised the
importance of the context within which court-connected mediation
was occurring. Some emphasized the courts' obligation to facilitate
128. Id. It seems reasonable to assume that Kovach and Love also would term a
mediator "'evaluative' in the sense of being off the mediation map" if the mediator
urged or pushed the parties to settle or to accept a particular settlement proposal or
range. Importantly, Kovach and Love identified certain "evaluative" activities as "es-
sential parts of a mediator's facilitative role" including "challenging proposals that
seem unrealistic... and sometimes making suggestions about possibilities for resolu-
tion in order to stimulate the parties to generate options." In determining whether
such activities were consistent with the mediator's facilitative role, Kovach and Love
express most concern with whether the activities were "motivated by and result[ed in
the stimulation of party evaluation and decision-making[.l" Id. at 79-80.
129. Id. at 80.
130. Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 53, at 75; see also Kovach &
Love, Evaluative Mediation, supra note 121, at 32 ("[Tlhese practices are inconsistent
with primary objectives of mediation: promoting self-determination of parties and
helping the parties examine their real interests and develop mutually acceptable solu-
tions."); Stulberg, supra note 79, at 1001-02.
[Mlediation is a dialogue process designed to capture the parties' insights,
imagination, and ideas that help them to participate in identifying and shap-
ing their preferred outcomes. Concepts of participation and empowerment
are not idle pleasantries but are central principles of a democratic society
and critical features of consensual decision making processes, of which medi-
ation is traditionally thought to be a prime example.
Id. See also Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, supra note 66, at 45 (ob-
serving that the facilitative, rather than the evaluative, approach gives parties and
their lawyers "a greater feeling of participation and more control over the resolution
of the case ... and offers greater potential for educating parties about their own and
each other's position, interests, and situation").
131. Stempel, supra note 88, at 969.
132. Id. See also Robert Moberly, Mediator Gag Rules: Is It Ethical for Mediators
to Evaluate or Advise?, 38 S. TEx. L. REV. 669, 671-72 (1997) (acknowledging that
evaluative mediation potentially endangers parties' self-determination, but arguing
that there is not a "sufficient record of abuse that would justify banning evaluation
per se").
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fair and just results, which often required the application of estab-
lished legal norms, not heedless adherence to a particular model of
mediation.' 33 Others pointed out that the clients may invoke legal
norms and are entitled to explore the application of these norms to
their cases. 134 Still others observed that mediation was simply as-
sisted negotiation and that negotiators had to have the opportunity to
define and understand the consequences of going to trial, which
would be their best alternative to a negotiated agreement
(BATNA).' 35 They argued that, at its worst, mediator evaluation
under these circumstances would not impair party self-determination
133. See Stempel, supra note 88, at 966 (arguing that "the formalist 'facilitative'
model of mediation" should not be elevated "above the practical needs of disputants
and the fairness concerns that must animate decision making in any government-
sponsored proceeding"); see also Russell Engler, And Justice for All-Including the
Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67
FoRDHA L. REv. 1987, 2031-36 (1999) (urging redefinition of the mediator's role to
insure that fair and just agreements are produced by court-connected mediation in-
volving poor, unrepresented litigants).
134. See James H. Stark, Preliminary Reflections on the Establishment of a Media-
tion Clinic, 2 CLINICAL L. REv. 457, 487 (1996).
135. See Stempel, supra note 88, at 982-83 ("[B]oth economic and sociological anal-
ysis tends to suggest that more value is added to the process when the mediator pro-
vides some yardstick for assessing the options and some information about the range
of default options if the matter is adjudicated rather than settled."); see also Robert
Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L. J. 950, 968-70 (1979) (noting that in negotiating and settling di-
vorce matters, disputants are aware of the range of likely outcomes at trial if settle-
ment is not achieved); Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, supra note 66,
at 44. But see Lande, supra note 62, at 153 (noting that research shows that claims
adjusters and personal injury lawyers "rely on folk conceptions" to determine liability
and damage estimates).
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and, at its best, evaluation could enhance party self-determina-
tion.136 Some commentators even asserted that evaluation was nec-
essary and even inevitable, regardless of the mediator's
orientation.
137
Many judges, attorneys and mediators viewed (and continue to
view) this debate as a purely academic dialogue largely irrelevant to
136. See Moberly, supra note 132, at 675 (arguing that "mediator evaluation can
assist the parties in their self-determination efforts"); see also Jacqueline Nolan-
Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding Principle for Truly Educated Deci-
sion-Making, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 775, 777 (1999) (arguing that self-determina-
tion is undermined by the absence of informed consent); Donald Weckstein, In Praise
of Party Empowerment-and of Mediator Activism, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 501, 511
(1997) ("Rather than interfering with the self-determination of parties to resolve their
own dispute, activist interventions by the mediator may enhance the parties' empow-
erment by educating them and by aiding their realistic understanding of the alterna-
tives to agreement."). Roselle Wissler's research examining the perceptions of parties
in domestic relations and general civil mediation in Ohio lends support to this argu-
ment. Her research shows no statistically significant relationship to exist between
parties' perceptions that the mediator engaged in evaluation of the merits of the case
and their perceptions of whether they had enough chance to tell their views or
whether they were pressured by the mediator to accept a settlement. A significant
relationship was found between parties' perceptions that mediators engaged in evalu-
ation of the merits of the case and parties' perceptions that their understanding of the
other's views and/or their own case had improved, that they had more input in decid-
ing the outcome of the mediation, and that the mediation process was more fair.
When parties perceived that mediators had recommended a particular settlement,
however, they reported that they felt their input was more limited and they were
pressured to accept a settlement. See ROSELLE L. WISSLER, TRAPPING THE DATA: AN
ASSESSMENT OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS MEDIATION IN MAINE AND OHIO COURTS (1999)
(on file with author); ROSELLE L. WISSLER, AN EVALUATION OF THE COMMON PLEAS
CIVIL PILOT MEDIATION PROJECT (2000) (on file with author).
137. These commentators contended that even facilitative mediators could,
should, and perhaps were required to make use of certain "evaluative" techniques in
order to be effective. See Stulberg, supra note 79, at 1002-03.
The image of the placid intervener-that is, a mediator embracing the
facilitative orientation-who can be helpful to the parties reaching realistic
agreements about real problems but who, in the process, never makes a sug-
gestion or offers an idea that might be responsive to party concerns, does not
aggressively prod one or more parties to reconsider its proposed position,
does not actively restructure the bargaining agenda based upon party
presentations, or does not challenge party proposals (perhaps in caucus) as
unworkable or misleading based upon one's knowledge of the field and prac-
tices, is stunningly implausible.
Id. See also Stempel, supra note 88, at 961 (urging that a "broad notion of facilitation
encompasses the use of evaluative techniques in appropriate circumstances"); David
Greatbatch & Robert Dingwall, Selective Facilitation: Some Preliminary Observations
on a Strategy Used by Divorce Mediators, 23 L. & Soc'Y REV. 613 (1989) (suggesting
that mediators inevitably evaluate what they hear from the parties and directly or
indirectly communicate such evaluation); WISSLER, supra note 136 (showing that par-
ties involved in domestic relations mediation in Ohio and Maine were more likely
than their mediator to report that the mediator evaluated the merits of the case, dis-
closed his or her opinion of the merits and recommended a particular settlement).
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real practice. However, there were a few states in which state regula-
tors found themselves forced to grapple with the debate and consider
its relationship to the core principles of mediation, including the prin-
ciple of party self-determination. These regulators had to decide
what mediator behavior was and was not ethical, particularly when
parties were ordered into mediation by the courts. The next section
will focus on the processes of creating ethical guidelines for court-
connected mediators in Florida and in Minnesota. These states'
processes and the debate accompanying them shed light on the evolv-
ing conception of self-determination in mediation as it has adapted to
the courthouse.
IV. DEFINING AND PROTECTING SELF-DETERMINATION IN COURT-
CONNECTED MEDIATION
As state courts institutionalized mediation, lawyers, judges, and
mediation advocates recognized that the courts needed to create ethi-
cal guidelines for mediators handling court-connected cases. 138 State
supreme courts appointed drafting committees to take on this task.
As some of the drafting committees set to work, they found that they
specifically needed to address the questions raised by the evaluative-
facilitative debate and this required consideration of mediation's un-
derlying principle of party self-determination.
This section will focus on two of those states: Florida and Minne-
sota. There are four reasons for focusing on these two states. First,
both states' ethical guidelines apply to all court-connected mediators
throughout the state.' 3 9 Second, both states are recognized as lead-
ers in the institutionalization of court-connected mediation.140 Third,
138. This was particularly true for the courts that were ordering parties into medi-
ation. As the degree of party autonomy decreased, the need for court oversight in-
creased. See SPIDR COrNOSSION ON QUALIFICATIONS, QUAFYiNG NEUTRALS: Tim
BAsIc PRINCIPLES, SPIDR COMuSSION ON QUALIFICATIONS REPORT 14 §§ 2-1, 6-1, 6-3,
6-5, 6-6 (1989).
139. Although the Virginia Bar Association's ethical provisions for attorneys serv-
ing as mediators are particularly thoughtful, they are not considered in this article
because they have not been adopted by Virginia's courts to apply to all court-con-
nected mediators. For brief descriptions of statutes and rules in Virginia, Florida,
Texas, and Minnesota, see Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 53, at 84-
88.
140. This may be particularly true of Florida, which has effectively disseminated
information regarding its programs and carefully engaged in a national dialogue re-
garding its institutionalization of court-connected mediation. In distributing the first
draft of the 1998 revisions to the Florida Rules for Certified and Court-Connected
Mediators, Sharon Press, Director of the Florida Dispute Resolution Center, observed:
"I do not believe it is an overstatement to say that we have reached a critical juncture
in the field and that the revisions to these rules will greatly affect the practice of
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both states have now decided to permit mediators to use evaluative
techniques but have also incorporated mechanisms designed to
"tame" such evaluation and keep it from violating party self-determi-
nation. Fourth, in drafting (or in Florida's case, revising) their guide-
lines regarding the appropriateness of mediator evaluation, both
states solicited written input from mediators, judges, attorneys, and
others interested in the development of ADR.141 These comments-
which this section will examine in some detail-vividly illustrate the
different visions of self-determination held by people who shared a
commitment to this principle. The comments also highlight what
was included in and excluded from the vision of self-determination
that now infuses the ethical guidelines in Florida and Minnesota.
Last, the comments reveal very different points of view regarding ef-
fective safeguards for party self-determination.
A. The Development of Florida's Ethical Guidelines
In order to understand the context for the comments that Florida
received regarding its proposed revisions to its ethical guidelines for
court-connected mediation, it is helpful to begin with a bit of back-
ground. Florida courts have had the authority to refer all or any part
of a filed civil action to mediation since January 1, 1988.142 In 1990,
the Florida legislature adopted a definition of mediation that sug-
gested a preference for a facilitative, non-confrontational approach in
mediation, but the statute also established facilitation of "resolu-
tion"-not communication or negotiation between the parties-as the
key objective of the mediator.143 The statute's internally conflicting
mediation in the future-in Florida and nationally." Sharon Press, Message From the
Director, RESOL. REP. 1998, at 31 (Fla. Disp. Resol. Ctr., Vol. 13, Jan. 1998).
141. Florida held public hearings, public drafting sessions, and even solicited and
received input from nationally-recognized scholars, mediators, judges, and lawyers
outside the state, making the pool of comments particularly diverse, knowledgeable,
and rich. See Florida Standing Committee on Mediation and Arbitration Rules' Re-
sponse to Comment on Amendment to the Florida Rules for Certified and Court-Ap-
pointed Mediators at 2, In re Florida Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed
Mediators, 762 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam).
142. See FLA. STAT. ch. 44.302 (1989).
143. The Florida statute authorizing referral of civil actions to mediation was
amended, effective October 1, 1990, by Laws 1990, c. 90-188, §1 to define mediation
as:
a process whereby a neutral third person called a mediator acts to encourage
and facilitate the resolution of a dispute between two or more parties. It is
an informal and nonadversarial process with the objective of helping the dis-
puting parties reach a mutually acceptable and voluntary agreement. In me-
diation, decision making authority rests with the parties. The role of the
mediator includes, but is not limited to, assisting the parties in identifying
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language thus set the stage for a thinning understanding of self-
determination.
Florida's first set of ethical guidelines for its court-connected
mediators, the Florida Rules for Certified and Court Appointed
Mediators ("the 1992 Rules"), became effective in May, 1992.144 The
1992 Rules established standards of professional conduct for
mediators and created two institutions, the Mediator Qualifications
Advisory Panel and the Mediator Qualifications Board, to interpret
and enforce the standards. 145 Although the facilitative-evaluative
debate had not yet surfaced at the time that the 1992 rules were
drafted, the rules touched upon evaluation by mediators. Subsection
(a) of Rule 10.090 permitted a mediator to provide only "information"
and only to the extent that it was information that he or she was
"qualified by training or experience to provide." 146 Subsection (d) of
the same rule permitted mediators to "point out possible outcomes of
the case" being mediated. However, this subsection banned particu-
larly potent evaluation by providing that "under no circumstances
may a mediator offer a personal or professional opinion as to how the
court in which the case has been filed will resolve the dispute."147
issues, fostering joint problem-solving, and exploring settlement
alternatives.
FLA. STAT. ch. 44.1011(2) (1997). Previously, the statute defined mediation as "a pro-
cess whereby a neutral third party acts to encourage and facilitate the resolution of
dispute without prescribing what it should be. It is an informal and nonadverarial
process with the objective of helping the disputing parties reach a mutually accept-
able agreement." FLA. STAT. ch. 44.301(1) (1989).
144. See FLA. R. FOR CERTIFIED AND COURT APPOINTED MEDIATORS (1992), availa-
ble in SHARON PRESS & KI:MERLY KOSCH, 1998 FLORIDA MEDIATIONWARBITRATION PRO.
GRAMS: A CotEIE.NDImi, 11th Ed. 178-93 (Fla. Disp. Resol. Ctr.) [hereinafter 1992 FLA.
RULES].
145. The 1992 Rules created a comprehensive set of institutions and procedures
for enforcement of the rules. The Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel was created
to issue advisory opinions in response to the ethical questions raised by practicing
mediators. See 1992 FLA. RULES, supra note 144, R. 10.300. The Florida Mediator
Qualifications Board was created to adjudicate and dispose of actual grievances which
were filed against mediators. See id. R. 10.190. In addition to establishing standards
of professional conduct for mediators, the 1992 Rules incorporated previously-adopted
qualification criteria for mediators. Id. R. 10.010 (establishing qualification criteria
for mediators handling county court matters, family, circuit court, and dependency
matters); see also Alison Gerencser, Alternative Dispute Resolution Has Morphed into
Mediation: Standards of Conduct Must Be Changed, 50 FL. L. REv. 843, 852-55
(1998) (describing the varying types of cases, training requirements, and mediation
styles used for county, family, and circuit court mediation in Florida).
146. Id. R. 10.090(a).
147. Id. R. 10.090(d). Robert Moberly, who participated in the deliberations that
resulted in this provision, has stated that "Ithis rule was adopted to 'prohibit tactics
that imply some special knowledge of how a particular judge wll rule.' Even that
limited rule was controversial." Moberly, supra note 132, at 674 (citing Robert B.
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The 1992 Rules also repeatedly asserted the importance of party
self-determination and mediation process characteristics designed to
achieve such self-determination. For example, Rule 10.020(d), enti-
tled "General Principles," provided that mediation was "based on
principles of communication, negotiation, facilitation, and problem-
solving that emphasize the needs and interests of the participants;
and self determination."148 Most significant, however, was Rule
10.060, devoted entirely to self-determination. It provided:
(a) Parties' Right to Decide. A mediator shall assist the parties
in reaching an informed and voluntary settlement. Deci-
sions are to be made voluntarily by the parties themselves.
(b) Prohibition of Mediator Coercion. A mediator shall not co-
erce or unfairly influence a party into a settlement agree-
ment and shall not make substantive decisions for any party
to a mediation process.
[Item (c) omitted]
(d) A Balanced Process. A mediator shall promote a balanced
process and shall encourage the parties to conduct the medi-
ation deliberations in a non-adversarial manner.
[Item (e) omitted]
(f) Mutual Respect. A mediator shall promote mutual respect
among the parties throughout the mediation process.
149
This language indicated a particular understanding of what self-
determination in mediation meant. Most clearly, it meant that the
parties were to make the substantive decisions regarding whether to
settle or not, and their decisions were to be voluntary. The language
of these rules (i.e., balanced, non-adversarial, promoting mutual re-
spect) also suggested that the mediation process was supposed to feel
Moberly, Ethical Standards for Court-Appointed Mediators and Florida's Mediation
Experiment, 21 FLA. St. U. L. Rev. 701, 715 (1994)); see also Letter from Jim Alfini,
Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University, to Sharon Press, Director, Florida Dis-
pute Resolution Center (Feb. 20, 1998) (on file with author) ('The mischief we were
seeking to prevent in the original rule was to reduce the risk of allowing the mediator
to have undue influence, particularly where the parties are Unrepresented .... Isn't
this [predicting case outcomes] the kind of advice or opinion that is potentially most
damaging to party self-determination?").
148. Id. R. 10.020(d).
149. 1992 FLA. RULES, supra note 144, R. 10.060. The Committee Notes to Rule
10.060 provided that:
While a mediator has no duty to specifically advise a party as to the legal
ramifications or consequences of a proposed agreement, there is a duty for
the mediator to advise the parties of the importance of understanding such
matters and giving them the opportunity to seek such advice if they desire.
Id. R. 10.060 Committee Notes.
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different than-or be alternative to-traditional court processes. Im-
portantly, however, it was not at all clear that the vision of self-deter-
mination contained in these rules required: 1) the parties' active and
direct participation in the communication and negotiation occurring
within the mediation process; 2) the parties' direct participation in
the definition of the substantive norms which would guide their deci-
sion-making; or 3) the parties' direct participation in the creation of
settlement options. Thus, from the beginning, Florida's rules both
reflected and invited the narrower vision of self-determination de-
scribed supra.
Following the passage of the 1992 Rules, as Florida's Mediator
Qualifications Advisory Panel "gained pragmatic experience in the
application of ethical concepts to actual practice" °50 and the Florida
Mediator Qualifications Board "gathered specific data from [its inves-
tigation and disposition ofi actual grievances," 15 evidence began to
accumulate that some disputants perceived mediators as reducing
their participation in the mediation process, hindering their power to
define the substantive norms which would guide their decision-mak-
ing, and ultimately depriving them of their ability to create and con-
trol the resolution of their disputes. 152 Complaining parties often
pointed to mediators' aggressive and exclusively legal evaluation of
their cases and potential settlement options as the source of their
discontent.'5
3
150. Proposed Rule Changes, Florida Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed
Mediators, in RESOL. REP. 1998, at 18 (Fla. Disp. Resol. Ctr., Vol. 13, Jan. 1998) [here-
inafter 1998 Proposed Rule Changes], R. 10.020 Committee Note.
151. Id.
152. One commentator has observed that the advisory opinions from Florida's Me-
diator Qualifications Advisory Panel in 1995 "reveal[edl a highly restrictive Panel
view of mediation-one that appears to forbid even isolated, minor, and useful evalu-
ative action by mediators." Stempel, supra note 88, at 963. The Mediator Qualifica-
tion Board's handling of actual grievances suggests that its view of mediator
evaluation was not as restrictive. See supra note 26 and infra note 153.
153. See, e.g., Florida MQB 11 (1994) (summary on file with author) (alleging that
mediator had used threats, coercion and prediction regarding judge's decision to in-
duce complainants to cooperate and to forward the agreement); Florida AfQB 1 (1993)
(summary on file with author) (dismissing for lack ofjurisdiction allegation that com-
plainant was induced to sign mediation agreement by his health-related need to end
prolonged mediation session); Florida MQB 97-003 (1997) (summary on file with au-
thor) (referring to hearing panel and then dismissing complaint alleging threats, coer-
cion and verbal assaults by mediator); Florida MQB 98-010 (1998) (summary on file
with author) (dismissing grievance alleging that mediator advised plaintiffs regard-
ing the value of their case and unfairly influenced them into signing settlement
agreement).
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In 1997, the Florida Supreme Court Committee on Mediation
and Arbitration Rules "undertook a year long study program to deter-
mine if Florida's ethical rules for mediators would benefit from re-
view and revision."154 Perhaps partly as a result of the national
facilitative-evaluative debate as well as the experience of Florida's
Mediator Qualifications Board and Mediator Qualifications Advisory
Panel, the rules regarding evaluation by mediators, the definition of
self-determination and mechanisms to safeguard self-evaluation
emerged as prime candidates for such review and revision. In Janu-
ary, 1998, the Committee solicited comments on proposals for revi-
sions to these rules.
The revisions to Rule 10.037, "Professional Advice," dealt most
directly with the issue of whether or not to permit mediators to pro-
vide evaluations. 155 Significantly, the Committee developed two op-
tions for this rule upon which it sought comments, signaling its
inability to reach consensus on this revision. Although neither option
strictly forbade evaluation by mediators, the options began with very
different presumptions. Option One began with the presumption
that evaluation was prohibited,156 but went on to carve out excep-
tions, allowing the mediator to "provide information about the pro-
cess, draft proposals, point out possible outcomes of a case, and help
parties explore options." 15 7 Option Two began with the presumption
154. FLA. R. FOR CERTIFIED AND COURT-APPOINTED MEDIATORS (2000), available in
In re Amendments to the Florida Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators,
762 So. 2d 441, 449 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam) [hereinafter 2000 FLA. RULES], R. 10.200
Committee Note. The Supreme Court of Florida gave final approval to the rules on
February 3, 2000. By order of the court, the amendments to the rules became effec-
tive on April 1, 2000. See In re Amendments to the Florida Rules for Certified and
Court-Appointed Mediators, 762 So. 2d 441, 449 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam).
155. The Appendix contains a comparison of the provisions regarding professional
advice contained in the 1992 Florida Rules, 1998 Proposed Revisions, and 2000 Flor-
ida Rules.
156. Specifically Option One provided: "A mediator shall not provide professional
advice or opinions." 1998 Proposed Rule Changes, supra note 150, R. 137(a) Option
One.
157. 1998 Proposed Rule Changes, supra note 150, R. 137(a) Option One. This Op-
tion also allowed the mediator to advise the parties of their rights to seek independent
counsel if the mediator determined that either party did not understand the legal
effects of an agreement. See id. R. 10.037(b) Option One.
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that evaluation was permissible,158 but used the principles of impar-
tiality and self-determination to place limits upon evaluation. 1 9
Both of these options were designed to improve upon the 1992 Rules
by making it clear whether mediators were permitted to evaluate or
not and, further, by making it clear which particular evaluative activ-
ities were permitted and which were not.
While the concept of self-determination had been prominently
featured in the 1992 Rules, the Committee's proposed revisions did
even more to thread this concept throughout the rules. 160 In revised
Rule 10.031, the Committee tackled the question of what self-deter-
mination meant. Subsection (a) of the rule defined this concept as
"[d] ecision-making" and provided that "[d]ecisions made during a me-
diation are to be made by the parties. A mediator shall not make
substantive decisions for any party. A mediator is responsible for as-
sisting the parties to reach informed and voluntary decisions while
protecting their right to make decisions for themselves." 161 The Com-
mittee Note for Rule 10.031 added that the parties' right to self-deter-
mination should be "preserved during all phases of mediation" and
self-determination meant "a free and informed choice to agree or not
to agree."
1 6 2
158. Specifically, Option Two began by providing: "A mediator shall not provide
professional advice or opinions." 1998 Proposed Rule Changes, supra note 150, R.
137(a) Option Two.
159. The following language established these limits: "However, in providing pro-
fessional advice or information, a mediator shall not violate impartiality or self-deter-
mination of the parties." Id. R. 10.037(a) Option Two. The Committee Note
accompanying Proposed Rule 10.037 Option Two further clarified the scope and limi-
tations on evaluation by mediators, specifically prohibiting any action by mediators
that would "have the effect of overriding the parties' rights of self-determination.m " Id.
R. 10.037(a) Option Two Committee Note.
160. See, e.g., 1998 Proposed Rule Changes, supra note 150, R. 10.021 (defining
mediation as "a process whereby a neutral third party acts to encourage and facilitate
the resolution of a dispute without prescribing what it should be. It is an informal and
non-adversarial process intended to help disputing parties reach a mutually accept-
able solution"); id. R. 10.022 ("[I1n mediation, decision-making authority rests solely
with the parties."); id. R. 10.023 (listing "self-determination" as the first among six
concepts to be emphasized in mediation); id. R. 10.030 (providing that "a mediator's
responsibility to the parties ... includes honoring their right of self-determination...
and avoiding coercion, improper influence, or conflicts of interest").
161. 1998 Proposed Rule Changes, supra note 150, R. 10.031(a).
162. Id. R. 10.031 Committee Note. In requiring that the party's choice be "free"
and "informed," the drafters apparently tried to make informed consent part of self-
determination. For an articulation of the role of informed consent in mediation, see
Nolan-Haley, supra note 136.
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Ultimately, these proposed revisions regarding the definition of
self-determination did not represent a change from the understand-
ing of self-determination incorporated in the 1992 Rules. If anything,
the proposed revisions made it even clearer that the drafters' concep-
tion of self-determination was the narrower one described supra.
Their vision was quite consistent with the traditional operation of the
courts and lawyers. Party self-determination began and ended with
the parties' control over the decision "to agree or not to agree"163 to
enter into a particular settlement. It was this "basic right"164-the
same basic right that clients have as their lawyers attempt to negoti-
ate a settlement on their behalf' 6 5-that mediators were not to "com-
promise" 166 and indeed were expected to "honor" 67 and "protect."168
In its proposed revisions, the Committee also addressed the
mechanisms for safeguarding self-determination from over-aggres-
sive evaluation. As noted supra, Options One and Two for Rule
10.037 approached this goal very differently. Option One protected
self-determination by beginning with a presumption against the pro-
vision of professional advice or opinions and then creating exceptions
for evaluative activities which were more likely to be viewed as "neu-
tral" or merely "input." Option Two presumed that the provision of
professional advice or opinions was permissible and then named pro-
tection of self-determination as an important limit upon evaluative
activities. Proposed Rule 10.031, "Self-Determination," also ad-
dressed the need to safeguard self-determination by prohibiting those
behaviors that were deemed most likely to undermine self-determina-
tion. Specifically, the proposed revision prohibited mediator coercion,
163. 1998 Proposed Rule Changes, supra note 150, R. 10.031 Committee Note.
164. Id.
165. See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Rule 1.2(a) (1995)
(stating that "[a] lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to accept an offer of
settlement of a matter."); see also CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS §4.6.2 at
171-72 (1986) ("All recognize that settlement authority rests in the client and not the
lawyer. Courts have also held that it is part of the common-law duty of a lawyer to
communicate settlement offers to a client so that the client may exercise the power to
decide whether or not to accept").
166. 1998 Proposed Rule Changes, supra note 150, R. 10.031 Committee Note.
167. Id. R. 10.030.
168. Id. R. 10.031(a). One of the most striking and least-noticed proposed revi-
sions appeared in Rule 10.020 regarding the scope and purpose of the rules. There,
the Committee tried to elevate the value of ethical conduct above settlement. Perhaps
the Committee was trying to counteract settlement as the most potent and influential
measurement of success in mediation. Specifically, the Committee's revision provided
that "[wihether the parties involved in a mediation choose to resolve their dispute is
secondary in importance to whether the mediator conducts the mediation in accor-
dance with these ethical standards." Id. R. 10.020.
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improper influence by the mediator, 169 and mediator "attempt[s] to
interfere with a party's self-determination by offering professional or
personal opinions regarding the outcome of the case."1'70 Proposed
Rule 10.030 mirrored this language, providing: "A mediator's respon-
sibility to the parties includes honoring their right of self-determina-
tion; acting with impartiality; and avoiding coercion, improper
influence, or conflicts of interest."17' The proposed Committee Note
to Rule 10.031 provided some elaboration, pointing out:
A mediator must not substitute the judgment of the media-
tor for the judgment of the parties, coerce or compel an unwill-
ing participant to make a decision, knowingly allow a
participant to make a decision based on misrepresented facts or
circumstances, or in any other way impair or interfere with the
parties' right of self-determination.1
7 2
Whether these proposed revisions actually changed the 1992
Rules' mechanisms for protecting parties' self-determination from
overly aggressive evaluation by mediators ultimately depended upon
whether the Committee chose to recommend Option One or Option
Two.
As noted supra, the Committee solicited comments in Florida
and throughout the nation on its proposed revisions in January,
1998. The Committee received many thoughtful and passionate com-
ments in response. For the most part, the comments focused on Rule
10.037, "Professional Advice," where the Committee had requested
input on Options One and Two. Most commentators directed their
comments to Option Two, which began with the presumption that
mediator evaluation was appropriate but made it clear that such
evaluation could not violate the principles of self-determination and
169. Proposed Rule 10.031(b) provided: "A mediator shall not coerce or improperly
influence a party to make a decision or continue participating in mediation if the
party is unwilling to do so." 1998 Proposed Rule Changes, supra note 150, R.
10.031(b). The Committee intended this language as an expansion of the 1992 prohi-
bition against party coercion because it included "participation in the mediation pro-
cess itself, as well as any decision made during the process." Petition for Amendment
to the Florida Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators at 8, In re Florida
Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators, 762 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 2000) (per
curiam).
170. 1998 Proposed Rule Changes, supra note 150, R. 10.031(c).
171. Id. R. 10.030.
172. Id. R. 10.031 Committee Note. The Committee Note accompanying Option
Two for Rule 10.037 used similar language, cautioning: "Mediators shall not adjudi-
cate, substitute their advice or opinions for the true will of the parties or in any way
coerce or compel the parties to unwillingly resolve their dispute or accept any particu-
lar resolution option." Id. R. 10.037 Option Tvo Committee Note.
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impartiality. Several themes regarding self-determination and effec-
tive mechanisms for safeguarding self-determination emerge from a
review of these comments. 173
First, regardless of whether the commentators supported or op-
posed Option Two, they overwhelmingly espoused (or at least as-
sumed) the importance of something called "self-determination" as
the core principle underlying mediation. 174 One commentator, who
supported Option Two, referred to self-determination as "the heart
and soul of mediation as a dispute resolution procedure .... 17  This
commentator, like the others supporting Option Two, saw no conflict
per se between mediator evaluation and self-determination. 176 Those
opposing Option Two, however, largely grounded their opposition in
their commitment to self-determination. 177
This leads to the second theme to emerge from the comments.
The apparent consensus on the centrality of self-determination was
deceptive. As mediators know well, disputants can use the same
word and yet mean very different things. This appears to be the case
173. Other very interesting themes emerged as well. For example, those opposing
Option Two tended to argue that: mediation simply was not evaluation; use of evalua-
tive techniques was unnecessary given the success of the facilitative approach; media-
tor evaluation was likely to invite lawsuits against mediators by parties claiming they
had relied to their detriment on negligent mediator opinions or advice; mediator eval-
uation would interfere with the attorney-client relationship; mediator evaluation also
would impair mediator's impartiality or neutrality; and mediators would be tempted
to "rig" their evaluations in order to appeal to repeat players. Those supporting Op-
tion Two claimed that: ethical guidelines should be in touch with the marketplace; the
market wants evaluation; and mediators are evaluating under the guise of facilitation
anyway.
174. Not every commentator embraced self-determination, however. For example,
one commentator suggested that the strong emphasis on "self-determination, non-co-
ercion, and independent legal advice" in both versions of Rule 10.037 might be less
appropriate to mediation occurring outside of the family law area. Letter from John
Leo Wagner, Irell & Manella LLP, to Elizabeth Palpinger, CPR Institute for Dispute
Resolution (Feb. 2, 1998) (on file with author) [hereinafter Wagner letter].
175. Lawrence M. Watson, Jr., Advice and Opinions from Mediators: A Rational
Analysis, in RESOL. REP. 1998, at 13, 14 (Fla. Disp. Resol. Ctr., Vol. 13, Jan 1998).
176. See, e.g., Arden Siegendorf, A False Premise Leads to a False Conclusion: A
Reply to 'Some Hazards of Mediators Providing Opinions and Advice, RESOL. REP.
(Fla. Dispute Resolution Ctr., Tallahassee, Fla.), Jan. 1998, at 12, 13 (supporting Op-
tion Two and arguing that the 'evil' of evaluative mediation lies "not in the providing
of information or advice [but rather] in violating the principles of self-determination
and impartiality").
177. See, e.g., Letter from Janice M. Fliescher, Florida Conflict Resolution Consor-
tium, to Lawrence M. Watson, Chairman, Florida Supreme Court Standing Commit-
tee on Mediation Rules (Jan. 15, 1998) (on file with author) (supporting Option One
and stating that the focus on "empowerment and self-determination of the parties...
must continue to preserve both the process and the independence of the parties").
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with the term "self-determination." Though those opposing and sup-
porting Option Two agreed on the importance of preserving "self-de-
termination," they disagreed on the meaning of self-determination
and the extent to which mediator evaluation could negatively affect
their conception of self-determination. Professor John Lande, of the
Department of Dispute Resolution at Nova Southeastern University,
commenting on the two options for Rule 10.037, eloquently summa-
rized the tension evidenced by the comments:
As I see it, the controversy hinges on what people mean by self-
determination and how people think that mediators' actions af-
fect or impair it. In particular, there is the question of whether
mediators' expression of opinion is considered to impair [self-de-
termination] per se. I realize that you all do not have a lot of
time for philosophical discussion, but this seems to boil down to
fundamental issues of things like what is "free will," what limits
it (to an unacceptable degree), and how one can know whether
an action is voluntary and whether it is excessively or inappro-
priately influenced.
178
Those opposing Option Two feared that important elements of
self-determination would be lost if mediators were permitted to eval-
uate. For example, one opponent predicted:
[Tihe proposed rule revision will indirectly serve to unnecessa-
rily reduce the active participation of the parties in mediation
.... Empowerment involves both active involvement in the 1)
process of mediation (negotiation) and 2) outcome of mediation
(acceptance or rejection of a final agreement). The proposed
rules, while generally preserving self-determination, seem
likely to have a chilling effect [on] ... the parties' participation
in mediation .... [Tihe mediator will have more freedom to
deviate from the existing rules while the parties will feel less
freedom to freely, actively, and openly exercise their right to
freely participate in mediation.
179
Another decried the elimination of "the ability of the parties to
fully share their story ... ."180 Other opponents feared that Option
Two would "pave the way for mediators... to emphasize the legality
178. E-mail from John Lande, Department of Dispute ResolutionISSS, Nova
Southeastern University, to Sharon Press, Director, Florida Dispute Resolution
Center (Feb. 12, 1998) (on file with author) [hereinafter Lande e-mail] (minor gram-
matical errors corrected).
179. Letter from Gregory Firestone to Sharon Press, Director, Florida Dispute
Resolution Center (Sept. 29, 1998) (on file with author).
180. Letter from Gary Canner, Dade Mediation Associates, to Sharon Press, Direc-
tor, Florida Dispute Resolution Center (Feb. 16, 1998) (on file with author).
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and omit.., an exploration of... feelings"18 ' or that the disputants
would become "reliant on information provided by an 'expert' media-
tor and acquiesce to a settlement based upon what a mediator
states."18 2 Overall, the comments of those opposing Option Two echo
the vision of self-determination that originally dominated the con-
temporary mediation movement. For these commentators, party self-
determination in mediation required that the parties participate di-
rectly and fully in the process of resolving their dispute, define the
substantive norms controlling their discussion and decision-making,
and both create and control the outcome of the dispute resolution
process.183
The supporters of Option Two were just as committed to self-de-
termination, and they agreed with Option Two's opponents that self-
determination meant that the parties must have control over the final
outcome of the mediation session.' 84 Beyond this, however, they had
a very different vision of self-determination. Rather than viewing the
parties as the primary participants in the process and the creators of
181. Letter from Sheldon Finman, Attorney at Law, to Florida Supreme Court
Rules Committee (Feb. 12, 1998) (on file with author).
182. Memorandum from Deborah Deratany to Sharon Press, Director, Florida Dis-
pute Resolution Center (Feb. 18, 1998) (on file with author).
183. See, e.g., Letter from Lela Love, Director, Kukin Program for Conflict Resolu-
tion, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, to Lawrence M. Watson Jr., Chairman,
Florida Supreme Court Standing Committee on Mediation Rules, and Sharon Press,
Director, Florida Dispute Resolution Center (Feb. 24, 1998) (on file with author)
("[Pirohibiting certain enumerated types of mediator advice and opinion keeps the
responsibility squarely upon the parties to be the evaluators of the fair, proper or
likely court outcome."); Letter from Joseph Stulberg, Director of Advanced Studies,
University of Missouri School of Law, to Sharon Press, Director, Florida Dispute Res-
olution Center, and Lawrence M. Watson Jr., Chairman, Florida Supreme Court
Standing Committee on Mediation Rules (Feb. 23, 1998) (on file with author) [herein-
after Stulberg letter] ("[A] mediator should be able to use his/her professional insights
and knowledge to help people move towards resolution; but in order for the mediator
to do that consistent with self-determination, one cannot do it by 'providing' profes-
sional counsel, advice, etc."). But see Watson, supra note 175, at 15 (stating that it is
disingenuous to suggest that mediators who take a direct approach are always
unethical).
184. See Watson, supra note 175, at 14-15 ("The mediator's primary ethical obli-
gation to the parties, the process and the profession is to serve as an impartial
facilitator who preserves, protects and respects the parties' right to decide for them-
selves. [11f the advice or opinions given go beyond mere input and become a determi-
native factor, the 'line is crossed' and an ethical problem arises.").
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their own substantive norms and settlement options, these commen-
tators emphasized the need for "qualified, legal opinion and under-
standing" and "objective criteria"185 to inform rational decision-
making 8 6 and to correct power imbalances between the parties.
187
Overall, these commentators seemed to view the parties as consum-
ers (or clients) who needed and wanted'88 to be educated about their
pre-packaged (generally legal) options so that they could make an in-
formed choice among them. 8 9
Thus, two very different foci in understanding how self-determi-
nation is defined emerge in the comments on the two options for Rule
10.037. The first, which is reminiscent of the vision that inspired
185. Letter from Michael V. Mattson, attorney at law, to Florida Dispute Resolu-
tion Center Rules Committee (Mar. 16, 1998) (on file with author) [hereinafter Matt-
son letter] ("I and all attorneys I have ever spoken with on this issue strongly believe
that it is a most valuable feature that the mediator is able to express, if qualified,
legal opinion and understanding. It assists in providing objection [sic] criteria for the
parties to make their decisions and compromises.").
186. See, e.g., Lande e-mail, supra note 178 ("[Mluch theory argues that to be truly
empowered, principals must thoroughly understand their options and it is the duty of
the mediator to firmly make sure that they are educated."); Siegendorf, supra note
176 at 13 (quoting Stark, supra note 134, at 487) ("I think it is misguided to argue
that a mediator with knowledge of the law should not share her knowledge with the
parties in a law-based mediation-especially if the parties are pro se.... [Wihen
settling their disputes, disputants must be permitted to invoke legal norms if they
choose to, and the mediator must take steps to ensure that the parties' choices are
knowing and informed.").
187. See E-mail from Rev. Dr. David P. Juwel, to Sharon Press, Director, Florida
Dispute Resolution Center (Feb. 14, 1998) (on file with author) ("[Iln an 'Attorney-
Plaintiff vs. Layman-Defendant' environment it is not unusual to deal with attorney's
[sic] who purposely use their professional status to try and intimidate the defendant
into a winning settlement favoring their client, totally disregarding any spirit of mu-
tual agreement.... [Allowing the Mediator to give an opinion and advice based on
their experience, training, and field of expertise, in situations such as the above, will
help to overcome that imbalance.").
188. See Letter from Tom Arnold, Attorney, Arnold, White & Durkee, to Elizabeth
Plapinger, CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution (Jan. 27, 1998) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Arnold letter] ("The point is that the users want, often expect, often need
some major mix of evaluation and advice into the [mediation] process. If the custom-
ers want it, who are the providers-or the rules makers for the providers-to play
God and say you can't have it?").
189. Many commentators supporting Option Two also had very strong feelings
about mediation without evaluation. See, e.g., Watson, supra note 175, at 15 (arguing
that mediators would become mere and dreaded "'message carriers' who simply re-
peat what they have been told and offer no new input to the process"); Arnold letter,
supra note 188 (arguing that prohibiting evaluation would "sterilize the process into
impotence"); Mattson letter, supra note 185 (arguing that prohibiting the provision of
advice would "wrongly emasculate the process"). The gender-invoking language is in-
teresting and perhaps revealing.
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many to join the contemporary mediation movement, focuses on par-
ties' self-understanding, their control over the norms to guide deci-
sion-making, their active and direct participation in the
communication needed to achieve shared understanding and negotia-
tion, and, ultimately, their control over the final decision. The second
vision also incorporates parties' control over the final decision but
tends to place the parties in the role of consumers who require exter-
nally-generated information to inform rational decision-making as
they choose among several pre-packaged settlement options.
The third theme to emerge from the comments involves varying
degrees of faith in the proposed rules' different mechanisms for safe-
guarding self-determination. Option Two of Proposed Rule 10.037
named party self-determination as a key limitation upon the scope of
the professional advice that could be provided to parties in media-
tion. 190 Proposed Rule 10.031 specifically prohibited mediator at-
tempts to interfere with self-determination by offering professional or
personal opinions regarding the outcome of a case. 19 Perhaps due to
their different and more passive vision of party self-determination,
the commentators supporting Option Two exhibited substantial faith
in the effectiveness of naming self-determination to limit the poten-
tially negative effects of mediator evaluation:
In the minds of virtually every member of the Committee, self-
determination of the parties and impartiality of the mediator
are the substance of the mediation process. Adopting a rule
which arbitrarily bans a mediation style, technique or method,
or even restricts the type of contribution a mediator could make
to a mediation, tends to focus on form rather than substance.
Ethical rules should protect substance, not form.
19 2
Those who had the more participatory vision of self-determina-
tion, however, were skeptical. One commentator noted, "Without
separating the advisory from the prohibited, the draft rules run the
risk of being 'preachy' but not precise or clear enough to be enforcea-
ble."' 93 Another commentator also raised concerns that it would be
difficult to enforce the prohibition against giving professional or per-
sonal opinions regarding the outcome of a case if the key question
190. 1998 Proposed Rule Changes, supra note 150, R. 10.037 Option Two.
191. Id. R. 10.031.
192. Watson, supra note 175, at 14.
193. Charles G. Stephens, Circuit and Family Mediator, Comments on Draft Stan-
dards of Professional Conduct for Certified and Court Employed Mediators (submit-
ted to Florida Supreme Court Committee on Mediation and Arbitration Rules) (on file
with author).
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was whether the mediator was attempting to interfere with the par-
ties' self-determination: "Mediator intent is a problematic hinge on
which to hang if the Committee's purpose here is to protect self-deter-
mination of the parties."194 A third distilled these thoughts, writing,
"The 'safeguard' language in Option Two is all fine and dandy in the-
ory and print, but no one has really come forward to demonstrate how
it can and should be done; how we are to establish models and train
mediators to do it; and how standards can be developed to discipline
mediators who don't do it right." 95
As a further means to safeguard party self-determination, the
proposed revisions to Rule 10.031 specifically prohibited coercion or
improper influence by mediators. The proposed Committee Notes ac-
companying Rule 10.031 and Option Two of Rule 10.037 cautioned
more broadly that: "A mediator must not substitute the judgment of
the mediator for the judgment of the parties"19 6 and "[miediators
shall not substitute their advice or opinions for the true will of the
parties." 97 Fewer commentators addressed these provisions. Of
those who did, regardless of whether they were proponents or oppo-
nents of Option Two, most seemed to agree that at the very least, self-
determination presumed the absence of coercion and that coercion
should be expressly banned. 98 These commentators also seemed to
assume that a prohibition against "coercion" would be clearer than a
prohibition against substituting the mediator's advice or opinions for
the "true will" of the parties:
194. Letter from Lela Love, Director, Kukin Program for Conflict Resolution, Ben-
jamin N. Cardozo School of Law, to Sharon Press, Director, Florida Dispute Resolu-
tion Center (Sept. 29, 1998) (on file with author) [hereinafter Love letter]. Professor
Love was commenting on the next publicized draft of the revised Rule 10.037(c) which
provided: "A mediator shall not offer a personal or professional opinion intended to
coerce the parties, decide the dispute, or direct a resolution of any issue." 1998 Pro-
posed Rule Changes to Florida Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators
(second draft) (August 19, 1998), R. 10.037(c) (on file with author). In her letter, Pro-
fessor Love added, "I suspect no mediator would ever confess to intending to coerce,
direct or decide." Love letter, supra.
195. Harry G. Goodheart I, Some Hazards of Mediators Providing Opinions and
Advice, in RESOL. REP. 1998, at 11, 12 (Fla. Disp. Resol. Ctr., Vol. 13, Jan. 1998).
196. 1998 Proposed Rule Changes, supra note 150, R. 10.031 Committee Note.
197. Id R. 10.037.
198. See Letter from John Leo Wagner, Alternative Dispute Resolution Center,
Irell & Manella LLP, to Lawrence M. Watson, Jr., Chair, Florida Supreme Court
Committee on Mediation and Arbitration Rules (Sept. 29, 1998) (on fle with author)
[hereinafter Wagner letter] ("I appreciate the express prohibition of coercion and mis-
representation in Rule 10.031. I believe these are wise policy choices that needed to
be set out explicitly.").
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What could [the] "true will" [of the parties] possibly mean? And
how would you ever determine it? This is a metaphysical con-
cept that has challenged plenty of people-why have it in a
Committee Note? The basic concept is that you don't want the
mediator to coerce or in some other way denigrate the self-deter-
mination of the parties. 199
It is worth noting, however, that a few commentators raised cau-
tionary flags regarding a lack of clarity regarding what exactly was
prohibited. They questioned whether there was a clear difference be-
tween coercion and a party's "detrimental reliance" on the mediator's
opinion 200 and whether a mediator could be accused of coercion even
though the parties had asked the mediator to "beat up" on them.
201
Another commentator asked, 'What is meant by 'improperly in-
fluence a party?' Does 'pressure' capture what is meant here?"
20 2
Finally, a few commentators recommended that Florida's rules
prescribe the mediator behaviors or interventions that would protect
and even nurture parties' self-understanding, participation, and con-
trol while also permitting mediator evaluation. These suggested be-
haviors included: seeking the views of the parties before offering an
199. Stulberg letter, supra note 183. Other dispute resolution scholars have also
equated the existence of self-determination with the absence of coercion. See, e.g.,
Menkel-Meadow, Ethics, supra note 17 at 448-49 (listing as aspects of free choice in-
voked in discussions of mediation, "informed consent to both process and outcome,
and 'self-determination' or lack of coercion and abuse in the process" (emphasis
added)).
200. See, e.g., Goodheart, supra note 195, at 12 ("Change the prohibition against
opinions and advice and you open the door for any party who develops 'buyer's re-
morse' to claim detrimental reliance on a mediator's allegedly defective opinion or
advice. The standard will be one of perception from the standpoint of the party, not
the intent or recollection of the mediator.').
201. Arnold letter, supra note 188 ("I have heard again and again from the [big
consumer] users [of mediation] expressions like: I want the mediator to beat up on me,
because that is the only way I can develop any confidence that he is beating up on the
other guy. 'Beating up on' is a form of advice and coercion I don't indulge, but many
users want it.").
202. Charles G. Stephens, Circuit and Family Mediator, Comments on Draft Stan-
dards of Professional Conduct for Certified and Court Employed Mediators (submit-
ted to Florida Supreme Court Committee on Mediation and Arbitration Rules) (on file
with author).
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opinion;203 disclosing possible effects of mediator evaluation;2°4 and
requiring mediator training on evaluation.
205
In summary, the Committee learned from these comments that
there was consensus on the central importance of self-determination,
but that there were strikingly different visions of party self-determi-
nation held by those supporting and opposing Option Two. Those op-
posing Option Two conceived self-determination as a promise to the
parties that their participation, their norms, and their creativity
would play the central part in the mediation process. For these com-
mentators, permitting mediators to provide professional advice and
opinions violated self-determination per se. In contrast, those sup-
porting Option Two perceived mediator evaluation as potentially fur-
thering party self-determination because the provision of advice and
opinions would inform the parties' decision-making as they chose
among the options available to them.
To the extent that mediator evaluation had the potential to
threaten party self-determination, the proponents of Option Two be-
lieved that self-determination could be safeguarded effectively by ex-
pressly prohibiting coercion and making it clear that party self-
determination could not be violated. The opponents of Option Two
had much less faith in the effectiveness of simply "naming" self-deter-
mination as a check upon over-aggressive mediator evaluation but,
for the most part, they also agreed that coercion should be prohibited.
On May 4, 1999, the Committee submitted its final draft of the
proposed rules to the Florida Supreme Court for adoption. 20 6 On
203. See Facsimile from Michael Lewis to Elizabeth Plapinger, CPR Institute for
Dispute Resolution (on file with author) ("One way to reduce the likelihood that the
mediator will substitute her judgment for that of the parties is to ensure that she
seeks the views of the parties before offering her own opinion. In other words, the
mediator's first obligation should be to attempt to get the parties themselves to de-
velop workable solutions."). But see Stempel, supra note 88, at 956 ("Although there
should probably be a presumptive preference for requiring mediators to first exhaust
facilitative approaches before turning evaluative, mediators should have some discre-
tion to make evaluative moves if necessary, and that choice should be given wide
deference by the courts.").
204. See Lande e-mail, supra note 178 ("[A] possibly better option would be to
mandate certain types of disclosure and discussion... While this would certainly not
be a complete solution to the problem, I suspect that it would be more effective than
trying to regulate mediators' styles by official rules.").
205. See Arnold letter, supra note 188 ("[Mlediators should be trained on when
and how to use evaluation and advice, not instructed to deny this often valuable
service.").
206. See Petition for Amendment to the Florida Rules for Certified and Court-Ap-
pointed Mediators, In re Florida Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators,
762 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam).
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February 3, 2000, after providing an opportunity for additional com-
ments,20 7 the Florida Supreme Court adopted the new rules with
only minor changes. 208 Although the Committee made many revi-
sions between the first and final drafts of the 2000 Rules, most of
these revisions were stylistic rather than substantive.20 9 Self-deter-
mination continued to be an important theme threaded throughout
the rules.2
10
Obviously, however, the Committee had been required to make a
choice regarding Rule 10.037. Despite all of the questions and con-
cerns raised by the opponents of Option Two, the Committee was per-
suaded by the arguments of those who supported that option. In the
second and final draft revisions of the 1992 Rules, the Committee
opted to permit mediators to offer their personal or professional
"opinions" (not "advice"211) and to engage in evaluation ranging from
the provision of "information" to pointing out possible outcomes of the
case and discussing the merits of a claim or defense. 212
207. The Supreme Court received comments from only Gregory Firestone, Ph.D.
and the Committee itself. See In re Amendments to the Florida Rules for Certified
and Court-Appointed Mediators, 762 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam).
208. See id.
209. The most significant stylistic change was an alteration in the numbering of
the rules in the final version. For example, Proposed Rule 10.020 became Rule 10.200;
Proposed Rule 10.021 became Rule 10.210, etc. See 2000 FLA. RULES, supra note 154.
210. In addition, Proposed Rule 10.020, which became Rule 10.200, continued to
identify ethical mediator conduct as more important than settlement. See id. R.
10.200.
211. Some commentators had expressed concerns about the reference to "advice."
See, e.g., Wagner letter, supra note 174 ("I don't like either [o]ption... to the extent
that they both refer to the rendering of 'professional advice'.. . . Giving 'professional
advice' comes dangerously close to crossing the line to where the mediator could be
said to be acting in a representational capacity.").
212. In its entirety, the final draft revision of Rule 10.370 "Professional Advice and
Opinions" (previously numbered Rule 10.037) and its Committee Note read:
(a) PROVIDING INFORMATION. Consistent with standards of impartiality and
preserving party self-determination, a mediator may provide information
that the mediator is qualified by training or experience to provide.
(b) INDEPENDENT LEGAL ADVICE. When a mediator believes a party does not
understand or appreciate how an agreement may adversely affect legal
rights or obligations, the mediator shall advise the party of the right to seek
independent counsel.
(C) PERSONAL OR PROFESSIONAL OPINION. A mediator shall not offer a personal
or professional opinion intended to coerce the parties, decide the dispute, or
direct a resolution of any issue. Consistent with standards of impartiality
and preserving party self-determination, however, a mediator may point out
possible outcomes of the case and discuss the merits of a claim or defense. A
mediator shall not offer a personal or professional opinion as to how the court
in which the case has been filed will resolve the dispute.
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Clearly, however, the Committee had heard the concerns raised
by those who opposed Option Two. In its second and final draft revi-
sion of Rule 10.370 (previously numbered Rule 10.037), the Commit-
tee made it absolutely clear that self-determination was paramount
and its preservation placed limits upon the personal or professional
opinions offered by mediators. Specifically, the rule provided: "Con-
sistent with the standards of impartiality and preserving party self-
determination, a mediator may provide information that the mediator
is qualified by training or experience to provide .... [and] may point
out possible outcomes of the case and discuss the merits of a claim or
defense."
21 3
In Rule 10.370, the Committee also identified two specific situa-
tions in which offering a personal or professional opinion would vio-
late per se self-determination. First, the mediator was prohibited
from offering a "personal or professional opinion intended to coerce
the parties, decide the dispute, or direct a resolution of any issue."
214
Second, the mediator was prohibited from offering "a personal or pro-
fessional opinion as to how the court in which the case has been filed
[Note referring to the Florida Bar Committee on Professional Ethics
omitted.]
1998 Revision: The primary role of the mediator is to facilitate a process
which will provide the parties an opportunity to resolve all or part of a dis-
pute by agreement if they choose to do so. A mediator may assist in that
endeavor by providing relevant information or helping the parties obtain
such information from other sources. A mediator may also raise issues and
discuss strengths and weaknesses of positions underlying the dispute. Fi-
nally, a mediator may help the parties evaluate resolution options and draft
settlement proposals. In providing these services however, it is imperative
that the mediator maintain impartiality and avoid any activity which would
have the effect of overriding the parties' rights of self-determination. While
mediators may call upon their own qualifications and experience to supply
information and options, the parties must be given the opportunity to freely
decide upon any agreement. Mediators shall not utilize their opinions to de-
cide any aspect of the dispute or coerce the parties or their representatives to
accept any resolution option.
While a mediator has no duty to specifically advise a party as to the legal
ramifications or consequences of a proposed agreement, there is a duty for
the mediator to advise the parties of the importance of understanding such
matters and giving them an opportunity to seek such advice if they desire.
2000 Fi.. RuLEs, supra note 154 R. 10.370.
213. Id. R. 10.370(c) (emphasis added).
214. Id. (emphasis added).
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will resolve the dispute."2 15 The revisions to Rule 10.031, "Self-De-
termination," also evidenced the Committee's awareness of the con-
cerns expressed by opponents of Option Two. There, the Committee
added to the Committee Note that "[s]pecial care should be taken to
preserve the parties' right to self determination if the mediator pro-
vides input to the mediation process."
216
Ultimately, the Committee's recommendations (and Florida's
new rules) reflect: 1) the Committee's comfort with and decision to
recommend institutionalization of the thinner vision of self-determi-
nation which focuses exclusively on preserving the parties' control
over the outcome of the mediation session, 2) the Committee's rejec-
tion of a more expansive vision of self-determination anchored in
party empowerment, 3) the Committee's conclusion that mediator
evaluation and the thinner vision of party self-determination can co-
exist, and 4) the Committee's faith in the effectiveness of protecting
self-determination by repeatedly asserting this concept's importance
and prohibiting mediator coercion.
B. The Development of Minnesota's Ethical Guidelines
After years of work and experimentation by mediation advocates,
district courts, and committees and task forces established by the
Minnesota State Bar Association and the Minnesota Supreme
Court,217 the Minnesota Legislature passed Minn. Stat. Section
484.76(1) in 1991. This legislation established a statewide ADR pro-
gram for most civil cases filed with Minnesota's courts, gave Minne-
sota's judges the authority to order parties into mediation and other
non-binding ADR processes, and required the Minnesota Supreme
Court to adopt rules governing practice, procedures, and jurisdiction
for ADR programs adopted under the statute. In 1993, based upon
the recommendations of the ADR Implementation Committee, the
Minnesota Supreme Court promulgated Rule 114 of the Minnesota
215. Id. This provision apparently was resurrected from the 1992 Rules, perhaps
due to the peculiar potency of a prediction as to how a particular judge will decide an
issue or case.
216. 2000 FLA. RULES, supra note 154, R. 10.310 (formerly numbered 10.031) Com-
mittee Note.
217. See generally McAdoo & Welsh, Does ADR Really Have a Place on the Law-
yer's Philosophical Map?, supra note 91, at 376; Barbara McAdoo & Nancy Welsh, The
Times They Are A'Changin'--Or Are They? An Update on Rule 114, HENNEPIN LAW.
YER, Jul.-Aug. 1996, at 8-9; Nancy Welsh & Barbara McAdoo, Alternative Dispute Res-
olution (ADR) in Minnesota-An Update on Rule 114 in COURT-ANNEXED MEDIATION:
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SELECTED STATE AND FEDERAL PROGRAMis 203 (Edward J.
Bergman & John G. Bickerman eds., 1998); Welsh & McAdoo, The ABCs of ADR,
supra note 85, at 11.
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General Rules of Practice for District Courts, which included defini-
tions of the ADR processes covered by the rule218 and established
"mandatory consideration" of ADR in most civil cases, a roster of
qualified neutrals (including mediators), and an ADR Review
Board.2
19
It is noteworthy that Minnesota's definition of mediation in Rule
114 focused upon the facilitation of "communication between the par-
ties" with the ultimate goal of promoting settlement. Thus, Minne-
sota's definition was relatively consistent with the vision arising out
of the contemporary mediation movement and arguably should have
signaled the courts' adoption of a participatory understanding of self-
determination. However, it is just as noteworthy that this definition
was not the subject of any substantial debate among members of the
ADR Implementation Committee. 220 Instead, it is quite likely that
this language was borrowed from a definition that had been devel-
oped and promoted by an ADR non-profit organization, The Media-
tion Center. Thus, it is unclear whether all of the members of the
ADR Implementation Committee agreed that "communication be-
tween parties" was of paramount importance and equally unclear
whether the definition of mediation contemplated communication be-
tween the disputants themselves rather than between their
attorneys.
In 1996, at the direction of the Minnesota Supreme Court, the
ADR Review Board began more than a year's worth of work develop-
ing a code of ethics for mediators and other ADR neutrals providing
services pursuant to Rule 114. The Board reviewed many other
states' codes of ethics, as well as the Model Standards of Conduct de-
veloped jointly by the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution,
the American Bar Association, and the American Arbitration Associ-
ation.221 By June, 1996, the Board had developed a draft to be circu-
lated among Minnesota's attorneys, judges, and ADR neutrals for
their feedback. Like the drafters of Florida's ethical guidelines, the
218. Rule 114.02 includes the following definition of mediation:
"A forum in which a neutral third party facilitates communication between par-
ties to promote settlement. A mediator may not impose his or her own judgment on
the issues for that of the parties." MIN. GEN. R. oF PRACTICE FOR DiST. CT., R.
114.02(a)(7) (1999).
219. See id. R. 114.01, R. 114.05.
220. As a member of the Minnesota ADR Implementation Committee, the Author
participated in these discussions.
221. As a member of the Minnesota ADR Review Board, the Author participated
in this review.
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members of the Minnesota Review Board believed that self-determi-
nation was the key principle underlying mediation. They also be-
lieved that this principle was unique to mediation. Therefore, one
section of the proposed code was devoted exclusively to mediation and
provided:
SELF-DETERMINATION. A mediator shall recognize that me-
diation is based on the principle of self-determination by the
parties. It requires that the mediation process rely upon the
ability of the parties to reach a voluntary, uncoerced agreement.
The primary responsibility for the resolution of a dispute and
the shaping of a settlement agreement rests with the parties.
Any party may withdraw from mediation at any time.
22 2
In the comments to this provision, the ADR Review Board ad-
dressed the national facilitative-evaluative debate. Specifically,
Comment 1 provided:
The mediator may provide information about the process, raise
issues, draft proposals, and help parties explore options. The
primary role of the mediator is to facilitate a voluntary resolu-
tion of a dispute. Parties should be given the opportunity to con-
sider all proposed options. It is acceptable for the mediator to
suggest options or to offer opinions about the case, in response to
parties' requests for such options and opinions.
223
Thus, the ADR Review Board proposed, much like the drafters of
Florida's ethical guidelines, that Minnesota's mediators be permitted
to evaluate but that such evaluation not be permitted to violate the
parties' self-determination. Like the drafters in Florida, the Minne-
sota ADR Review Board seemed to adopt the narrow vision of self-
determination by defining it as "the ability of the parties to reach a
voluntary, uncoerced agreement" with "primary responsibility for
resolution of a dispute... rest[ing] with the parties."224 Importantly,
however, Minnesota's drafters took one step beyond Florida's drafters
222. Minnesota Alternative Dispute Resolution Review Board, Rule 114 Code of
Ethics, 5 (proposed June 5, 1996) (on file with author).
223. Id.
224. Interestingly, Minnesota's definition also may have incorporated some ele-
ments of the more expansive vision of self-determination which had been rejected in
Florida. Specifically, Minnesota's proposed definition of self-determination provided
that "[tihe primary responsibility for the shaping of a settlement agreement rests
with the parties." MINN. GEN. R. OF PRACTICE FOR DIsT. CT., R. 114 app. (1999) (em-
phasis added). This language could suggest that the ADR Review Board perceived
self-determination as involving parties' direct and active participation in the media-
tion process, as well as party control over the substantive norms which will guide
their decision-making. Unfortunately, there was no debate regarding this language
which could help to clarify its intended meaning or effect. Further, even if this lan-
guage hints at party empowerment, the actual implementation of Rule 114 strongly
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and encouraged particular conduct to protect and nurture self-deter-
mination. Specifically, the proposed comment made it clear that a
mediator should withhold his/her suggestions or opinions until after
the parties had requested this evaluative service.
Surprisingly, this provision of the proposed Code of Ethics did
not draw as much attention as other proposed rules. Less surpris-
ingly, there were those who supported this provision in its entirety,
those who opposed permitting mediators to provide evaluations, and
those who opposed placing any limitations on the mediator's ability to
evaluate.22
5
Those who opposed evaluation raised concerns about its effect on
parties' self-determination: "The last sentence of Comment #1, specif-
ically 'to offer opinions about the case' appears to contradict the defi-
nition of mediation in Rule 114.02(4), which prohibits the mediator
from imposing [the mediator's] own judgment on the issues brought
forth by the parties."226 Indeed, some commentators proposed spe-
cific revisions to the proposed rule in order to make it clear that
mediators should strive for agreements reflecting the underlying in-
terests of all the parties and should restrain themselves from offering
opinions or engaging in any judgmental conduct or
communication.
227
suggests that aspects of evaluative mediation are being institutionalized in Minne-
sota's courts. See McAnoo, A REPORT To T E MwNESOTA SuPREM % CoutT, supra note
104.
225. Some even opposed the provision allowing the parties to withdraw from medi-
ation at any time. Two commentators wrote: "If they [the parties] are given that op-
portunity, many mediations would never start (or proceed very far)." Letter from
Brian Short, 1014 Property Company, and Thomas Fraser, Fredrikson & Byron, PA,
to ADR Review Board (Aug. 15, 1996) (on file with author).
226. Letter from D.M. Boulay et al., on behalf of the Minnesota Association of
Mediators, to Alanna Moravetz, ADR Review Board (Aug. 15, 1996) (on file with au-
thor). Some also commented that permitting mediators to provide opinions endan-
gered their impartiality. See Letter from John Lundblad, President, Midwest
Mediation, Inc., to Alanna Moravetz, ADR Review Board (Aug. 15, 1996) (on file with
author).
227. See, e.g., Memorandum and Comments from the Conflict Management and
Dispute Resolution Section of the Minnesota State Bar Association to Alanna
Moravetz and Lynae Olson (August 15, 1996), Proposed Revised Rule 114 Code of
Ethics, app. A. (on file with author) [hereinafter Memorandum and Commentsl. The
Section proposed the following revisions to the rule and the first comment (new lan-
guage is italicized):
SELF-DETERMINATION IN MEDIATION. A mediator shall recognize that
mediation is based on the principle of self-determination. This principle re-
quires that the mediation process rely upon the ability of the parties to reach
a voluntary, uncoerced agreement which, so far as possible, accommodates
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As in Florida, those who opposed the proposed rule's limitation
on mediators' ability to evaluate emphasized the value of the infor-
mation provided by the evaluative mediator:
I am concerned that the Code as drafted discourages neutrals
from rendering an opinion if the opinion is requested. The pro-
posed code also discourages evaluation of parties' positions if the
opinion is unrequested. There is an ongoing debate whether,
when and to what extent evaluation (i.e., an opinion) is appro-
priate during mediation. The draft on "mediation" endorses one
side of the debate, which is inappropriate. This is a Code of Eth-
ics, not an instruction manual. Almost all the mediators in my
cases have expressly or impliedly made their opinions known to
varying degrees at some point (usually late) in the process and
usually without my asking for their opinion. [In one case,] [t]he
claim was weak on damages and the client needed to work
through th[e] type of analysis [provided by the mediator].
Whether or not sharing these types of "opinions" comports with
others' theoretical definition of mediation, in practice it is a com-
mon occurrence. Therefore, I do not think it would be prudent
to call such behavior unethical. There is nothing immoral about
privately providing an unsolicited opinion. If rendering any
form of an opinion to any extent is objectionable, then this
should be taught, not branded as unethical.
2 2 s
Ultimately, the rule which the ADR Review Board proposed and
the Minnesota Supreme Court promulgated 229 endorsed mediator
evaluation even more strongly than the proposed rule which was cir-
culated in June of 1996. The rule's comments clearly permit
mediators to "raise issues, offer opinions about the strengths and
the underlying interests of all parties. The primary responsibility for the res-
olution of a dispute rests with the parties. Any party may withdraw from
mediation at any time.
Comment 1: A mediator may provide information about the process, raise
issues, draft proposals and help parties explore options. The primary role of
a mediator is to facilitate a voluntary resolution of a dispute and not to im-
pose his or her preferred solution. Parties should be given the opportunity to
consider all proposed options. It is acceptable for a mediator to suggest op-
tions, but not to coerce the parties to accept any particular option. A mediator
shall be non-judgmental. For example, the mediator shall not seek to deter-
mine which party is likely to prevail in litigation and to persuade the parties
to accept the mediator's opinion of an appropriate settlement.
Id.
228. Letter from Dean Thomson, Fabyanske, Suoboda, Westra & Hart, to Alanna
Moravetz, ADR Review Board (June 17, 1996) (on file with author).
229. The Code of Ethics was promulgated by the Supreme Court as an appendix to
Rule 114 of the Minnesota General Rules of Practice for District Courts. MINN. GEN.
R. OF PRACTICE FOR DIST. CT., R. 114 app. (1999).
[Vol. 6:1
The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?
weaknesses of a case," and suggest options for settlement. 230 The
limitations placed on these evaluative activities look much like those
developed in Florida. The mediator is required to behave in a man-
ner consistent with party self-determination, and the mediator may
not coerce parties to accept any particular option. Minnesota's draft-
ers were more prescriptive than the drafters in Florida in only one
significant respect. The Comments to the provision make it clear
that a mediator should wait for a request from a party before sug-
gesting an option for settlement.23 '
C. Summary of Florida's and Minnesota's Processes: Placing Their
Trust in the "Fine and Dandy" Words of Self-
Determination
For very good reasons, particularly given the court-connected
context which was their focus, the drafting committees in Minnesota
and Florida determined that mediator evaluation should be permit-
ted. As noted supra, mediator evaluation has the potential to aid
party self-determination by insuring that the parties who have in-
voked the law and legal institutions are adequately informed regard-
ing their choices. But legitimate concerns about the potential
negative impact of such evaluation existed. Both committees re-
sponded by endorsing a thinner vision of self-determination, naming
self-determination as a core principle, and prohibiting coercion. Both
committees apparently assumed that these measures would success-
fully counterbalance the temptation to push inappropriately for set-
tlement in mediation.
230. MIN. GEN. R. OF PRACTICE FOR Disr. CT., IL 114 app. (1999). See also Memo-
randum and Comments, supra note 227, Comment 1.
231. In full, the final rule provides:
SELF-DETERMINATION. A mediator shall recognize that mediation is
based on the principle of self-determination by the parties. It requires that
the mediation process rely upon the ability of the parties to reach a volun-
tary, uncoerced agreement. The primary responsibility for the resolution of a
dispute and the shaping of a settlement agreement rests 'with the parties. A
mediator shall not require a party to stay in the mediation against the
party's will.
The 1997 Advisory Task Force Comments provide:
1. The mediator may provide information about the process, raise issues, of-
fer opinions about the strengths and weaknesses of a case, draft proposals,
and help parties explore options. The primary role of the mediator is to facil-
itate a voluntary resolution of a dispute. Parties should be given the oppor-
tunity to consider all proposed options. It is acceptable for the mediator to
suggest options in response to parties' requests, but not to coerce the parties
to accept any particular option.
INN. GEN. R. OF PRACTICE FOR DIsT. CT., R. 114 App. (1999).
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The committees' choices leave us with important questions: How
likely is it that these measures will effectively safeguard the admit-
tedly "fundamental" principle of self-determination, even in its nar-
rowed form? Will these measures be effective in keeping permissible
mediator evaluation from becoming "inappropriate pushing?" The
answers to these questions will depend upon how courts and ethical
boards respond to claims that mediators violated disputants' self-de-
termination by engaging in evaluation or persuasion that was so ag-
gressive that it effectively coerced the disputants into reaching
settlement agreements.
The issue of coercive evaluation by third parties is not entirely
new. Courts have addressed similar claims when litigants have come
to them with arguments that aggressive evaluation by judges or mag-
istrates in judicially-hosted settlement conferences had the effect of
coercing settlement agreements. 232 The next section of this Article
will examine the courts' handling of these cases and will demonstrate
that courts have rarely been persuaded that "mere" judicial evalua-
tion or "mere" suggestions regarding settlement constitute coercion,
even when litigants may legitimately fear that their failure to accede
to judges' wishes could result in unfavorable rulings or even sanc-
tions. This strongly suggests that if aggressive evaluation is not coer-
cive when a judge does it, the courts are unlikely to find it coercive
when their court-approved and court-certified mediators use aggres-
sive evaluation or aggressive persuasive techniques to deliver settle-
ments. 233 After all, unlike judges, mediators do not have the power
to decide issues in cases, to decide the ultimate outcomes of cases, or
to assess penalties. If a judge's evaluation and settlement proposals
are not viewed as coercive, the powerless mediator's evaluation or
settlement proposals are even less likely be deemed coercive. It is
232. Other commentators have also noted the similarity between the role and eth-
ics of judges in settlement conferences and the role and ethics of mediators in media-
tion sessions. See Stempel, supra note 88, at 970 (recommending that mediators
consider mimicking the "alternating evaluative-hybrid-facilitative tactics of the judge
[which] appear to bring about fair, effective, and lasting settlements"); JONA GOLD.
SCHMIDT & LISA MILORD, JUDICLAL SETTLEMENT ETHICS: A JUDGE'S GUIDE 1, 6 (1996)
("Depending on the judge's settlement 'style,' such a [settlement] conference often re-
sembles mediation. [Nlonjudicial codes developed for the mediation context contain
useful principles for judges to consider in the study of ethics of settlement confer-
ences."). But see Evans v. State of Florida, 603 So. 2d 15 (Fla. Ct. App. 1992) ("The
function of a mediator and a judge are conceptually different .... [Miediation should
be left to mediators and judging to judges.").
233. Although related, this is a different question than asking whether the courts
are likely to find that non-attorney mediators are engaged in unauthorized practice of
law if they provide evaluations or use legal information to explain their proposals for
settlement.
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also unlikely that courts (or the ethical boards they have established)
will perceive that the commitment to self-determination in mediation
somehow changes the definition of coercion, particularly when self-
determination is either ill-defined or defined so narrowly that it is no
longer anchored in a vision of party participation and empowerment.
Thus, in reviewing the courts' handling of claims of coercion by
judges and magistrates, the next section raises substantial doubts re-
garding the effectiveness of the choices made by the Minnesota and
Florida drafting committees to promote and protect party self-deter-
mination in court-connected mediation.
V. SETrLEMENT IN THE COURTS AND THE RUSH TO CLOSURE
A. Deference to Settlement as the Expression of Parties' Free Will
Generally, today's courts prefer that civil cases settle.234 Indeed,
at least one court has declared that settlements represent the "best
justice."235 Why do courts view settlement in this way? Many note
that "the salutary effect of settlements on our overtaxed judicial and
administrative calendars .. . is an undeniable benefit."2 6 Courts
also are concerned about the delay and expense suffered by litigants
involved in full-scale litigation.237 Philosophically, some courts have
observed that "voluntary compliance [with the law] is preferable to
court action."238 Courts also are quite aware that Congress has
clearly expressed a preference for private settlement in various stat-
utes.2 9 Finally, research has indicated that parties' compliance with
their own settlement agreements is greater than their compliance
234. This was not always so. Increasing dockets, the language of Rule 16 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and Congress' direction in the Civil Justice Act help
to explain the courts' change in attitude toward settlement-and many courts' em-
brace of alternative dispute resolution. Some also have hypothesized that the preva-
lence of settlement is the result of other factors such as the smaller percentage of
attorneys who have trial experience, the increasing number of new and unknown
judges, and the increasing number of complex causes of action. See Bundy, supra note
24, at 28-37.
235. Cottman Transmission Sys., Inc. v. Metro Distrib. Inc., No. ClV. A. 92-2131,
1993 WL 481555 at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 1993). Many commentators have expressed
concern about the courts' apparent willingness to abandon their responsibility for de-
termining public norms. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J.
1073 (1984); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HIv. L. Rxv. 374 (1982).
236. Peskin v. Peskin, 638 A.2d 849, 856 (N.J. 1994) (citing Dep't. Of Pub. Advo-
cate v. N.J. Bd. of Pub. Util., 503 A.2d 331 (1985)).
237. See quotation from Chief Justice Burger, supra note 87.
238. Dent v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Co., 406 F.2d 399, 402 (5th Cir. 1969).
239. See United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322, 1331 (5th Cir. 1980) (not-
ing that Congress has put an "extremely high premium on voluntary settlement of
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with court orders, thus reducing the likelihood that they will need to
turn to the court for enforcement. 240
Beyond this, however, courts indicate that they defer to agree-
ments reached by the parties because "the parties to the dispute are
in the best position to determine how to resolve a contested matter in
a way which is least disadvantageous to everyone."241 This language
suggests that the courts, like those involved in regulating mediator
ethics, are concerned about party self-determination. Settlement per-
mits the parties to be directly involved in and to control the assess-
ment of their interests and the shaping of a settlement agreement
that meets those interests or, at the very least, is "least disadvanta-
geous to everyone."
It seems reasonable that if the courts defer to settlements be-
cause they express the parties' self-determination, then the courts
must be sure that the settlements actually express such self-determi-
nation. Courts do not seem to see it this way. First, the courts are
unfamiliar with the language of "self-determination" in the context of
settlement.242 Instead, the courts concern themselves more narrowly
with whether or not parties "freely entered into"2 43 the agreement.
Title VII suits"); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974) ("Coopera-
tion and voluntary compliance were selected [by Congress] as the preferred means for
achieving [the goal of elimination of unlawful employment discrimination].")
240. See McEwen & Maiman, supra note 89, at 237 (reporting that compliance
with mediated results was higher than compliance with adjudicated results).
241. City of Miami, 614 F.2d at 1322.
242. Indeed, courts appear to discuss "self-determination" as it applies to settle-
ment agreements only in the context of challenges to tribes' right to self-government.
See, e.g., Penobscot Indian Nation v. Key Bank of Me., 112 F.3d 538, 546, 554-55 (1st
Cir. 1997); Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians v. Maine Human Rights Comm'n, 960 F.
Supp. 449, 453 (D. Me. 1997). Interestingly, mediation advocates also have invoked
self-government-and particularly the underlying values of democracy-to explain
the importance of self-determination in mediation. See Menkel-Meadow, Ethics,
supra note 17, at 452 ("As I have argued for the substantive justification of ADR (and
settlement) on the basis of democratic, party-empowering participation, consent and
quality of solutions, and outcomes, then so must the ethics (and justice) of ADR be
judged by these goals and purposes .. ."); Stulberg, supra note 79, at 1001 ("Concepts
of participation and empowerment are not idle pleasantries... but are central princi-
ples of a democratic society and critical features of consensual decision-making
processes, of which mediation is traditionally thought to be a prime example.");
FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 35 ("Using mediation to facilitate conflict resolu-
tion and encourage self-determination thus strengthens democratic values and en-
hances the dignity of those in conflict."). See also Alex Wellington, Taking Codes of
Ethics Seriously: Alternative Dispute Resolution and Reconstitutive Liberalism, 12
CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 297 (1999) (arguing that liberal pluralistic democratic
theory provides coherent context for understanding and defending value of alterna-
tive dispute resolution).
243. Casto v. Casto, 508 So. 2d 330, 334 (Fla. 1987).
The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?
In other words, did the parties' "manifestation of assent"244 to the
settlement agreement result from the exercise of their "free will?"245
Was it the product of a "free and untrammeled mind? 2 46
Second and very importantly, the courts hold a nearly-unshak-
able presumption that any settlement actually represents the exer-
cise of parties' free will. Indeed, it is the party who claims that he or
she was deprived of the exercise of his or her "free will" in entering
into a settlement agreement who bears the burden of proof.247 This
burden is generally not met by pointing to evidence that the party
was unaware of relevant legal information or lacked counsel. 248 The
courts tend to conclude that, if a party was aware that he or she had
the right to consult with an attorney, then that party made "free, cal-
culated, and deliberate choices" 249 in deciding not to seek indepen-
dent legal information or counsel.250 It also does not matter to the
244. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, §§ 164, 175 1981).
245. It is worth noting here the similarity between this focus and the definition of
self-determination contained in Florida's revisions to its rules described infra. Both
the courts and the drafters of the revised rules narrowly focus on the point at which
the parties make and manifest their decision to agree or not to agree.
It is also worth noting that, outside the context of settlement agreements, courts
have tended to avoid the term "free will" in examining whether parties entered into
contracts under duress. Instead, they have tried to determine whether the alleged
victim of duress had "no reasonable alternative" but to acquiesce to entering into the
contract. See Machinery Hauling, Inc. v. Steel of W. Va., 384 S.E.2d 139, 142 (W. Va.
1989); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, §175t1) ("If a party's manifesta-
tion of assent is induced by an improper threat by the other party that leaves the
victim no reasonable alternative, the contract is voidable by the victim.").
246. Olam v. Congress Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1149 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
247. See Petracca v. Petracca, 706 So. 2d 904, 912 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1998) ("In
order to avoid an agreement settling a dissolution of marriage action in which the
parties were adversaries, the challenging spouse is limited to showing fraud, misrep-
resentation in the discovery, or coercion."); Clooten v. Clooten, 520 N.W.2d 843, 845
(N.D. 1994) (party challenging judgment entered pursuant to contractual stipulation
has "burden of showing that, under the law of contracts, there is justification for set-
ting the contract aside").
248. See Steward v. Rahr, 435 N.W.2d 538, 539 (Minn. 1989) (lack of legal repre-
sentation, without more, insufficient to show mistake); Casto, 508 So. 2d at 334;
Bubenik v. Bubenik, 392 So. 2d 943 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Cowen v. Cowen, 95 So.
2d 584 (Fla. 1957). See also Tenneboe v. Tenneboe, 558 So. 2d 470,473 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1990) (recognizing that a lack of legal representation is not, by itself, a ground to
vacate an agreement, but is "one factor for the court to consider and weigh" when
determining claims of fraud, misrepresentation and overreaching).
249. Fleck v. Fleck, 337 N.W.2d 786, 791 (N.D. 1983).
250. See Clooten, 520 N.W.2d at 845 ("CL]ack of legal representation of one of the
parties to a marital settlement agreement is just one factor for the court to consider
and weigh when claims of fraud, undue influence, or other actionable misconduct are
made[.]"); Cleghorn v. Scribner, 597 So. 2d 693, 696 (Ala. 1992) (holding that in the
absence of evidence of misrepresentation or concealment of material fact, release will
be given effect even though plaintiff did not have an attorney and was having "serious
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courts that a settlement represents a poor bargain for one of the par-
ties.251 The power to exercise free will is accompanied by responsibil-
ity for the consequences, whether they be for good or for ill. The
courts will not permit parties to rescind agreements simply because
they are suffering "buyer's (or seller's) remorse,"252 had a "change of
heart,"253 or became "unhappy"254 with the deal they struck.
The law, however, does provide disgruntled parties with a few
narrow avenues for overcoming the presumption that they exercised
free will in reaching their settlement agreement. First, because set-
tlement agreements are contracts, parties can assert the general con-
tract defenses of fraud, 255 misrepresentation, 256 mutual mistake, 25 7
coercion or duress, 258 and undue influence.259 Second, under certain
circumstances, disgruntled parties can argue that they belong to a
sort of "protected class" whose exercise of "free will" cannot be as-
sumed, either because they lacked the mental capacity to enter into a
settlement agreement 260 or because they entered into a settlement
agreement in a situation that invited patently unfair bargaining. 261
financial difficulties" when he signed the release since the record did not show that
the plaintiff "was discouraged or somehow prevented from seeking legal advice").
251. See Petracca, 706 So. 2d at 910 ("[Flreedom to contract is fundamental, and
the contracts of capable people are enforced by courts even when the bargain is diffi-
cult."); Casto, 508 So. 2d at 334 ("[Ihe fact that one party to the agreement appar-
ently made a bad bargain is not sufficient ground, by itself, to vacate or modify a
settlement agreement.").
252. See Rosevear v. Rosevear, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 691, 699 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
253. Ovadiah v. N.Y. Ass'n for New Americans, Nos. 95 Civ. 10523(SS), 96 Civ.
330(SS), 1997 WL 342411 at *11 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 1997).
254. Stoelting v. Stoelting, 412 N.W.2d 861, 864 (N.D. 1987).
255. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (1979).
256. See id. §§ 162-64.
257. See id. § 152.
258. See id. § 175. See also Machinery Hauling, Inc. v. Steel of W. Va., 384 S.E.2d
139 (W. Va. 1989) (discussing generally defenses of duress in contract enforcement
actions).
259. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §177 (1979).
260. Minors and persons suffering from mental incapacity fit into this category.
See, e.g., Dengler v. Crisman, 516 A.2d 1231 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (involving settle-
ment of a minor's action).
261. Seamen, members of class actions, and shareholders in shareholder deriva-
tive suits fall in this category. See Castillo v. Spiliada Maritime Corp., 937 F.2d 240,
243 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that the district court erred in ruling that seamen's re-
leases were valid as a matter of law, and noting that "seamen have enjoyed a special
status in our judicial system because they occupy a unique position. A seaman iso-
lated on a ship on the high seas is often vulnerable to the exploitation of his em-
ployer."); United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322, 1331 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting
that settlements of class actions and shareholder derivative suits are unique because
absent class members or shareholders are involved and such settlements "may benefit
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In these "exceptional situation[s],"262 statutes or court rules do not
presume that settlement agreements represent the exercise of the
parties' free will. Instead they require court review of the reasona-
bleness of the terms of settlement agreements, 263 closer scrutiny of
the fairness of the process used to negotiate these settlements,264 or a
combination of both.
265
the class representatives or their attorneys at the expense of absent class members or
shareholders").
262. City of Miami, 614 F.2d at 1331.
263. In determining whether to approve a settlement of a minor's action, a court is
required to review the terms of the settlement agreement and determine whether the
rights and best interests of the minor are adequately protected. See, e.g., Klein v.
Cissone, 443 A.2d 799 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982). In most jurisdictions, the judges are
required to review divorce agreements for fairness or lack of unconscionability, but in
practice there is minimal judicial oversight. See Eileen Bryan, The Coercion of Wo-
men in Divorce Settlement Negotiations, 74 Dnsv. U. L. Ruv. 931, 937 (1997); see also
Engler, supra note 133, at 2018-21.
264. In a settlement agreement with a seaman, the ship owner bears the burden of
establishing the validity of the seamen's release of claims and must show that the
release "was executed freely, without deception or coercion, and that it was made by
the seaman with full understanding of his rights.'" Castillo, 937 F.2d at 244 (citing
Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 248 (1942)). See also infra note 334.
265. For proposed class action settlements, proposed settlements of shareholder
derivative suits, and proposed settlements of claims in bankruptcy court, the stan-
dards for judges' approval of settlements have been described positively Ii.e., requir-
ing the court to find the settlement "fair, adequate, and reasonable") and negatively
(i.e., requiring court approval of a settlement provided that the terms are "not unlaw-
ful, unreasonable or inequitable"). See City of Miami, 614 F.2d at 1330 (providing a
general discussion). In determining whether a settlement is "fair, reasonable and ad-
equate," courts examine factors relating to both the substantive terms of the settle-
ment and the dynamics of the negotiation process. Specifically, the factors include:
the existence of fraud or collusion behind the settlement; the complexity, expense and
likely duration of the litigation; the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discov-
ery completed; the probability of plaintiffs success on the merits; the range of possible
recovery;, and the opinions of the class counsel, class representatives and absent class
members." See EEOC v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 894 F. Supp. 1329, 1333 (E.D. Mo.
1995).
The courts' general discomfort with determining whether settlement agreements
are fair, reasonable, and are the result of informed decision-making is suggested by
the court in Petracca v. Petracca, 706 So. 2d 904 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1998). There, a
divorced wife moved to invalidate an agreement settling the dissolution of marriage
litigation. She argued that the court was required to determine whether the agree-
ment made "an unfair or unreasonable provision for the [challenging] spouse" and
whether she had adequate knowledge of the defending spouse's finances at the time
the agreement was reached, based on a line of cases involving challenges to prenup-
tial and postnuptial agreements. Id, The court also declared that this line of cases
was inapplicable to settlement agreements, noting-
This litigation settlement presumption arises from the special treatment
that courts give to voluntary settlements of lawsuits. [Imt ought to be very
difficult to unsettle an agreement settling litigation. Settlements of civil law-
suits merit the greatest protection from judges. In short, it is the policy of
this state to encourage settlements and enforce them whenever it is possible
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Despite the existence of these defenses, it remains very difficult
for parties who wish to rescind a settlement agreement to overcome
the presumption that they exercised free will. It becomes even more
difficult when a party claims that his or her free will was violated by
the language or behavior of a judge in a settlement conference. The
courts' handling of allegations of coercion by judges and other judicial
officers involved in settlement conferences may be both instructive
and troubling for those who are working to protect party self-determi-
nation in court-connected mediation.266
B. Distinguishing Between Explicit and Implicit Coercion: The
Courts' Definition of "Acceptable Pressure"
The Commentary for Canon 3B(8) of the ABA Model Code of Ju-
dicial Conduct (1990)267 clearly condemns coercion as a means to set-
tle cases. Specifically, it provides that: "A judge should encourage
and seek to facilitate settlement, but parties should not feel coerced
into surrendering the right to have their controversy resolved by the
courts."268 Yet, it is acknowledged that "judicial officers acting as
mediators ... [make] occasional use of inappropriate techniques."
269
Indeed, there is substantial empirical evidence that judges wield a
to do so. If one of the settling parties can have the court later inquire into its
reasonableness and fairness, there would be little incentive for courts to en-
courage settlements.
Id. at 912.
266. Professor Menkel-Meadow has raised concerns about the apparent disconnect
between the ethics of mediation and the contract principles which are used to deter-
mine whether to enforce settlement agreements, writing: "In ADR ethics we must be
concerned about whether consent [to a settlement agreement] is real and thus, will
have to carefully scrutinize and perhaps go beyond simple contract enforcement stan-
dards or important process issues will be merged (and lost) in contract doctrine (as I
believe has already happened with Supreme Court arbitration jurisprudence)."
Menkel-Meadow, Ethics, supra note 17, at 451, n.198. Specifically, she has urged:
"Outcomes should not be coerced (there must be real consent); parties should feel as if
they have been given a fair opportunity to choose (self-determination) and participate
in their proceedings (democratic participation); and the process should be conducted
by parties and neutrals who behave fairly (and without partisanship as third parties,
even if they can not be totally neutral and detached)." Id. at 451-52.
267. FED. R. Civ. P. 16; MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(5), Com-
mentary (2000); see also Laura Margolis Warshawsky, Objectivity and Accountability:
Limits on Judicial Involvement in Settlement, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 369 (1987) (urg-
ing that judges should encourage settlement only if they can do so without using their
position coercively).
268. FED. R. Civ. P. 16; MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(5), Com-
mentary (2000).
269. In re Fee, 898 P.2d 975, 978 (Ariz. 1995).
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wide range of potentially coercive tools to persuade parties to set-
tle.270 Although there is no evidence that the use of coercive tools is
the norm among judges, a review of the cases and survey data does
reveal judges who have:
o sanctioned parties for their failure accept the settlement sug-
gested by the court;
27 '
o sanctioned parties for their failure to settle by a deadline;272
o sanctioned attorneys for their failure to make a settlement
offer;27
3
o sanctioned parties for waiting to settle within a court-recom-
mended settlement range until after trial commenced;
274
270. See Daisy Hurst Floyd, Can The Judge Do That?-The Need for a Clearer
Judicial Role in Settlement, 26 Amz. ST. L.J. 45, 53-54 (1994) (One empirical study
identified approximately seventy settlement techniques that had either been observed
or used by judges and lawyers. These techniques ranged from fairly benign interven-
tions (e.g., setting a settlement conference upon request) to more directive techniques
(e.g., calling a certain figure reasonable or arguing logically for concessions) to explic-
itly coercive measures (e.g., penalizing or threatening a lawyer for refusal to settle).
Approximately 10 percent of the federal and state judges responding to another sur-
vey indicated that they "intervene aggressively-through the use of direct pressure"
in settlement.
The more coercive techniques used by judges include reminding litigants of
the possible adverse consequences of not reaching an agreement. One judge
reported that he sometimes encourages litigants to talk settlement at the
final pretrial conference by belittling the case with an observations such as
'You don't want to go to trial with this!' Others suggest the possibility that
defendant might invoke Rule 68 and submit an offer of judgment, which
could expose plaintiff to paying the costs of continuing the litigation.
Id. (citing James A. Wall, Jr., Judicial Participation in Settlement, 1984 J. Disp.
RESOL. 25 and JoHN P. RYAN, AMRiCAN TRIAL JUDGES: THEIR WORK STYLES AND PER.
FORMANCE, 77 (1980)); see also Stacey Burns, The Name of the Game Is Movement:
Concession Seeking in Judicial Mediation of Large Money Damage Cases, 15 MEmA-
TioN Q. 359 (1998) (examining the obstacles to settlement encountered by public and
private judge-mediators and skills and tactics used to overcome these obstacles).
271. See Nat'l Ass'n of Gov't Employees, Inc. v. Nat'l Fed'n. of Fed. Employees, 844
F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1988) (vacating a district court's order to impose sanctions under
Rule 11, Fed. R. Civ. P. on a plaintiff for not accepting settlement at pretrial confer-
ence or at the close of the case).
272. See Newton v. A-C. & S., Corp, 918 F.2d 1121 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that,
while the district court had authority to impose fines for failure to settle by deadline,
fines also constituted civil contempt and the court could not impose fines without af-
fording the parties due process rights of adequate notice and prior hearing).
273. See Dawson v. United States, 68 F.3d 886 (5th Cir. 1995) (reversing and va-
cating the trial court's imposition of sanctions upon two Assistant United States At-
torneys for their failure to make a settlement offer, and holding that making a
settlement offer was not required as part of good faith effort to settle).
274. See Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667, 669 (2d Cir. 1985) (remanding and vacating
sanctions imposed on defendant by the trial court which reasoned "that it was 'deter-
mined to get the attention of the carrier' and that 'the carriers are going to have to
wake up when a judge tells them that they want [sic] to settle a case and they don't
want to settle it'").
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" accelerated the date of trial due to a party's refusal to
settle;
27 5
" threatened to report parties' or their attorneys' uncooperative
conduct to the trial judge;
276
* threatened to consider a party's refusal to settle when evalu-
ating the other party's petition for fees;
2 77
" threatened to make undesirable rulings during trial.278
It is important to note that when parties have alleged and been
able to show that judges engaged in the explicitly coercive behaviors
listed above for the purpose of coercing settlement or punishing a fail-
ure to settle, appellate courts have been willing to vacate the sanc-
tions and, occasionally, vacate settlement agreements.27 9 However,
appellate courts have been much less willing to recognize and provide
relief to parties who have claimed more subtle, implicit coercion by a
judge, such as aggressively evaluating a party's case, strongly urging
a party to settle, or advocating for a particular settlement.
280
275. See Wolff v. Laverne Inc., 233 N.Y.S.2d 555 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962) (allowing a
motion to vacate the trial court's advancement of an action to the head of next term's
calendar after defendant refused to offer an additional $1,000 to settle case); Innis v.
Innis, 616 N.E.2d 837 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993) (affirming the trial court's refusal to undo
a judgment incorporating a stipulation after a party alleged that the judge had co-
erced her into agreeing to the stipulation by threatening to hold immediate trial,
which would have been too much for party due to her condition of depression and
recent diagnosis of Parkinson's disease); Chomski v. Alston Cab Co., 299 N.Y.S.2d
896, 897 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969) (reversing and vacating the trial court's advancement
of a case on the trial docket due to defendant's "dilatory foot-dragging" tactics and
refusal to agree to court's view of settlement); Mitchell v. Iowa Cab Co., 294 N.Y.S.2d
749 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968) (reversing the trial court's advancement of the case for
finding that defendants' response of $35,000 to plaintiffs demand for $125,000 was
not realistic).
276. See In re Fee, 898 P.2d 975, 976 (Ariz. 1995) (reviewing settlement judge's
threat that if case did not settle, he would advise the trial judge that the failure to
settle was due to plaintiffs attorneys' "greed").
277. See Peskin v. Peskin, 638 A.2d 849 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (vacating
the judgment entered on a settlement agreement after finding that trial judge had
improperly coerced a defendant suffering from clinical depression into settling).
278. Floyd, supra note 270, at 55 (citing James A. Wall, Jr., Judicial Participation
in Settlement, 1984 J. Disp. RESOL. 25, 38-39). Participants in an empirical study
were asked to identify settlement techniques used by judges to facilitate settlement
and were asked whether they thought each particular technique observed was ethical.
Seventeen of the seventy techniques identified were thought to be unethical. These
included penalizing a lawyer for not settling [e.g., with dismissal or mistrial], threat-
ening the lawyer for not settling [e.g., with dismissal or mistrial], threatening to de-
clare a mistrial if a decision is not returned by a certain time during the time the jury
is deliberating, and transferring the case to another district on the day of the trial, to
force settlement rather than to have the trial far away. See id.
279. See supra notes 255-65 and accompanying text.
280. See infra notes 307-22 and accompanying text.
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This tendency can appear reasonable. A judge's decision to share
his/her negative evaluation of a party's case or strongly urge the par-
ties to settle at a particular amount may not appear very coercive
when such behavior is compared to imposing outright sanctions or
making threats for refusing to settle. Indeed, there is substantial evi-
dence that attorneys prefer judges who share their reasoned evalua-
tions of each party's case. 28 ' A consequence of this, as will be shovm
infra, is that courts do not demonstrate much sympathy for parties
who claim they were coerced into settlement by the judge's aggressive
encouragement to settle or as a result of the judge's attack upon the
strength of the party's legal arguments.
Nonetheless, when a trial judge shares his/her evaluation of a
party's case, the potential for coercion remains. If a party refuses to
accept the judge's evaluation, there is fear that the judge's rulings,
instructions to the jury, and general behavior will be influenced by
the party's refusal to cooperate. 28 2 In addition, parties can be at vari-
ous stages of qualitative psychological development, with very differ-
ent abilities to withstand a judge's disapproval.2 s Under these
circumstances, it is questionable whether the resulting settlement
agreement is an expression of free will. It is also questionable
281. See D. MARIE PROViNE, S'TrLEri ENT STRATEGIES FOR FEDERAL DisTrier
JUDGES 35-36 (1986) (noting that attorneys prefer a settlement judge who points out
evidence or law that attorneys misunderstand or are overlooking); Dale Rude &
James Wall, Judicial Involvement in Settlement: How Judges and LawLyers View It, 72
JUDICATURE 175, 176-77 (1988) (reporting that attorneys prefer judges to inform them
regarding how similar cases have settled and to argue logically for concessions, but do
not prefer judges to share their evaluations of the case with clients or discuss with the
lawyers the high risk of going to trial); see also Stempel, supra note 88, at 971 ("[Iln
my view, the best judges lean toward the evaluative side of the scale.").
282. See Krattenstein v. G. Fox & Co., 236 A.2d 466, 469 (Conn. 1967) ("For a
judge in chambers to solicit or receive the opinion of counsel as to the dollar value of a
court case which he is to hear; to express not only his opinion as to that dollar value
but, after that opinion has been conveyed to a party, to persist in his efforts at settle-
ment by requesting counsel again to convey it to his client; and, on further refusal of
the litigant to accede to the judge's proposal, to hear the case and render judgment is
a procedure which inevitably raises in the minds of litigants, as well as counsel, as it
did in this instance, a suspicion as to the fairness of the court's administration of
justice."); Warshawsky, supra note 267, at 371 (arguing that, because a judge ulti-
mately may make a decision on the merits of a case, his/her evaluations and state-
ments of opinion about the law or facts become opportunities for judicial coercion,
while a mediator's substantive suggestions will have no such coercive force).
283. See Jeffrey Seul, How Transformative is Transformative Mediation?: A Con-
structive-Developmental Assessment, 15 OHIo ST. J. Disp. REsOL 135 (1999) (discuss-
ing three most common stages of adult development to assess, from a constructive-
developmental perspective, the ability of transformative mediation to promote indi-
vidual moral development).
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whether a party who agrees to settle due to fear of reprisal is truly
exercising self-determination.
Most of the time, the courts do not perceive evaluation by
judges-even with the unspoken threat of reprisal hanging in the
air-as undermining parties' free will. The following case will illus-
trate the courts' aversion to finding coercion when a judge uses tech-
niques which may be described as "high pressure" or "strong arm"
tactics, but which do not include explicit threats or the imposition of
sanctions. This case and those like it should raise concerns about the
effectiveness of protecting party self-determination simply by pro-
claiming "thou shalt not coerce." Coercion, much like self-determina-
tion, is in the eyes of the beholder.
C. The Judicial Settlement Conference in Associates Financial
Services Company of Hawaii, Inc. v. Mijo
28 4
This case, like Allen v. Leal, involves another set of unlucky par-
ents and their son. Warren Mijo needed capital for his business. In
August, 1987, he persuaded his parents, Roy and Kimie, to put up
their home as security for a mortgage in favor of Associates Financial
Services Company of Hawaii, Inc. (AFSCH). Prior to that time, the
Mijos' home was essentially unencumbered. In 1988, AFSCH
brought an action to foreclose on the mortgage, claiming that the
Mijos owed approximately $134,000. The Mijos counterclaimed and
alleged eight causes of action in connection with the refinancing
agreement.
On October 15, 1991, a settlement conference was held before
then circuit court Judge Thomas Kaulukukui in his chambers.
AFSCH offered to allow the Mijos to execute a new note and mort-
gage for $100,000, while the Mijos demanded that AFSCH pay them
$150,000, wipe the mortgage debt clean, and restore title to their
home. The case did not settle.2 5
Three days before the week for which the trial was scheduled,
the parties' attorneys met for a pretrial conference with the trial
judge, Judge Wendell Huddy. The conference lasted for nearly four
hours. During this time, Mr. and Mrs. Mijo and their son "Waited
outside in the hallway, apparently unaware of the nature or sub-
stance of the discussions in conference."28 6 As noon approached, the
Mijos' attorney "emerged from the conference and informed Warren
284. 950 P.2d 1219 (Haw. 1998).
285. Mijo, 950 P.2d at 1221.
286. Id. at 1221.
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[Mijo] that AFSCH had made an offer to settle the case for $82,500.
[The Mijos' attorney] also advised Warren that 'this would probably
be the best [they] could get, and [they] should take it."'
2 s7
Warren then accompanied the attorney into the judge's cham-
bers. Roy and Kimie, whose home was at issue, continued to wait
outside. In his chambers, presumably in order to persuade Warren
and his parents to accept AFSCH's settlement offer, Judge Huddy
"discussed with Warren the possible damages the jury might award
and recommended to Warren that the Mijos settle."288 Warren later
testified: "[A]t first I felt that since he was going to be the trial judge
the following week and he's the one that's going to decide what's go-
ing to happen, and with my lawyer telling me that this is the best we
can get, I was pretty much pressured to think that's all I could
get."28 9
"Three or four minutes" after they were first told about the set-
tlement and with no opportunity to confer with their attorney, the
Mijos accompanied their son and their attorney into the courtroom
where the case was called.290 Counsel for AFSCH read the terms and
conditions of the settlement into the record. The judge then asked
Roy, Kimie, and Warren a series of questions to determine that they
agreed to the settlement terms, agreed that it was a voluntary settle-
ment, and understood the terms and conditions of settlement.
29 1
In the colloquy between the judge and the Mijos that followed, it
is noteworthy that Roy and Kimie ultimately answered "Yeah" or
"Ivh-hm" at the points when the judge needed something on the re-
cord verifying the existence of the agreement and the Mijos' agree-
ment to the terms and conditions. 292 However, it is just as
noteworthy that the Mijos continually asked questions themselves,
strongly suggesting that either they had not agreed to this settlement
or did not understand it. Their questions went unanswered as the
judge pressed forward with his questions and the responses he
needed for the record:
THE COURT: Roy Mjo, do you understand the terms and condi-
tions? You understand the settlement?
DEFENDANT ROY MIJO: Yeah.
THE COURT: Do you have any questions about the settlement?
287. Id. at 1221-22.
288. Id. at 1222.
289. It also appears that the judge then met "briefly" vith Roy and Kimie, but it
was not clear exactly what was said. Id.
290. Mijo, 950 P.2d at 1225.
291. Id. at 1222.
292. Id. at 1222-23.
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[ROY]: No, I-
THE COURT: About the terms?
[ROY]: No, only thing I want to know is I want to have the low-
est monthly payment, and I could keep up with the payment so
we don't get into trouble like-that we have now.
THE COURT: Do you understand the terms though?
[ROY]: Yeah.
THE COURT: You understand that it's going to be another loan
for $82,500? You understand that?
[ROY]: Yeah, I understand.
THE COURT: And that you understand that it's a 10-percent
interest?
[ROY]: Yeah.
THE COURT: You understand that half the interest is payable,
and the rest is going to be deferred to the end? You understand
that?
[ROY]: Yeah.
THE COURT: And you understand that the period is 15 years or
the death of you and your wife, whichever takes place first? You
understand that?
[ROY]: Yeah.
THE COURT: And you understand that you're giving up any
and all claims against the plaintiff?
[ROY]: Yeah.
THE COURT: Okay. And they're giving up any and all claims
against you and your wife and your son. You understand that?
[ROY]: Yeah.
THE COURT: Is anyone forcing you, putting any kind of pres-
sure, or threatening you to go into this settlement agreement?
[ROY]: What do you mean?
THE COURT: Do you understand the question?
[ROY]: No. I don't.
THE COURT: Are you being forced-is someone forcing you to
go into the settlement?
[ROY]: No.
THE COURT: That's all. And, Kimie Mijo, you understand the
settlement?
DEFENDANT KIMIE MIJO: Not quite.
THE COURT: Okay, what don't you understand about it?
[KIMIE]: Why we have to pay more.
THE COURT: You understand that on this settlement, you're
agreeing to a new loan of $82,500? You understand that?
[KIMIE]: That we owe that much yet?
THE COURT: No, you understand by settling this case, you're
agreeing to a new loan of $82,500, and everything in the past is
being wiped out?
[Vol. 6:1
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[KIMIE]: I think so.
THE COURT: You understand that?
[KIMIE]: (Nods head)
THE COURT: And you understand that this loan-the period of
the loan is 15 years or the death of you and your husband, which
ever happens first? You understand that?
[KIMIE]: Okay.
THE COURT: The interest, 10 percent, you understand that?
[KIMIE]: (Nods head)
THE COURT: Now, the payments, half the interest only with
the balance to come at the end with the principal, you under-
stand that part?
[KIMIE]: (Nods head)
THE COURT: And then you understand that you're giving up
any and all claims that you may have against them, and they're
giving up any and all claims that may have against you? You
understand that?
[KIMEI: Yes.
THE COURT: What I've given you is the general terms of the
settlement. You understand me?
[KIMIE]: Mh-hm.
THE COURT: Is anyone forcing you, putting any kind of pres-
sure, or threatening you to enter into this settlement with the
terms?
[KIMIE]: No.
THE COURT: Thank you. You may have a seat. And, Mr. War-
ren Mijo, you understand the terms and conditions?
DEFENDANT WARREN MIJO: Yes.
THE COURT: Do you agree with those terms and conditions?
[WARREN]: Yes.
THE COURT: Is anyone forcing you, putting any kind of pres-
sure, or threatening you to enter into those terms and
conditions?
[WARREN]: No.
Counsel No. 1 [Mijos' attorney] also stated on the record that he
agreed to the terms and conditions of the settlement. Prior to ad-
journing the session, Judge No. 2 [Huddy] told the parties:
THE COURT: I know you folks are not happy, you know. It's
unfortunate that it came to this situation. But as I indicated,
you know, to you, this is the best under the circumstances. And I
want to thank you folks for coming to court this morning, taking
time and bringing this matter to a settlement. I know both sides
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are not happy. But I think this settlement is best under the
circumstances. 2
93
When the Mijos received the Settlement Documents, they re-
fused to sign them and claimed that they had been pressured by both
their attorney and Judge Huddy into the settlement agreement.
294
AFSCH filed a motion to enforce the settlement.
295
Judge Huddy, the same judge who had presided over the pretrial
conference, heard and ruled on the motion to enforce. The judge or-
dered that the settlement agreement be enforced, finding that: War-
ren Mijo was the "primary mover" and showed "sophistication," the
Mijos relied upon their son, the terms of the agreement were ex-
plained to the Mijos, they testified that they agreed and understood,
and they failed to reject the terms by the trial date.296 On appeal,
Hawaii's Intermediate Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court
erred in enforcing the settlement agreement because Judge Huddy
"had exerted an implied threat upon the Mijos, amounting to duress,
in obtaining their assent to the settlement agreement."297 Accord-
ingly, the ICA vacated the enforcement order and remanded the case
for trial. The Supreme Court of Hawaii granted certiorari.
298
Perhaps surprisingly in light of the facts of this case, the Su-
preme Court of Hawaii ruled that the trial judge had not coerced Roy
and Kimie Mijo into accepting the settlement agreement. Although
the court was careful to note that "[slettlement can be coerced, either
by the power of the parties, by a strong judge in a settlement confer-
ence, or by inexorable trial dates"299 and that "[t]hroughout [the set-
tlement] process, the judge must guard against indirectly coercing a
settlement by 'nudging' or 'shoving' the parties toward a settle-
ment,"300 the court did not find coercion here.
Instead, the court first pointed to the strong judicial policy favor-
ing "the resolution of controversies through compromise or settle-
ment rather than by litigation."301 Second, the court observed that "a
293. Id. at 1222-23.
294. Mijo, 950 P.2d at 1224.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 1224-27.
297. Id. at 1229.
298. See Mijo, 950 P.2d at 1228.
299. Id. at 1228 (citing Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses
and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REv. 485, 505
(1985)).
300. Id. (citing Comment, Let's Make A Deal: Effective Utilization of Judicial Set-
tlements in State and Federal Courts, 72 OR. L. REV. 427, 448 (1993)).
301. Id. at 1230 (citing Sylvester v. Animal Emergency Clinic of Oahu, 825 P.2d
1053, 1056 (Haw. 1992)).
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judge should encourage settlement throughout the case and particu-
larly on the eve of trial. By encouraging the Mijos to settle, Judge
[Huddy] acted completely within the bounds of propriety."30 2 Third
and very significantly, the court could find no evidence of explicit co-
ercion. Judge Huddy had not "overtly made improper threats to influ-
ence the result of the trial had the parties decided to try the case."30 3
Because the court found no evidence of overt coercion, it had to
address the question of whether the judge's evaluation alone consti-
tuted coercion. The court could not bring itself to find coercion, ob-
serving that "[tihe Commentary to Hawaii's Revised Code of Judicial
Conduct, Cannon 3(B)(8) provides that '[a] judge should encourage
and seek to facilitate settlement,' keeping in mind that 'parties
should not feel coerced into surrendering the right to have their con-
troversy resolved by the courts.'"304 The court went on to say that it
did "not agree, therefore, that a judge should refrain from offering his
or her assessment of a case on the eve of trial, solely to avoid the
appearance of impropriety. Such a policy would effectively render
meaningless a judge's role in the settlement process."305 Therefore,
the court held that "[a] judge who is conducting a settlement confer-
ence acts within the bounds of propriety when he [or she] offers his
[or her] assessment of a case as he [or she] understands it and recom-
mends a settlement."30 6
In addition, the court refused to see the MAjos' forced march into
the courtroom or the questioning by the judge on the record as consti-
tuting coercion. Instead, the court reasoned that the Mlijos had never
asked for more time and that the record contained nothing "but af-
firmative responses" by the Mijos to the judge's questions.
30 7
302. Mijo, 950 P.2d at 1230.
303. Id at 1229 (emphasis added).
304. Id at 1229-30. This language from the Hawaii Revised Code is nearly identi-
cal to the Commentary to Canon 3 (B)(8) of ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct
which provides: "A judge should encourage and seek to facilitate settlement, but par-
ties should not feel coerced into surrendering the right to have their controversy re-
solved by the courts." MODEL CODE OF JUDicIAL CoNDucT Canon 3(BL(8) Commentary
(2000). The Canon itself provides: "A judge shall dispose of all judicial matters
promptly, efficiently, and fairly." Id. at Canon 3(B)(8).
305. Mijo, 950 P.2d at 1230 (emphasis added).
306. Id. at 1228 (citing Herzfeld v. J & M Realty Assoc., 542 N.Y.S.2d 374 1N.Y.
App. Div. 1989)).
307. Id. at 1231.
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D. The Court's Aversion to Finding Coercion Unless It Is Overt /
Explicit/Blatant
The Mijo case is not an aberration. Courts generally have re-
fused to find pressure or coercion by judicial officers in settlement
conferences, unless the judicial officers make outright threats or im-
pose sanctions for parties' or attorneys' failure to cooperate by set-
tling.30 8 In other words, the coercion or pressure must be explicit.
For example, courts have not found it coercive when judicial officers
have predicted to unrepresented parties that they will lose their law-
suits and their businesses will be closed, 30 9 or when trial judges have
told stories about other cases "'where the court had attempted to ne-
gotiate settlement but was unable to get the parties to agree and sub-
sequently the court's decision resulted in a substantially lesser award
to the party who objected to the settlement terms."' 310 Similarly,
courts have refused to find coercion when parties have alleged that
the judicial officer presiding over a settlement conference made them
308. This also seems to be true when parties have sought to avoid the enforcement
of a settlement agreement by alleging that their attorneys coerced them into the
agreement. See Fortenberry v. Parker, 754 So. 2d 561 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (af-
firming the result reached by the chancellor, even though the chancellor failed to pur-
sue the client's allegation of coercion by her attorney after the client testified before
him that she did agree to the terms of the settlement and court determined that the
client had authorized the attorney to enter into the settlement on her behalf). But see
Jones v. Feiger, Collison & Killmer, 903 P.2d 27, 34 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) rev'd 903
P.2d 1244 (Colo. 1996) (finding that provisions of representation agreement prohibit-
ing client from unreasonably refusing to settle and permitting law firm to withdraw
in the event of client's unreasonable refusal to settle, together with provision for cal-
culating attorneys fees, were unenforceable).
309. See Cottman Transmission Sys. Inc. v. Metro Distrib., Inc., No. CIV. A. 92-
2131, 1993 WL 481555 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 1993). See also Polin v. Polin, 367 S.E.2d
433, 434 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988) (finding that the trial judge did not engage in coercion
when complaining party expressed reservations on the record regarding one of the
terms of the settlement agreement, and the trial judge commented, "I could hear the
whole thing and you might come out worse when I heard it. I don't know. Or, you
might come out better. But, do you want to accept the agreement?"); Fagala v. Sand-
ers, 488 N.E.2d 1093, 1094 (Ill. 1986) (noting trial judge's statement during settle-
ment negotiations that the defendant was "in a risky position"); Lyons v. Sockwell, 91
A.2d 847 (D.C. 1952) (noting trial judge's pretrial conference remarks that the case
could go either way, that the plaintiff might easily receive nothing, and that plaintiff
should try to settle).
310. Dutton v. Dutton, 713 N.E.2d 14, 17 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998).
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feel that they must make an immediate decision regarding settle-
ment,3 1 ' or when a trial judge has excluded parties' attorneys from
his settlement discussions with the parties.
3'2
The courts often explain their decisions by finding that the com-
plaining party's allegation of coercion, duress, or pressure was not
adequately substantiated and "falls well short of demonstrating by
clear and convincing evidence that [the complaining party] was 'de-
prived of the exercise of... free will.' 3 13 In other words, the courts
are unlikely to brand anything as coercion unless they can "see" it in
the record.
Specifically, courts have pointed to the following justifications in
refusing to find coercion: that the judge made no explicit threats,
314
that the complaining parties' perception of coercion is a "subjective
feeling [that] is fatally conclusory and wholly unsupported by specific
factual averments,"31 5 that the complaining parties are sophisticated
311. See Porter v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 981 F. Supp. 1129, 1132 (N.D. Ill. 1997)
(stating that a party had "'felt pressured by the Magistrate Judge" to enter into the
agreement, because, the party claimed, "'[the judge made me feel like I could not go
home and think about it-that I had to say yes on the spot.'").
312. See Dutton, 713 N.E.2d at 15 (describing a situation in which the judge ex-
cluded the parties' attorneys from four-hour settlement meeting and permitted them
to consult with their attorneys only after the meeting, even though one of the parties
was himself an attorney and the other was not). See also In re Judicial Complaint No.
91-9026, Unreported Memorandum and Order (Chief Judge of the 4th Cir., Sept. 26,
1991) cited in JONA GOLDSCHMnDT & LiSA MILORD, JuDicIL SnTTLNtwur ETmCS:
JUDGEs' GUIDE 44 (1996) (describing a situation in which a district judge told the
complainant that she would receive nothing if she did not accept a settlement offer
that had been made to her, and then convinced complainant's attorney to advise the
complainant that she had to accept the settlement offer).
313. Porter, 981 F. Supp. at 1132. See also Willgerodt v. Hohri, 953 F. Supp. 557,
558 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (finding that the transcript of the proceeding showed that the
magistrate "encouraged the parties to settle but did not unduly pressure or coerce"
defendant who claimed that she was suffering from postpartum depression and was
in an "unstable mental and emotional state").
314. See Cottman Transmission Sys., 1993 WL 481555 at *3. ("[Tihere were no
threats .... ").
315. Porter, 981 F. Supp. at 1132.
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or outspoken and thus could not have been coerced, 316 that the com-
plaining parties failed to raise their concerns in a timely manner,317
or that the complaining parties' agreement to the settlement can be
found in black-and-white in the court record. 318 What is most strik-
ing about these cases is the outrage expressed by courts that a judge's
evaluation of a party's case might permit that party to undo a settle-
ment. In one case where the parties alleged that a magistrate's eval-
uation of their case coerced them into settling, the district court
reviewing the magistrate's conduct wrote:
It would be a travesty of justice if Judges conducting settlement
conferences participated in by parties who were not represented
by counsel but who are competent businessmen would be per-
mitted to walk away from a settlement agreement that was en-
tered into voluntarily and was memorialized on the record
316. See Cottman Transmission Sys., 1993 WL 481555 at *3 (describing a situa-
tion in which defendants were "three sophisticated business executives" who operated
their own transmission repair businesses, owned a majority of the stock in their com-
panies and were presidents of their companies). See also Horton v. Hevia, No. CIV. A.
86-3346-LFO, 1988 WL 12493 at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 5, 1988) (finding that a plaintiff was
not coerced by her attorney into settlement, and observing that the plaintiff "had been
quite outspoken in the prosecution of her claim both in several conferences before the
Magistrate and in correspondence with him... [s]he did not impress [the Magistrate]
as a person who would have agreed to a settlement 'due to coercion of another person,
or if she had felt coerced, would have refrained from informing the Magistrate, espe-
cially when asked directly.'"); Dutton, 713 N.E.2d at 18 (noting the complaining party
is "a forty-eight-year-old well-educated individual").
317. See Porter, 981 F. Supp. at 1129; Rosevear v. Rosevear, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
691; see also Horton, 1988 WL 12493 at *2 ("[I]t is more likely than not likely that [the
plaintiff] could have obtained counsel if she had made known to the Magistrate her
dissatisfaction with [her counsel during the settlement conference].").
318. See Cottman Transmission Sys., 1993 WL 481555 at *3 ("As the record shows
they each agreed to settle upon the terms and conditions which were memorialized in
the Transcript."); Rosevear, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 691.
The transcript at the settlement conference contains no hint of coercion or
duress. To the contrary, Temporary Judge McCreadie took extraordinary
pains to ensure that Carol's agreement was freely, knowingly and voluntarily
given. He specifically asked her about the spousal support issue more than
once. Carol was clearly and expressly given sufficient opportunity to com-
plain or object. If she had truly felt coerced or pressured to agree at the time
of the settlement conference, surely some indication would appear in the re-
porter's transcript.
Id. See also Dutton v. Dutton, 713 N.E.2d 14, 20 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (Waite, J,
concurring) ("the record shows that appellant unhesitatantly [sic] entered into the
settlement agreement. In fact, she swore in open court that she was agreeing to the
settlement terms of her own free will and was not under any type of coercion.").
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before the Judge who conducted the settlement conference in his
court.
3 1 9
It is also noteworthy that, unless the complaining party can
demonstrate that the judicial officer made an outright threat or im-
posed a sanction for failure to cooperate in reaching settlement, the
courts are quite likely to belittle any claims of coercion. 320 Indeed,
courts often describe claims of coercion simply as the expression of
319. Cottman Transmission Sys., 1993 WL 481555 at *4. See also Porter, 981 F.
Supp. at 1131 n.4. The Magistrate Judge who presided over the settlement confer-
ence at which coercion was alleged expressed similar outrage when he stated:
that the settlement was reached 'after an extended settlement conference at
which [attorney for Plaintiffs] client was present and after which time we
went on the record. Everybody confirmed that there was an agreement. I am
not going to let people renegotiate the agreement. There was an agreement.
There is an agreement, and I am going to enforce it.'
Id. (emphasis added); see also Horton, 1988 WL 12493 at *2 (involving claim of coer-
cion by plaintiffs attorney based in part on attorney's response that plaintiff should
"'get another attorney' or words to that effect" when she requested advice regarding
whether to accept a settlement, and acknowledging that: "If this were a criminal case
in which plaintiff was guaranteed by Constitution a right to adequate counsel, it
might be appropriate to set aside a plea of guilty made in the circumstances described
here. However, this is a civil case."). But see G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat
Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 670 (7th Cir.1989) (Manion, J., dissenting) ("where coercion does
succeed in producing a settlement, it is unlikely that success will advance the cause of
justice or the federal courtes image as a neutral forum.").
320. There are a few exceptions under certain extreme circumstances, of course.
In the case of Dodds v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 906 P.2d 1260, 1266-67
(Cal. 1996), the California Supreme Court affirmed the conclusion of the Commission
on Judicial Performance that a judge's settlement-related behavior in four cases con-
stituted "prejudicial conduct." In one of these cases, involving allegations of sexual
harassment, the judge "abruptly and repeatedly interrupted the plaintiff," argued
with the plaintiff, "pressed the plaintiff for a settlement figure," and in response to
such settlement figure "threw up his arms and yelled, 'Get out, it vll not settle.' The
plaintiff cried at the time, and cried again when asked to recount the incident as part
of this [disciplinary] proceeding." The court found these and other acts by the judge to
be "dclearly unjudicial" and bringing "disrepute upon the judicial office." The judge
had argued that his "'assertive' judicial 'style'" enabled him to "effect settlements in
difficult cases." Id. at 1270. But the California Supreme Court responded:
Petitioner's argument betrays an understanding of the judicial role that
places too much emphasis on the efficient disposition of cases and too little
emphasis on the dignity of litigants. The judicial system is not concerned
only with the resolution of disputes. It also permits individuals and entities
to participate in the process by which the state determines to exercise its
power. Thus, due process affords a litigant a right to be heard, 'not only be-
cause he might contribute to accurate determinations, but also because a
lack of personal participation causes alienation and a loss of that dignity and
self-respect that society properly deems independently valuable.' [cite omit-
ted] Even an otherwise just settlement, if imposed summarily and coer-
cively, is likely to disserve justice by leaving the parties with a lingering
resentment of one another and the judicial system.
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"buyer's or seller's remorse"321 or "a 'morning after' effort to retreat
from an agreement now thought to be ill-advised."322 As discussed
earlier, the courts will not permit parties to rescind their agreement
to settle, simply because they have a change of mind or now believe
they made a poor bargain.
The range of "persuasive" tools available to judges and magis-
trates clearly is much broader than the range of tools available to
mediators. Judges have the power to decide cases, assess penalties,
and enforce their decisions. The blatantly coercive nature of these
tools, coupled with the courts' strong preference for settlement,323
may help to explain courts' aversion to categorizing "mere" judicial
evaluation or "mere" suggestions regarding settlement as coercive.
This review of the courts' handling of allegations of coercion suggests
further, however, that courts (and the ethical boards they have ap-
pointed) will find it equally difficult (or perhaps even more difficult)
to view a powerless mediator's aggressive evaluation as coercive. If a
trial judge's evaluation and advocacy for a particular settlement are
not viewed as coercive, it is hard to comprehend how even the evalua-
tive interventions used by the mediator in Allen v. Leal could be
deemed coercive. Under these circumstances, the choice of the draft-
ing committees in Minnesota and Florida to protect self-determina-
tion by repeatedly asserting the importance of this principle and
banning coercion appear well-meaning but doomed.
In order to protect self-determination in mediation, modifications
must be made to the framework within which court-connected media-
tion operates. The next section will discuss and assess the effective-
ness of several possible modifications. It will also identify the
proposal that the author believes is most likely to be effective.
VI. MODIFYING THE FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH MEDIATION
OPERATES IN ORDER TO PROTECT SELF-DETERMINATION
AND PREVENT COERCION
In searching for an effective means of protecting self-determina-
tion, it is important to remember that high-pressure settlement tac-
tics, or muscle mediation, are not effective in a vacuum. Rather,
these tactics derive their effectiveness from the framework within
which they operate. They are effective because: 1) self-determination
321. Rosevear, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 696 n.5.
322. Innis v. Innis, 616 N.E.2d 837, 839 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993).
323. Admittedly, settlement also is the goal of many of the parties who participate
in mediation.
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is now understood quite narrowly as a party's power to choose to
agree or not to agree to a settlement; 2) this narrowed vision is con-
sistent with courts' and attorneys' understanding of parties' free will;
3) courts are eager to enforce settlements and have established a
strong presumption that a settlement reflects the exercise of parties'
free will (or self-determination); and 4) courts require a strong show-
ing to overcome this presumption and generally perceive coercion
only in its most blatant forms.
This suggests that in order to protect parties' self-determination
in mediation-even in the narrower sense-something within this
framework requires modification. What follows are several options,
as well as reasons for favoring one of those options.
3 24
A. Clarifying the Definition of Self-Determination in Mediation
As described earlier, mediation proponents have varying under-
standings of the core principle of self-determination. Part of the con-
fusion is the result of unclear drafting of statutes, rules, and ethical
guidelines. In some statutes, "mediation" is defined as facilitation of
"settlement" while others define it as facilitation of "communication
between the parties" in order to discuss settlement. Different defini-
tions can lead to different perceptions regarding the appropriate goal
324. Some have suggested that it is inevitable that court-connected mediation will
be transformed into the traditional settlement conference and equally inevitable that
the unfamiliar concept of party self-determination will be transformed into the more
familiar and comfortable concept of free will. Although the parties will lose the oppor-
tunity to play the central role in a court-connected dispute resolution process, settle-
ment of their cases will still be achieved. If this co-optation of mediation is inevitable,
it is pointless to worry about protecting a vision of self-determination that is unique to
mediation. For clarity, however, such a court-connected process should be called a
settlement conference, and parties and their attorneys should expect the neutral in
this process to behave much as a judge or magistrate. See SEIIA PuncLL &
HEATHER ANDERSON, JUDGES GUIDE TO ADR 27 (1996), which includes both "media-
tion" and "settlement conference" as alternative dispute resolution process available
in California. A settlement conference is described as:
tTlhe parties meet with a neutral third party to explore settlement options.
Settlement conferences are generally informal, and procedures vary from
neutral to neutral and from dispute to dispute. Neutrals commonly use tech-
niques similar to those used in mediation and neutral evaluation. However,
in a settlement conference the neutral generally takes a more active role in
trying to guide the parties to a resolution. Typically, the neutral makes an
independent evaluation of the case based on knowledge of the law and prior
experience and then seeks to persuade the parties to change positions and
move toward a compromise settlement. The neutral does not render a deci-
sion; the ultimate decision regarding whether and how to resolve the dispute
is left to the parties.
Id. See also Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 53, at 96 (proposing that
mediators offer and distinguish between mediation and neutral evaluation services).
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and role of mediators. Similarly, ethical guidelines seem to define
"self-determination" solely as the ability of a party to decide to agree
or not to agree-making this concept synonymous with free will-
while many mediation proponents view self-determination as some-
thing more.
In response to the concern that the original rich vision of self-
determination is being lost, there may be a need to clarify the defini-
tion of self-determination in statutes, rules and ethical guidelines. It
must be made clear that self-determination is different than parties'
free will and requires more protection than parties' free will has re-
ceived in traditional negotiation or in judicially-hosted settlement
conferences. Specifically, statutes, rules, and ethical guidelines re-
garding self-determination could be rewritten to include: the parties'
active and direct participation, communication, and negotiation;325
the parties' identification and selection of the interests and substan-
tive norms which should guide the creation of settlement options; the
parties' creation of potential settlement options; and the parties' con-
trol over the final outcome. In other words, the definitions should
reference the indicia of party empowerment.
There is reason to suspect, however, that these semantic changes
are unlikely to have much effect 326 and will lead to new questions of
interpretation. For example, questions will arise as to how much di-
rect participation by parties will be considered enough, or how the
system will judge whether a mediator adequately solicited parties' in-
terests and norms, or what will constitute adequate consideration of
parties' interests and norms in the creation of a settlement. Ulti-
mately, it is not clear how this redefinition of self-determination
ought to be enforced.
325. With exceptions for cases in which direct participation is impossible (e.g.,
very large multi-party cases, labor-management negotiations, negotiations over trea-
ties). Notably for many of these categories of cases, representatives participate in the
mediation but the agreement is not final until ratified by those with authority.
326. I should note, however, that some mediators and directors of court-connected
programs believe that, if courts understand the meaning of self-determination in me-
diation, they will enforce it more strictly with mediators (particularly if they are not
attorneys) than they might with judges or magistrates presiding over settlement con-
ferences. See Telephone Interview with Geetha Ravindra, Director of Dispute Resolu-
tion Services for the Administrative Office of the Supreme Court of Virginia (July 19,
1999) (on file with the author). The relationship between the courts and arbitrators
(who often are not attorneys) provides a muddy precedent. Clearly, the courts defer to
arbitrators and their decisions. On the other hand, arbitrators' awards have been
overturned based on partiality under circumstances that would not have led to the
reversal of a judicial decision.
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These are significant concerns and lead to the conclusion that
focusing on changing the language in statutes, rules, and ethical
guidelines is unlikely to succeed in safeguarding self-determination.
B. Clarifying the Definition of Mediation and Self-Determination
By Educating the General Public
Frequently, mediators speak of the need for more extensive and
more effective public education as a means to assure that disputants
understand the mediation process. 327 Such public education would
incorporate a vision of self-determination. The concept of increased
public education has tremendous appeal, particularly for mediators
who are concerned about and wish to serve the public good. But it
ignores the difficulty of reaching a mass audience and delivering a
rather subtle message. To date, mediation has been institutionalized
most effectively by reaching and responding to the needs of society's
professional gatekeepers-lawyers, judges, counselors, therapists,
ministers, managers-who then educate their clients, congregants, or
employees. Obviously, these gatekeepers bring their own profes-
sional biases, which tend to influence the message. 32 It is unlikely
that public education regarding the meaning of self-determination
will ever be able to reach a mass audience effectively. Therefore, this
option also appears unlikely to safeguard self-determination.
C. Clarifying the Relationship Between Self-Determination and
Mediator Evaluation By Educating Mediators
Some mediators believe that the key to safeguarding self-deter-
mination lies in educating mediators in techniques designed to pro-
tect and nurture self-determination. This helps to explain the
number of articles that have been written and sessions that are being
taught regarding effective evaluation by mediators.329 The authors
327. See Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 53, at 95 (suggesting
that courts and mediators educate parties about the facilitative nature of the media-
tion process and non-litigation-bound outcomes of mediation). See also Symposium,
State of the States: CARDOZO ONLINE J. CONFLICT RESOL. (last visited Mar. 30, 2000) at
http'/staging-cardozo.mc.yu.edu/cojcr/stateedit2.html (using a "thought experi-
ment'-the establishment of a high technology "Institute of Dialogue and Justice"-to
suggest desirability of educating the larger public about mediation).
328. See Lande, supra note 62 at 154-55 (describing normative isomorphism).
329. See Marjorie Corman Aaron, ADR Toolbox: The Highwire Art of Evaluation,
14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH CosT LITIG. 62 (1996). See also Marjorie Corman Aaron,
Strategies, Tactics, and Techniques for Effective Evaluation: Conducting Risk Analy-
sis with Parties, General Skills Training Workshop at Conference of the American
Bar Association Section of Dispute Resolution (Apr. 6-8, 1999); Barbara McAdoo, et
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of these articles and the leaders of the workshops are quick to men-
tion the importance of party self-determination in mediation. As a
result, they advocate evaluation designed to "educate" the parties,
not to coerce them into an agreement.
Unquestionably, mediators have much to learn from these arti-
cles and workshops, from research exploring the effect of particular
evaluative tools, 33 0 and from research and articles examining law-
yers' and parties' decision-making.331 By themselves, however, these
workshops, articles, and research projects can do no more than estab-
lish an informed, aspirational standard for mediator conduct. They
cannot regulate mediator conduct or be used directly to protect party
self-determination. Thus, this third option by itself cannot effectively
safeguard self-determination.
D. Modifying the Presumption Against Coercion
Currently, the courts prefer settlement and presume that a set-
tlement agreement represents the expression of free will.3 32 The
al., Could We Discuss What's Good About Evaluative Mediation?, Training Program at
Conference of the Heartland Mediators Association (Feb. 19, 2000).
330. See WISSLER, supra note 136.
331. See Richard Birke & Craig R. Fox, Psychological Principles in Negotiating
Civil Settlements, 4 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (1999); see also Russell Korobkin & Chris
Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Law-
yer, 76 Thx. L. REV. 77 (1997); Michael J. Saks & Robert F. Kidd, Human Information
Processing and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 LAw & Soc'y. REV. 123 (1980-81).
332. It seems quite likely that mediators who are required to testify will affirm the
courts' presumption. In one such case, Olam v. Congress Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp.
2d. 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1999), the court acknowledged this:
[A] mediator might have interests or motives that could affect the accuracy of
his or her testimony in a setting like this. It is safe to assume that mediators
would like their work to be productive or 'successful,' and that some
mediators measure success by whether or not the parties reached a settle-
ment. A mediator who so measures his success might have a vested psycho-
logical interest in testifying that the mediation process led the parties to
enter a settlement contract. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that at
least some mediators want to perceive themselves as both sensitive and
fair-so they would be unhappy if the court found that they had failed to
understand that a party to the mediation was in acute or disabling emotional
distress at the decisive juncture in the mediation, or was mentally incompe-
tent to make the kinds of decisions and commitments the mediator called
upon the party to make. Similarly, we should expect good mediators not to
want a court to find that they had permitted a truly disabled party to sign a
contract under duress, or to execute an agreement whose essentials they did
not understand, or to be unfairly victimized by an obviously more powerful or
sophisticated opponent. So when a party to the mediation claims not to have
understood the document she signed, or to have been emotionally and or
physically incapacitated when called upon to decide whether to enter into an
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party alleging coercion bears the burden of producing enough evi-
dence to persuade the court that the coercion occurred. A party's sub-
jective feeling that he or she did something he or she did not really
want to do is not enough. A fourth option for protecting a richer ver-
sion of party self-determination is to modify the burden of proof that
is borne by the party alleging coercion. 333 First, the burden might be
changed to require only that the party alleging coercion make a show-
ing that satisfies a probable cause standard. A party's subjective
feeling that he or she was coerced, coupled with evidence of a media-
tor's negative evaluation or strong support for a particular settlement
proposal, might be able to meet this standard. If the court found
probable cause, the court could require the mediator to prove either
that he or she did not engage in coercive behavior or that the party's
agreement was free and voluntary.
33 4
This modification obviously would reduce the burden currently
borne by parties alleging coercion, and it would acknowledge that
mediators can engage in effective and coercive manipulation without
making outright threats or imposing sanctions. However, this provi-
sion could have several very unfortunate consequences. Fewer peo-
ple might be willing to serve as mediators if they realized that they
might be forced to prove that they did not coerce parties into settle-
ment. Mediation itself could become the source of much litigation.
agreement, or to have been overborne by her opponent and the circum-
stances, it would not be surprising if one of a mediator's reactions was defen-
sive. A natural reaction by a mediator to such claims would be denial-an
assertion that the mediator would never let something like that happen.
Such a defensive reaction could infect testimony. It also is important to em-
phasize, however, that there is a substantial difference between possibility
and actuality-that possibility and inevitability are quite different things.
Id. at 1127, n.22.
333. Reducing the burden of proof borne by a party alleging violation of self-deter-
mination and/or mediator coercion was the intent of some of the revisions contained in
the 2000 Florida Rules. See Telephone Interview with Sharon Press, Director, Dis-
pute Resolution Center, Tallahassee, Fla (Jan. 10, 2000) (on file with the author).
334. This is loosely patterned after the Florida courts' review of challenges to pre-
nuptial and postnuptial agreements. If such an agreement is determined by the court
to make unfair provision for the challenging spouse, the court adopts the presumption
that the favored party engaged in fraud. The favored party is then required to make a
showing proving that s/he did not engage in fraud. See Casto v. Casto, 508 So. 2d 330,
333 (Fla. 1987); see also supra note 265. Somewhat similarly, in the Older Workers
Benefit Protection Act, Congress provided that if a worker waives her age discrimina-
tion rights and a dispute later arises, the party asserting the validity of the waiver
bears the burden of proving that the waiver was knowing and voluntary. See infra
note 368.
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Finally, it is difficult to imagine how confidentiality could be pro-
tected under these circumstances.335 For all of these reasons, this
option would probably not be most effective in safeguarding self-
determination.
E. Changing the Focus from Coercion to Undue Influence
This article has primarily discussed the contract defense of coer-
cion because Florida's and Minnesota's ethical guidelines have specif-
ically banned coercion and because parties challenging agreements
that have arisen in judicial settlement conferences and mediation
generally have raised the defense of coercion. However, there is an-
other, related contract defense which parties may use to void a con-
tract, and this defense may apply quite well to mediation,
particularly if mediators are considered to have a fiduciary relation-
ship with the parties.3 36 This is the defense of "undue influence," and
the use of this defense offers a fifth option for better safeguarding
self-determination in mediation.
Undue influence is "unfair persuasion of a party who is under the
domination of the person exercising the persuasion or who by virtue
of the relation between them is justified in assuming that person will
not act in a manner inconsistent with his welfare."33 7 Undue influ-
ence has been described as "a milder form of pressure than duress" 33 8
or coercion, "overpersuasion,"339 and "high pressure, a pressure
which works on mental, moral, or emotional weakness to such an ex-
tent that it approaches the boundaries of coercion."3 40 The existence
of a relationship or position of dominance, which helps to explain why
a party's "apparent will . . . [was] in fact the will of the dominant
person,"341 distinguishes the defense of undue influence from the de-
fense of coercion. No showing of use or threats of force is required.
3 42
335. See Olam, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1110.
336. See Nolan-Haley, supra note 136, at 825 n.235 (describing mediators as
fiduciaries).
337. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONRACTS § 177(1) (1979).
338. Id. ch. 7, introductory note.
339. Odorizzi v. Bloomfield Sch. Dist., 54 Cal. Rptr. 533, 539 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966).
340. Id.
341. Id. at 540. See generally Lonnie Chunn, Note, Duress and Undue Influence-
A Comparative Analysis, 22 BAYLOR L. REv. 572, 576-77 (1970).
342. It has also been noted that "overpersuasion is generally accompanied by cer-
tain characteristics which tend to create a pattern," including:
(1) discussion of the transaction at an unusual or inappropriate time, (2) con-
summation of the transaction in an unusual place, (3) insistent demand that
the business be finished at once, (4) extreme emphasis on untoward conse-
quences of delay, (5) the use of multiple persuaders by the dominant side
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Ultimately, the defense of undue influence "affords protection in situ-
ations where the rule... of duress give[s] no relief." 
3
Mediators are supposed to honor, protect, and nurture parties'
self-determination. Mediation-and the mediator presiding over this
process-is supposed to "empower" the parties, "enable" them to be
"ultimate decision makers" and "satisfy" them.3 44 Under these cir-
cumstances, it would be reasonable for parties in a mediation to as-
sume that their mediator has a type of fiduciary relationship with
them. The existence of this relationship could help to explain how
"the free play of a man's will [might be] overborne"34 by a mediator's
repeated and insistent evaluation, even though the mediator made no
threats and imposed no sanctions. All of this suggests that mediator
codes of ethics might be revised to prohibit undue influence by the
mediator and to make it clear that such undue influence will consti-
tute a violation of party self-determination.
Despite the apparent suitability of the defense of undue influ-
ence and the difference between the showings required for coercion
and undue influence, there is cause for concern that in practice,
courts, and ethical boards will not distinguish between these de-
fenses as they work to preserve settlement agreements, particularly
if they find that the settlement agreements are not unreasonable. In-
deed, the recent case of Olam v. Congress Mortgage Co. 34 6 supports
this contention. There, the plaintiff invoked the doctrine of undue
influence as a defense to a settlement agreement reached in a court-
connected mediation. The court required the plaintiff to prove a com-
bination of "undue susceptibility in the servient person and excessive
pressure by the dominating person" and found that even if the plain-
tiffs version of events were true-that the mediation lasted from 9:00
a.m. until 1:00 a.m.,3 47 the end of the session was "hurried,"38 the
plaintiff did not read or understand the settlement document,349 the
plaintiff was in considerable pain and was very hungry,35 0 and the
against a single servient party, (6) absence of third-party advisers to the ser-
vient party, (7) statements that there is no time to consult financial advisers
or attorneys. If a number of these elements are simultaneously present, the
persuasion may be characterized as excessive.
Odorizzi, 54 Cal.Rptr. at 541; see also 01am, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1142.
343. RESTATEmNT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRACTs § 177, Comment and Illustration (b).
344. See Rosenberg, supra note 90, at 467.
345. Odorizzi, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 540.
346. 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1110.
347. See id. at 1142-43.
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plaintiff understood the mediator to raise and "accent" the point that
"if she went to trial and lost she would lose both her homes and be
unable to get them back"351 -her evidence nonetheless "would fall
short of satisfying the test"352 for excessive pressure.
In addition, the option of using an undue influence standard
raises the likelihood of the same unfortunate consequences this arti-
cle discussed when examining the possibility of modifying the burden
of proof borne by parties alleging coercion. Mediation itself, and par-
ticularly the mediator's actions or statements designed to persuade a
party to change her position, will become the cause of litigation. And
Olam demonstrates the difficulty of protecting the confidentiality of
communications and conduct occurring during a mediation session
when the court must determine whether a mediator (or other parties
to a mediation) engaged in undue influence.3 53 Although this op-
tion-prohibiting undue influence by the mediator-has some ap-
peal, its effectiveness is also questionable.
F. Modifying the Presumption that a Mediated Settlement
Agreement is Immediately Binding
Many mediation advocates, including the author, have urged
courts to treat settlement agreements arising out of mediation
processes in precisely the same way that they treat settlement agree-
ments arising out of unassisted negotiation between litigants and/or
their attorneys. Many mediation advocates have bristled at addi-
tional requirements that legislators and courts have imposed upon
mediated settlement agreements before they will be considered en-
forceable, such as requiring that mediated settlement agreements be
in writing,354 requiring stipulations regarding the binding nature of
the agreement, 355 or requiring mediated settlement agreements to be
signed by all parties and their attorneys. 356 Perhaps many
mediators have reacted in this way because they have perceived
351. Olam, F. Supp. 2d at 1142.
352. Id. at 1144.
353. See Olam, 68 F. Supp. 2d 1131-32 (finding that under California law, court
may require mediator to testify regarding communications made in mediation ses-
sion, despite mediation privilege).
354. See Murphy v. Padilla, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 722, 725 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Ryan v.
Garcia, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 158, 162 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
355. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 467.4 (West 1990); see also Haghighi v. Rus-
sian-American Broad. Co., 577 N.W.2d 927, 929 (Minn. 1998) (applying section 572.35
of the Minnesota Statutes, which has since been amended).
356. See Gordon v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., 641 So. 2d 515, 517 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1994).
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these requirements as betraying skepticism-even outright dis-
trust-by legislators, lawyers and judges. As Robert Dingwall re-
cently observed, many mediation professionals have spent years
eagerly "seek[ing] a niche in the shadow of the dominant profession
[e.g., the legal profession], asking only to be recognized as offering a
useful and legitimate supplement to its services."3
57
Perhaps in their eagerness to attain this legitimacy, however,
many mediators have too quickly assumed that the enforcement of
mediated agreements must be made in the image of negotiated agree-
ments. The potentially dangerous consequences of this assumption
can be glimpsed in the fates of Mr. and Mrs. Allen in Allen v. Leal358
and Mr. and Mrs. Mijo in Associates Financial Services Company of
Hawaii, Inc. v. Mijo.35 9 As shown supra, "self-determination" is not
part of the lexicon regarding the enforcement of negotiated settle-
ment agreements. The standards currently used to determine
whether parties exercised their "free will" in reaching a negotiated
agreement are likely to fall short in protecting the fundamental prin-
ciple of self-determination. Therefore, it may be necessary to embrace
and advocate for a protection that holds court-connected mediation to
a higher standard than traditional negotiation. 360 The protection
that would be most effective is the imposition of a three-day non-
waivable cooling-off period before mediated settlement agreements,
whether oral or written, become binding. This is the sixth and final
option this article will discuss to protect self-determination in court-
connected mediation.
Cooling-off periods are not new. They are used in other contexts
in which it has become clear that high pressure sales tactics are being
357. ROBERT DiNGWALL, Divorce Mediation as a Social Movement in SoCIOLOGY OF
LAw, SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND LEGAL POLICY 371 (1999).
358. See supra Part I.A.
359. See supra Part V.C.
360. There are some who will object that rather than holding mediation to a
higher standard, we should change the standard that applies to traditional bilateral
negotiations and negotiations occurring within judicially-hosted settlement confer-
ences. See Telephone Interview with John Lande (Mar. 10, 2000). This suggestion is
intriguing but beyond the scope of this article. In addition, there certainly is prece-
dent for the concept that particular contexts can require more stringent ethical stan-
dards. For example, Rule 4.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct may require
attorneys to make more extensive disclosures in transactions to which federal securi-
ties laws apply than in sales of more common goods under the Uniform Commercial
Code. See Peter Jarvis & Bradley Tellam, A Negotiation Ethics Primer for Lawyers,
31 GoNz. L. REv. 549, 553 (1995-96); James White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical
Limitations on Lying in Negotiation, AM. B. FouND. REs. J. 926, 929 (1980).
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used to persuade unwilling parties to "manifest" their "assent" to con-
tracts. For example, in the home solicitation context, because legisla-
tors and regulators concluded that "in a significant proportion" of
these sales, "consumers [had been] induced to sign a sales contract by
high pressure techniques,"361 they decided to provide consumers
with a three-day cooling-off period during which they have the unilat-
eral right to rescind their purchase agreements without penalty.
36 2
As one court explained: "no longer subject to the hypnotic power of
the pitchman in his home, [the consumer] may act on sober second
thought about the wisdom of making the purchase or hiring the ser-
vices on the terms agreed to."
3 63
Cooling-off periods have been applied in other contexts as well.
Many state legislatures have enacted "consumer-oriented" 364 stat-
utes providing either seven or fifteen-day cooling-off periods before
agreements to purchase condominiums become binding.36  The U.S.
Congress has imposed a twenty one-day cooling-off period before
older workers may enter into agreements to waive age discrimination
rights,366 "reflect[ing] concern about the conditions (of knowledge and
free choice) surrounding the making"367 of such contracts. When
such waivers are contained in settlement agreements, the older
worker must be given a "reasonable period of time within which to
consider the settlement agreement."368 Cooling-off periods have even
361. U.C.C.C. § 2.501 cmt. 1 (1968).
362. See 16 C.F.R. §§ 429.1, 429.2 (1999); U.C.C.C. § 2.502(1) (1968); U.C.C.C.
§3.502(1) (1974); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.710 (West 1990); NEB. REV. STAT. § 69-1603(1)
- 1605 (1996); N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAv § 425, 427, 429 (McKinney 1992); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 25A-39(a) - 40 (1999).
363. Donaher v. Porcaro, 715 N.E.2d 464, 466 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999).
364. See Enfield v. FWL, Inc., 607 A.2d 685, 689 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1991).
365. See UNIF. CONDOMINIUMi ACT (1977, amended 1980) § 4-108; N. M. STAT. ANN.
§ 47-7D-8 (A) (Michie 1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.503(1)(a)(1) (West 1988). These
have been designed to "protect the public in general from high pressure . . . sales
situations [bly allow[ing] the purchaser to review or check out the contents of the
prospectus or offering statement ... to seek the advice of an attorney, or simply to
reconsider the decision." Asbury Arms Dev. Corp. v. Florida Dep't of Bus. Regula-
tions, 456 So. 2d 1291, 1293 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 1984).
366. The Act requires that older workers have at least twenty one days to consider
the agreement and further provides that, after the execution of the agreement, the
older worker may revoke the agreement for a period of at least seven days and the
agreement does not become effective or enforceable until after the revocation period
has expired. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(F)-(G) (1994).
367. Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422, 432 (1998) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
368. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(2)(B)(1994). Furthermore, if a dispute later arises, the
party asserting the validity of the waiver bears the burden of proving that the waiver
was knowing and voluntary. See id. § 626(f)(3).
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been applied to particular types of mediation. In Minnesota, for ex-
ample, a mediated settlement agreement between a debtor and credi-
tor is not binding until seventy two hours after it has been executed
and during this time either party may revoke the agreement.
369
Cooling-off periods have been introduced when it is known that
high pressure tactics are being used with some frequency, when there
are concerns that the people subjected to such behavior are not truly
exercising free choice in entering into agreements, and when it is not
possible to regulate effectively the use of high pressure tactics.
Under these circumstances, the introduction of a cooling-off period
serves as an effective antidote to high pressure tactics, both because
the cooling-off period protects those who have already been subjected
to high pressure tactics and because the threat of easy rescission
makes it less likely that rational actors will choose to use high pres-
sure tactics (thus producing a "normative shift"370 in behavior). In
the mediation context, both of these likely effects suggest that the
introduction of a cooling-off period represents an effective means to
protect the important principle of party self-determination.
It is fairly easy to anticipate the objections to this proposal.
Some will argue that a mediator-even a mediator using "muscle me-
diation" tactics-cannot be compared to a "pitchman" in a home solic-
itation sale. These critics will point out that in the home solicitation
context, consumers unexpectedly confront salespeople on their door-
steps and, as a result they have "not yet prepared [themselves] for
the negotiation process or braced [themselves] for the possibility of
high-pressure sales tactics. The consumer is therefore in a uniquely
vulnerable position and is susceptible to an unwanted sale."3 7 1 In
contrast, parties in a mediation generally plan for the process, are
accompanied by their lawyers and travel to a courthouse or office
building.
369. See hMN. STAT. § 572.35(2) (1988). See also F"A. FA iLY L. R. P. 12.7401flt1)
(providing for a ten day cooling-off period for agreements reached in family mediation,
if attorneys do not accompany parties); CAL. INS. CODF § 10089.82(c) (West 2000) (pro-
viding a three day cooling-off period for insured to rescind mediated agreement
reached regarding earthquake insurance disputes, provided that insured was not ac-
companied by counsel at the mediation and the settlement agreement is not signed by
her counsel).
370. My thanks to Christopher Honeyman for his thoughts regarding the likeli-
hood of this "normative shift." See E-mail from Christopher Honeyman, President,
CONVENOR Dispute Resolution Consulting, to Nancy Welsh (Aug. 10, 2000,
16:45:00) (on file with author).
371. Brown v. Jacob, 454 N.W.2d 226, 230 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (Griffin, P.J.,
dissenting). The reasoning in this dissent was later adopted in Brown v. Jacob, 476
N.W.2d 156, 157 (Mich. 1991).
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Initially, these may appear to be worthwhile distinctions be-
tween the average court-connected mediation and the average home
solicitation sale. Yet, we must remember that some mediators do not
just view themselves as "educating" parties regarding their options;
rather, these mediators describe their task as "selling" a settlement
proposal.37 2 The distinction between such a mediator and a "pitch-
man" may be difficult to draw. Further, we must remember that
many litigants do not voluntarily travel to the courthouse or an office
building for their mediation; they are ordered to participate in the
process. Beyond this, mediation has often been described to these lit-
igants as a process that will "promote mutual respect"373 while also
"empowering" them and allowing them "to reach agreements that
take into account important facts that are often ignored in judicial
decision making."374 These descriptions are unlikely to prepare par-
ties for the tactics of the muscle mediator.
Another set of objections is likely to center on the practicality of
this proposal. For example, there may be problems with a cooling-off
period if a court-connected mediation occurs on the eve of trial. Of
course, there are circumstances that demand exceptions to the gen-
eral rule. In the home solicitation context, the cooling-off period does
not apply if a buyer makes a written request for immediate delivery
of goods or services and the seller substantially begins performance of
the contract in good faith, and in the case of goods, they cannot be
returned to the seller in substantially as good a condition as when the
buyer received them.3 7 5 Similarly, here, if the parties enter into an
agreement in mediation less than three days before trial, both parties
immediately inform the court that the case has been settled and the
court then removes the case from its trial calendar, perhaps the cool-
ing-off period should not apply. Careful thought and drafting could
respond to this concern.
Another exception may be required when the parties in a media-
tion are sophisticated businesspeople who have been involved in
court-connected mediation several times, are represented by very
able counsel, knowingly selected a mediator known for his "muscle
372. See Diane Smith, Mediation: New Rules and New Rights, 40 ORAGE COUNrY
LAWYER 16, 47 (1998) (describing essential mediator skills, including "the ability to
evaluate risks and sell solutions that may only be 'better than we might otherwise
have received'").
373. 1992 FLA. RULES, supra note 144 at R. 10.060.
374. Rosenberg, supra note 90, at 467.
375. See U.C.C.C. § 3.502(5) (1974).
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mediation" tactics, and wish to be bound immediately by any settle-
ment agreement they reach. We may again refer to the home solicita-
tion context for guidance in responding to these circumstances.
There, legislators and regulators defined "home solicitation sales" to
differentiate between the "types of transactions which have been the
subject of particular abuse and those which have not."3 76 They were
less concerned about the likelihood of coercion if the buyer had al-
ready established a relationship with the seller by having a pre-ex-
isting open-ended account or had previously negotiated with the
seller regarding the disputed transaction at the seller's business es-
tablishment. Therefore, the cooling-off period did not apply in these
cases.3 7 7 Similarly, it may be possible to craft reasonable exceptions
to a cooling-off provision for court-connected mediation for the types
of parties and circumstances described above.
By far, however, the most significant objection to the imposition
of a cooling-off period is that it would permit parties to back out of
agreements much more easily, possibly based only on buyers' or sell-
ers' remorse. This could reduce mediation settlement rates3 7 v which
may, in turn, lead to reduced use of mediation. This concern squarely
raises the challenge of "walking the talk" of self-determination. If
self-determination-not settlement-is the fundamental principle
underlying mediation, the benefits provided by this cooling-off propo-
sal clearly outweigh the possible risks. First, a cooling-off period-
unlike many of the other options discussed supra-is relatively
straightforward, easily-administrable, and unlikely to invite litiga-
tion and/or intrusions upon the confidentiality of mediation.
Much more importantly, however, this option would reward
mediators who view their role as primarily facilitative and penalize
mediators who use techniques designed to force an agreement.
Mediators who use facilitative techniques are more likely to build
parties' investment in and likely compliance with a settlement that
they view as theirs, an expression of their self-determination. The
376. U.C.C.C. § 3.501 cmt. 2 (1974).
377. See U.C.C.C. § 3.501 and cmt. 3 (1974).
378. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, it would be quite helpful to
gather empirical data to determine the likelihood of this feared result. In Florida,
where there is a ten day cooling-off period provided for agreements reached in family
mediation if attorneys do not accompany the parties, anecdotal evidence and a pau-
city of reported appellate cases suggest that very few agreements have been re-
scinded. See E-mail from Sharon Press, Director of Dispute Resolution Center, to
Nancy Welsh (September 5, 2000, 08:28:21) (on file with author). More data might be
available in other contexts where mediated agreements are already subject to cooling-
off periods or where mediated agreements require ratification before they become fi-
nal (e.g., collective bargaining agreements, treaties). See supra note 369.
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parties will be less likely to rescind their agreements during the cool-
ing-off period, even if they may do so without penalty. Evaluation
will be one of the tools in these mediators' toolboxes but they will
have an incentive-keeping their settlements-to use this tool so
that it supports (rather than threatens) party self-determination.
The cooling-off period will discourage mediators' coercive use of eval-
uation, or muscle mediation, because these behaviors would be more
likely to result in parties' repudiation of their agreements.
How might a cooling-off period influence the conduct of a media-
tor who is trying to help the parties reach settlement in a case like
Allen v. Leal? Of course, answering this question requires pure spec-
ulation. Yet it is quite possible that the mediator who knows that the
parties have a brief period of time within which they can rescind
their agreement without penalty will spend substantial time probing
for and developing an understanding of the concerns and goals of the
grieving parents, the police and the representatives of the city. The
mediator may ask the parties to communicate directly with each
other regarding the impact of the young man's death upon their lives.
The mediator will ask the parents, the police and the city to partici-
pate in crafting meaningful, creative settlement terms that respond
to their most important concerns. If the mediator shares his evalua-
tion of the parties' legal case, he will do so only in response to their
request for this type of input and he will focus on educating the par-
ties, rather than on persuading them to accept his view of the case. If
he perceives that any party is entering into an agreement because he
or she feels forced to do so, he will pause and explore this with the
party. Ultimately, all of the mediator's interventions will be designed
to build the parties' comfort with and investment in the settlement
they reach in order to forestall the possibility of rescission during the
subsequent three-day cooling-off period.
If a cooling-off period has the effects posited above, this option 379
will be quite effective in reducing coercion and, as importantly, in
protecting both the narrowed understanding of self-determination
and the understanding that first inspired many to join the contempo-
rary mediation movement.
CONCLUSION
Self-determination has been identified as the fundamental, core
characteristic of the mediation process. Nonetheless, this article has
379. This could be complemented perhaps with education of mediators in how to
use evaluation to aid party self-determination. See supra at Part VI.C.
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attempted to demonstrate that the existence and meaning of self-de-
termination cannot be taken for granted. Indeed, current trends in
the institutionalization of court-connected mediation are challenging
courts and mediation advocates to clarify the meaning of "self-deter-
mination" and to develop effective mechanisms to protect it. If medi-
ation advocates and courts fail to develop these mechanisms, the
concept of self-determination will become a largely irrelevant relic
from the early days of the contemporary mediation movement. On
the other hand, if courts and mediation advocates act now to define
and protect self-determination, mediation may yet become a process
that is qualitatively different and better than the traditional dispute
resolution processes found within the courts. The days of romance for
mediation advocates and the courts are not over380 but, as with most
relationships, we must be willing to make the choices and undertake
the work required to keep the flame alive.
380. See Menkel-Meadow, Ethics, supra note 17, at 408 ("The romantic days of
ADR appear to be over"); Lela P. Love, Mediation: The Romantic Days Continue, 38 S.
TEX. L. R. 735, 743 (1997) ("The romantic days of mediation continue because the
paradigm it embodies, its underlying values and vision, are as compelling and laden
with potential as ever.").
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APPENDIX
The Evolution of Florida's Rule On Party Self-Determination
1992 Version
Rule 10.060
(a) Parties Right to Decide. A mediator shall assist the parties in
reaching an informed and voluntary settlement. Decisions are to
be made voluntarily by the parties themselves.
(b) Prohibition of Mediator Coercion. A mediator shall not coerce or
unfairly influence a party into a settlement agreement and shall
not make substantive decisions for any party to a mediation
process.
(c) Prohibition of Misrepresentation. A mediator shall not intention-
ally or knowingly misrepresent material facts or circumstances in
the course of conducting a mediation.
(d) A Balanced Process. A mediator shall promote a balanced process
and shall encourage the parties to conduct the mediation deliber-
ations in a non-adversarial manner.
(e) Responsibility to Nonparticipating Parties. A mediator shall pro-
mote consideration of the interests of persons affected by actual or
potential agreements who are not represented at the bargaining
table.
(f) Mutual Respect. A mediator shall promote mutual respect among
the parties throughout the mediation process.
First Draft
Rule 10.031
(a) Decision-making. Decisions made during a mediation are to be
made by the parties. A mediator shall not make substantive deci-
sions for any party. A mediator is responsible for assisting the
parties to reach informed and voluntary decisions while protect-
ing their right to make decisions for themselves.
(b) Coercion Prohibited. A mediator shall not coerce or improperly
influence a party to make a decision or continue participating in
mediation if the party is unwilling to do so.
(c) Professional or Personal Opinions. A mediator shall not attempt
to interfere with a party's self-determination by offering profes-
sional or personal opinions regarding the outcome of the case.
(d) Misrepresentation Prohibited. A mediator shall not intentionally
or knowingly misrepresent material facts or circumstances in the
course of conducting a mediation.
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(e) Postponement or Cancellation. If a party is unable to exercise the
right of self-determination for psychological, physical or other
reasons, a mediator shall postpone or cancel mediation until such
time as all parties are willing and able to resume.
Final Draft and Adopted Rule
Rule 10.310
(a) Decision-making. Decisions made during a mediation are to be
made by the parties. A mediator shall not make substantive deci-
sions for any party. A mediator is responsible for assisting the
parties in reaching informed and voluntary decisions while pro-
tecting their right of self-determination.
(b) Coercion Prohibited. A mediator shall not coerce or improperly
influence any party to make a decision or unwillingly participate
in a mediation.
(c) Misrepresentation Prohibited. A mediator shall not intentionally
or knowingly misrepresent any material fact or circumstance in
the course of conducting a mediation.
(d) Postponement or Cancellation. If, for any reason, a party is una-
ble to freely exercise self-determination, a mediator shall cancel
or postpone a mediation.
The Evolution of Florida's Rule on Professional Advice or Opinions
1992 Rules
Rule 10.090
(a) Generally. A mediator shall not provide information the media-
tor is not qualified by training or experience to provide.
(b) Independent Legal Advice. When a mediator believes a party
does not understand or appreciate how an agreement may ad-
versely affect legal rights or obligations, the mediator shall advise
the participants to seek independent legal counsel.
(c) When Party Absent. If one of the parties is unable to participate
in a mediation process for psychological or physical reasons, a me-
diator should postpone or cancel mediation until such time as all
parties are able and willing to resume. Mediators may refer the
parties to appropriate resources if necessary.
(d) Personal Opinion. While a mediator may point out possible out-
comes of the case, under no circumstances may a mediator offer a
personal or professional opinion as to how the court in which the
case has been filed will resolve the dispute.
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First Draft - Option One
Rule 10.037
(a) General Prohibition; Exception. A mediator shall not provide pro-
fessional advice or opinions. However, a mediator may provide
information about the process, draft proposals, point out possible
outcomes of a case, and help parties explore options.
(b) Independent Legal Advice. If a mediator determines that a party
does not understand how an agreement affects legal rights or ob-
ligations, the mediator shall advise the party of the right to seek
independent advice.
First Draft - Option Two
Rule 10.037
(a) Limitation on Information or Advice. A mediator may provide in-
formation or advice that the mediator is qualified by training or
experience to provide. However, in providing professional advice
or information, a mediator shall not violate impartiality or self-
determination of the parties.
(b) Independent Legal Advice. If a mediator determines that a party
does not understand how an agreement affects legal rights or ob-
ligations, the mediator shall advise the party of the right to seek
independent advice.
Final Draft and Adopted Rule
Rule 10.370
(a) Providing Information. Consistent with standards of impartiality
and preserving party self-determination, a mediator may provide
information that the mediator is qualified by training or experi-
ence to provide.
(b) Independent Legal Advice. When a mediator believes a party
does not understand or appreciate how an agreement may ad-
versely affect legal rights or obligations, the mediator shall advise
the party of the right to seek independent legal counsel.
(c) Personal or Professional Opinion. A mediator shall not offer a
personal or professional opinion intended to coerce the parties, de-
cide the dispute, or direct a resolution of any issue. Consistent
with standards of impartiality and preserving party self-determi-
nation however, a mediator may point out possible outcomes of
the case and discuss the merits of a claim or defense. A mediator
shall not offer a personal or professional opinion as to how the
court in which the case has been filed will resolve the dispute.
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